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As one of the major actors on the scene of international politics, 
Russia also impacts the various efforts of arms control, conflict 
settlement and mediation. This pertains to issues such as the Syrian 
conflict, nuclear proliferation in the case of Iran or various conflicts 
part of the post-Soviet space. Success or failure in these efforts has 
considerable significance for the conduct of international relations, 
including Russia’s own standing on the international scene. In 
particular, the approach adopted has impacted the chances of 
capitalizing on regionalization as an asset potentially bolstering 
Russia’s weight and influence.
 In addition to outlining the Russian approach to arms 
control, conflict settlement and mediation more generally, the 
various contributions included in the book set out to probe the 
policies pursued in the case of specific conflicts such as those 
unfolding in the Southern Caucasus as well as Moldova. In this 
context the only resolved post-Soviet conflict consists of that 
pertaining to Tajikistan whereas all other may be described as 
‘frozen conflicts’.    
 Particular attention is devoted to the case of Nagorno-
Karabakh and the various efforts to address and settle that conflict. 
Out of the various ‘frozen’ conflicts part of the post-Soviet space, 
it stands perhaps out as the ‘hottest’ one, although competes for 
attention and need of analysis with other conflictual issues in the 
region.
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9ForeWord
It is a widely accepted global norm that the international community 
has a responsibility to facilitate and support peace processes to 
prevent the continuation of conflicts and humanitarian crises. Thus, 
peace diplomacy and mediation has become one of the priority 
areas of the Finnish foreign policy agenda today. Conflict resolution 
and peace diplomacy, for Finland, is both a goal in itself and an 
opportunity to gain a role in constructive global politics.
Finland has actively contributed to creating mediation capacities 
within different international and regional organisations, including 
the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe and the European Union. In these efforts, one goal is to 
raise awareness of the importance of mediation in conflict prevention 
and resolution. 
Each conflict situation is unique by itself and there is no one 
model for organising an effective mediation effort. Nevertheless, 
in each case, useful lessons can be gained from past and ongoing 
experiences of different parties.
As a way to increase awareness of the Nordic experiences in 
mediation processes, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
supported a project Peace Mediation in Nordic Countries, a 
Comparative Study. The study was conducted by the Tampere Peace 
Research Institute and was published in 2014. The purpose was to 
investigate how mediation is organised in different Nordic countries. 
Is there a particular ‘Nordic model’ for peace diplomacy?
Similarly, it would be useful to know the role of and what type of 
peace diplomacy and mediation is carried by another Finnish neighbour 
— Russia. In this context even the interpretation of mediation as a 
concept may differ. Russia has frequently been labelled an unknown 
factor in international relations. What it wants and in which way is 
often questioned. Nevertheless, Russia has played a significant role as 
one of the mediators, for example, in the recent Syrian conflict, as well 
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as in the Iranian nuclear issue. Compared to these efforts, the role of 
Russia in various conflicts occurring within the territory of the former 
Soviet Union has been much more disputed.
Pertti Joenniemi, Senior Research Fellow, Tampere Peace 
Research Institute, was asked to organise a study that would examine 
the types and goals of Russian conflict resolution and mediation 
efforts. Accordingly, he formed a research group consisting of both 
Russian and Finnish researchers and specialists. This report reflects 
the results of their work. 
The individual articles in this report represent the views of 
the respected author only. Each is an independent analysis and an 
account by the authors themselves. 
As an introduction, Joenniemi probes Russia’s approach to 
arms control, conflict settlement and mediation as one aspect 
of the conduct of foreign affairs more generally. He also situates 
arms control, conflict settlement and mediation as part of broader 
changes underway in the sphere of international relations, and aims 
at situating the Russian policies in this changing context. 
Professor Alexander Sergunin describes Russian research and 
academic discussions on conflict resolution and mediation. His article 
explores different Russian social science schools and disciplines in 
this context. The similarities and dissimilarities, as well as inherent 
debates between various approaches, are studied. 
Vadim Romashov, research fellow at Tampere Peace Research 
Institute, contributes by providing insight into the Russian experts 
discussion on arms control and conflict settlement, and in particular 
those pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At large, the 
Russian efforts and the discussion generated by that endeavour, are 
related to the aspiration of creating a security space in the Caucasus 
at large.
Dr Yulia Nikitina focuses her comparative analysis of Russian 
conflict settlement and mediation practices on the wars within 
the post-Soviet space. In particular, she addresses Russian conflict 
resolution strategies in relation to ‘frozen conflicts’ in the Southern 
Caucasus and Moldova, and to the only resolved post-Soviet war 
in Tajikistan. Her analysis also presents some reflections on the 
ongoing crisis in Ukraine and on the Middle East.
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In their study, Research Fellow Vadim Romashov and Professor 
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen cover Russian policies in view of the 
Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. The question they address is how the 
Russian foreign policy interests are met or not met in this conflict 
settlement or non-settlement. 
Ambassador (ret.) Heikki Talvitie investigates Russian foreign 
and security policy needs and demands based on his personal 
experiences as a mediator. He focuses, in particular, on post-Soviet 
conflicts and inherent conflict resolution efforts in South Caucasus 
and Moldova, as well as on the recent crisis in Ukraine. 
Overall, the report illustrates well how the foreign policy interests 
of Russia are met in its conflict resolution and mediation efforts. 
One might not agree with the respected means and goals, but at least 
it is useful to understand the underlying arguments in order to be 
able to address these issues constructively. 
Kimmo Kiljunen
Special Representative for Mediation 
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conFlict resolution and 
arms control as politics: 
the case oF russia
Pertti Joenniemi
introduction
The meaning and weight of armaments, and therefore also that of 
conflict resolution as well as arms control and mediation, is not 
stable. It does not remain unaltered, but varies over time. Arguably, 
the changes have been quite distinct since the end of the Cold War 
with a significant number of previous consistencies undergoing 
change.
One of the crucial changes also impacting efforts at conflict 
resolution consists of alterations in the pattern of wars and conflicts. 
In the first place, a quite significant decline has occurred in the 
number of wars and deadly conflicts over the last two decades. 
Above all, major power political wars have lost their meaning and 
are no longer seen as serving any rational purpose. In addition, there 
has been a reduction in the intensity and utility as well as the impact 
of wars in terms of victims, and it also appears that the classical 
distinction of wars between states and intra-state wars has largely 
collapsed. 
If nonetheless upheld, it seems that the proportion of intra-state 
conflicts to interstate conflicts has markedly grown. The latter consist 
either of civil wars, in which at least one of the warring parties is 
the government of a state, or battles between two or several armed 
groups of which none is the government of a state. In addition, wars 
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and violent conflicts have become quite asymmetrical in nature due 
to a basic shift in the relationship between states and societies in the 
use of force. There is, thus, the presence of both states and actors 
beyond state control with formal as well as informal elements co-
existing and being intertwined. 
Furthermore, with even small groups wielding large powers of 
destruction, there has been a decline in the monopoly of coercive 
power that was previously held by the states. In general, it also appears 
that territorial sovereignty as a norm guiding the conduct of violence 
has become less sacrosanct than it used to be, although the issue 
remains highly divisive also among the major states. In any case, the 
normative ground of the policies pursued has changed, as indicated 
among other things by the fact that international organizations, 
above all the UN, have also in some instances contributed to military 
interventions. They may do so once the aim can be defined as that 
of halting genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Importantly, the practice of intervention no longer stands 
out as it used to as a practice of statecraft reserved merely for the 
great powers, but serves increasingly as a tool employed also by 
international society at large. It also follows then that sovereignty is 
less associated with control of a particular territory and is instead 
increasingly viewed as a responsibility for maintaining and managing 
control in accordance with particular values and criteria. 
Overall, wars and deadly conflicts – instead of being fought as a 
regular war through mass mobilization – seem to have become rather 
hybrid. The fight against non-state terrorism is a case in point. The 
‘new’ wars and conflicts tend to elude any clear-cut categorization, 
and it has become increasingly difficult to identify the root causes 
of conflict for these then to be remedied even by broadly supported 
international measures of conflict management and peace-building. 
To be certain, the various changes in the causes, dynamic, and type 
of actors as well as the consequences of wars rather profoundly impact 
the opportunities and ways of establishing peace. Among other things, 
the traditional role of state diplomacy has been under pressure, and 
has thus been complemented if not superseded by other approaches. 
In general, various forms of ‘soft’ power seem to have increased at 
the expense of the traditional ‘hard’ ones. This change includes the 
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fact that the various material forms of power, including arms, do not 
translate into political power in the way they used to. While some 
of the established approaches such as nuclear control and efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear capabilities remain valid, there are 
nonetheless also considerable discontinuities present. Among other 
things, far more attention has been paid to the local conditions as 
exemplified by the fact that peace mediation between the parties has 
grown in significance and also various forms of national dialogues 
have proliferated and turned into an approach frequently employed in 
the search for broadly acceptable solutions to conflicts.
In order to situate these changes and provide an insight into 
the various broader patterns of change present in the sphere of 
international relations, and hence also impacting the efforts of 
settling conflicts as well as arms control, I will initially draw on 
the work recently carried out by Barry Buzan and George Lawson.1 
The developments discernible in the policies pursued by Russia in 
the sphere of conflict resolution and arms control are then explored 
against the backdrop of the various arguments advanced by Buzan 
and Lawson pertaining to the key changes underway in the sphere 
of international relations. The key question addressed consists of 
the changes discernible in Russia’s reading of conflict resolution and 
arms control as a particular sphere of politics. In particular, the aim 
here is to probe Russia’s ability or inability to adapt to the changes 
presently also underway in both of these spheres as a consequence 
of global transformation.
towards increasingly de-centred 
international relations
In probing thoroughly the main contours of international relation 
over a longer period of time, and in particular the unfolding of the 
current international system, Buzan and Lawson note that there is 
considerable change in train. The post-1945 system, which consisted 
1 See Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2015), The Global Transformation. 
History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
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of a hegemonic core-periphery, one labelled by the authors as “the 
Western global international order”, is eroding and being substituted 
by “decentred globalism”. In essence, the change consists of the 
power cap that has been there mattering less. It may actually erode 
altogether. This is the case as the core expands with the differences 
between the former core and periphery evening out, they assert. 
Overall, the configuration that marks the global transformation – 
with a critical juncture consisting of the economic crisis in 2008 – is 
no longer concentrated on a small group of states, but is increasingly 
dispersed (274).
Buzan and Lawson further claim that, rather than standing for a 
rupture and reflecting a decisive break-through, for example in the 
field of technology, the outcome is premised on a continuation and 
an intensification of some earlier trends. The international system 
will remain highly interdependent and is likely to become even more 
so, the authors contend. Generally speaking, more states and peoples 
will acquire the configuration of power associated with global 
modernity. The core will, they argue, become bigger in absolute as 
well as relative terms, and it will also be less Western (275). 
In general, the West will arguably lose its privileged position 
within international society and in consequence a wider dispersion 
of power implies that no single polity will be able to dominate 
international society. The level of capability sustaining such a 
position is no longer possible, the authors conclude, as their claims 
concerning the right to global leadership no longer rest on the vast 
superiority the West enjoyed during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This then also implies that the position of the US will 
become more relative, although “no state will be able to replace the 
US as a sole, or even second, superpower” (276).2 In sum, the world 
of decentred globalism will consist of several great powers and many 
regional powers, although it will not have any superpowers. Various 
Asian countries, and in particular China, will move closer to the 
core, whereas the authors are of the view that parts of Southern and 
Eastern Europe will remain relatively underdeveloped compared to 
the more globally distributed leading edge (277).
2 For a somewhat different view, see Joseph S. Nye (2015), Is the American 
Century Over? Cambridge: Polity.
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A crucial aspect of decentralization consists of the growing 
eminence of regionalization as already evidenced by the standing 
of polities such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, CIS, Mercosur, AU 
and SADC on the current-day international scene. Some regions, 
most obviously the EU and North America, already possess 
robust international organizations and practices that mediate such 
aspirations. Other regions, such as South America and Southern 
Africa, South Asia and the Middle East contain only thin institutional 
frameworks (293). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
with Russia at the core undoubtedly belongs to this latter category 
of formations.
Regionalization is also spurred by the fact that the great 
powers are inclined to invest in such configurations in order to 
gain their own local spheres of influence. Regional configurations 
may, Buzan and Lawson note, serve as bastions for retaining 
local distinctiveness, although they may also serve as fall-backs 
if global cooperation weakens, as well as platforms from which 
to practice pluralist international relations more effectively (302). 
In short, the great powers need to pay as much attention to their 
regions as to each other. They should prioritise the creation of 
stable, consensual and legitimate regional international societies, 
“although some, like Russia, might seek to construct regional 
hegemonies” (303). 
The authors also posit that regionalization may actually figure as 
prominently as globalisation at large due to the lack of superpowers 
as well as a relatively wide distribution of power in the sphere of 
international relations (302). They note that it is driven by factors 
such as anti-hegemonic sentiments, increasing capacities held by 
formerly peripheral states, diversities in the way that capitalism is 
implemented and conducted as well as a sustained lack of consensus 
about issues as varied as human rights, freedom of sexual orientation 
and the role of religion in public life (291). All these factors 
contribute to the prominence of regional formations in current-day 
international relations. 
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changes in the modes of power
As to the divisions present in international relations, the authors 
note that the ideological global bandwidth has been narrowed 
down to a significant degree. Capitalism has won out, although 
at the same time remaining politically quite diverse. Buzan and 
Lawson therefore find reasons to distinguish between two types of 
democratic capitalism, liberal and social democratic, and they also 
differentiate between two ideal-types of authoritarian capitalism by 
drawing a distinction between competitive authoritarian and state 
bureaucratic capitalism (282). At the same time, they note that many 
states are hybrids in containing features drawn from more than 
one of these categories. For example, contemporary Russia forms 
a mixture of state bureaucratic and authoritarian capitalism, they 
maintain (283). 
Overall, the various distinctions notwithstanding, capitalism has 
turned into a near universal feature of contemporary international 
society, and there is, they note, therefore less space for any profound 
and system-based cleavages. This is so as almost all states organize 
their economy through market logics and take part in shared global 
regimes around trade, production and finance. In order to gain 
influence in an international context, states are obliged to compete 
on the international market, and also orient their economies not 
just towards trade in raw materials and industrial production, but 
also around information and services (284). And, what is crucial, 
the more or less universal acceptance of the market contributes to 
a shared international order, the authors note, and the operation of 
a global market then also creates pressures for shared standards in 
fields such as accounting, banking and monetary policy, trade and 
corporate governance. To some extent, transparency is necessary 
for markets to function effectively (290). The shared logic does, 
however, not axiomatically lead to stable international order, as the 
competition between the varieties of capitalist governance is likely 
to be with us for some time, Buzan and Lawson concede (285).
It seems in any case obvious that a rather significant change has 
taken place in the conduct of power. The authors describe it as a 
shift from geopolitics, i.e. territorial competition between states 
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in a military/political mode, towards geo-economic competition 
with the latter category pointing to a “competition for growth in 
an economic/political mode of relations among states where great 
power war is largely ruled out”. They further differentiate between 
soft and hard varieties of geopolitics and geo-economics, with 
hard geopolitics implying that “intentional war is legitimate and 
expected” (285). Soft geopolitics, in turn, points to conditions under 
which “intentional great power war is marginalized, but territorial 
competition and military balancing/hedging remains”. Furthermore, 
the hard version of geo-economics is taken to mean “a zero-sum 
competition for profit within a largely political/economic modality, 
while soft one is defined as consisting of “a mix of zero-sum and 
positive-sum relations within a largely political/economic modality” 
(285–6). 
By pointing to the fact that all the main actors on the current-
day international scene are firmly committed to the existing global 
institutions and regimes centred on issues such as arms control, 
climate change or counteracting terrorism, Buzan and Lawson also 
conclude that the pursuance of zero-sum type of hard geo-economics 
is a remote possibility. It is, in their view, hardly an option, because 
virtually every state is committed to global capitalism. “There is 
little or no reason to think that a world of decentred globalism will 
replay the conflicts of the 1930s, and as a result, a return can be 
ruled out” (286).
While ruling out the hard form of geopolitics, they find the 
pursuance of the soft forms far more plausible. It will be fuelled, 
the authors claim, by inter-capitalist competition: “At its heart, 
capitalism is a hardnosed competition over accumulation and 
profits” (286). Violence may, Buzan and Lawson concede, play a 
central role in the extension and maintenance of markets around the 
world. In addition, authoritarian forms of capitalism can become 
more extreme, abandoning the idea of separation between the 
economic and political spheres, they fear. The increased ideological 
and practical homogeneity prompted by the universalization of 
capitalism may not go sufficiently far in order for the subsequent 
moderation of political differences to stem the soft forms of 
geopolitical rivalry (288–289).
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A yet more likely scenario for tensions, if not openly conflictual 
relations, lies, according to the authors, in the zone of soft geo-
economics in which capitalist powers compete and cooperate with 
each other. The option of soft geo-economics is, in their view, far 
more plausible than the hard one, in particular if a ‘concert of 
capitalist powers’ emerges that is able to manage the inter-capitalist 
interaction. In general, they do not rule out the possibility of inter-
capitalist competition fuelling soft geopolitics, particularly in East 
Asia. This is the case as “at its heart, capitalism is a hard-nosed 
competition over accumulation and profits” (286). 
The decline of the meaning and weight of geopolitics and the 
attendant increase in the eminence of geo-economics implies, in one 
of its aspects, that there is crucial change in the modes of power. There 
is then also a far wider security agenda to be addressed with security 
having shifted from a narrow, contained sphere of military relations 
to a wide, everyday set of concerns. “There is a wider and, in some 
ways, more intrusive security agenda arising from the character of 
modern society itself”, Buzan and Lawson conclude (311). 
initial russian debates
Obviously, Russia has experienced considerable difficulties in 
adapting to the unfolding of international relations as outlined 
above. It was – in the period of the Soviet Union – integrally part of 
the core, but has since moved towards the periphery without being 
able to capitalize on trends pointing towards a less Western-centred 
configuration. Rather than accepting and reconciling itself with 
the dominance of soft geo-economics in current-day international 
relations, Russia has, it appears, been clinging to soft as well as hard 
geopolitics.3 This has been apparent also in the fields of arms control 
and conflict resolution.
3 For an excellent analysis of the Russian approach to arms control and particularly 
nuclear arms control, see Anne L.Clunan (2009), The Social Construction of 
Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University press, pp. 176–202. She relates the approach applied above all 
to Russia’s need to get recognition as a great power and shows the many problems 
that flow from such an approach.
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Yet it is to be noted that the developments since the years of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have been far from 
straight-forward. This is mainly due to the fact that the conceptions 
held by the conservative, liberal and centrist forces on Russia’s 
essence and its position in the sphere of international relations 
deviate significantly from each other. There was broad agreement 
that Russia had to remain a great power, but yet the understanding 
of the concept varied considerably. Whereas the conservatives held 
military power and the recovery of the Soviet Union in high esteem, 
the liberals rejected both of these conceptions, and stressed instead 
the significance of economic recovery as well as the importance of 
working through various international institutions. The centrists, 
for their part, shared the emphasis on economic recovery as well 
as remaining in the orbit of international institutions, but at the 
same time they associated strength with military power and saw the 
recovery of the Union in a rather positive light. The complexities 
pertaining to the discourses containing different ideas about how 
Russia could maintain or regain its great power identity have been 
summarized by Ted Hopf (2005) as follows: 4
Liberal Conservative Centrist
Military Power No Yes Yes
Economic Recovery Yes No Yes
International Institutionalization Yes No Yes
Recovery of the Union No Yes Yes
It is thus obvious in view of the constellations outlined in the summary 
that changes in the internal constellations of power within Russia 
yield quite different foreign and security policies. This is already 
evidenced by the fact that the liberal and conservative discourses 
are exact opposites. As such, the aspiration for a status of a great 
4 For a more detailed description, see Ted Hopf (2005), ‘Identity, Legitimacy, and 
the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities and Military Intervention 
in Abkhazia’. Review of International Studies, 31(1), p. 234
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power figures as a shared departure, but profound disagreements 
exist concerning what it implies, how it is to be aspired for and more 
generally what is the meaning of power in the sphere of current-day 
international relations. 
While the liberals had a fairly strong impact on how Russia 
was understood and what policies to pursue immediately after the 
Cold War, their weight has been significantly reduced over time. 
However, their initial strength contributed to Russia defining itself 
immediately after the demise of the Cold War as being on a par 
with the US, whereas the Soviet Union stood out as the significant 
Other for a return to be avoided. Yet, the liberal understanding 
of Russia as part of a universal civilization and modern liberal 
market democracy remained contested, and their identification 
with the West, and in particular with the US, was far from 
nationally shared. Above all, the conservative forces favoured a 
more traditional line aspiring to a Russia balancing against the 
US and the West more generally, whereas the centrists held more 
Europe-oriented views. 
It general, Russia, at the beginning of the 1990s, was polarized 
between liberal and conservative views, with the liberals stressing the 
importance of making it in the sphere of soft geo-economics, while 
the conservatives stood for a reading premised on the prevalence of 
geopolitics concerning Russia’s essence and the tasks at hand. The 
centrists were really centrist in the sense that their stance consisted of 
incorporating and employing any particular form of power, hard or 
soft, geo-economic or geopolitical, in the endeavours for preserving 
Russia’s position as a great power. 
From pragmatism to defiance
The initial pre-eminence of the liberals turned out to be short-
lived, and they lost their standing largely because of failures on the 
internal scene. The collapse of the Russian economy, rampant and 
rising crime, corruption and violence associated with privatisation 
and democratisation discredited not just the liberal course, but 
these trends also undermined more generally the emphasis on soft 
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geo-economics.5 Externally, and with the increasing dominance of 
centrist voices, Russia was still seen as one among several great 
powers in the multilateral management of global affairs, while 
internally the dominant theme consisted of the disintegrative 
processes occurring within the country, and most graphically, in 
Chechnya.
As to external factors, the liberals were further discredited by 
feelings that Russia was not rewarded for its efforts to be a willing 
ally of the West. NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia intensified 
these grievances significantly, and the fact that it took place without 
consulting Russia further undermined the position of the liberals. 
It also aggravated relations vis-á-vis the West, and in particular 
undermined those with the US. Furthermore, it strengthened in general 
the view that Western intensions were hostile and, more generally, 
that hard geopolitics still forms the essence of international relations. 
Notably, the civic connotations underlying the policies pursued 
increasingly gave way to ethno-nationalist understandings with an 
emphasis on Russia’s Slavic origins, and in this way Russia was also 
viewed as being unique and in a category of its own rather than 
being part and parcel of some broader international constellation. 
Yet, the overall aim throughout the 1990s consisted of restoring 
and maintaining the country’s great power status through economic 
development at home, i.e. the pursuance of soft geo-economics, and 
the empowerment of multilateral international institutions such as 
the Council of Europe and Council for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe abroad.6
5 For a detailed and documented analysis of the trends, see Ted Hopf, “Russia’s 
Identity Relations with Europe, the EU, and the United States 1991–2007, paper 
presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Annual Meeting, 
Pisa 2007: Bobo, Lo (2002), Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, 
Illusion and Mythmaking. New York: Palgrave.
6 For a discursive mapping of the Russian debate in the 1990s, see Ted Hopf 
(2005), ‘Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power 
Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia’. Review of International Studies, 
11(1): 225–243. See also Pål Kolstø (2000), Political Construction Sites. Nation-
Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States. London: Westview Press, pp. 208–13.
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goodbye pragmatism 
The ascendancy of Putin in 1999 initially changed very little. The 
emphasis was very much on ‘pragmatism’ defining Russia’s approach 
in the sphere of foreign and security policies. Russia continued 
to search for recognition as a great power, although there was 
somewhat more stress on recognition in terms of democracy and 
the market economy. As to exterior influences, the terrorist attack of 
9/11 also had a formative impact in Russia in the sense of providing 
the liberals with more credence, whereas the conservatives were for 
a while pushed into the discursive margins. The previous stress on 
multipolarity and counterbalancing the West was traded for efforts 
at returning to the very core of international relations as a close 
partner of the US, albeit this time with the aim of counteracting 
international instability and resisting terrorism, but also of managing 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In general, the aim 
was one of demonstrating that Russia remained an indispensable 
player on the international scene.7 
However, the efforts of establishing a US–Russia alliance turned 
out to be short-lived, in part because the US opted for efforts at 
making itself invulnerable largely through unilateral policies instead 
of relying on broad international cooperation. In addition to engaging 
in the war in Afghanistan in 2002, invading Iraq, supporting the 
colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 
approving a further expansion of NATO, the US chose to aspire 
to invulnerability by investing, among other things, in anti-ballistic 
missile defences. This latter aspiration entailed an abrogation of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. 
In consequence, and despite the efforts at counteracting terrorism 
as well as some measures in the field of nuclear arms control still 
remaining spheres of cooperation between Russia and the US, 
Russia gradually returned to its ambition to remain a great power 
in a multipolar world. Feeling rejected by the US, it searched for 
closer cooperation with various European states, above all Germany 
7 See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Schevchenko (2010), ‘Status Seekers. 
Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’. International Security, 34(4): 
63–95. 
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and France, in trying to moderate and restrain the behaviour of a 
unipolar hegemon. The attempt to remain at least within the broader 
core of international relations was significantly backed up by the 
Europeanness and a generally Eurocentric worldview quite deeply 
embedded in Russian daily life.8 
The main trend, though, has more recently consisted of a gradual 
drift towards an ‘authentic Russia with disengagement from the West. 
This has been accompanied by a rather selective engagement with 
international organizations, including the WTO and G7/8. As such, 
Russia participates in a wide range of international regimes, although 
the density still remains relatively shallow, particularly in the sphere 
of key economic institutions. It may also be noted that the overall 
total institutional and regime memberships remains considerably 
fewer than, for example, that of France.9 Moreover, with various 
value-based and normative approaches increasingly impacting the 
agenda as well as the outcomes in various international organizations, 
Russia has often found it difficult to play along, including various 
issues of conflict resolution. It has instead, on occasion, found it 
necessary to pursue an obstructionist line as exemplified by refusals 
to support the introduction of weapon embargoes or different forms 
of sanctions such as in the cases of North Korea, Iran and Syria. 
Instead of riding along, Russia has tended to wield its influence by 
veto rather than by initiative.
running against dominant trends
Generally speaking, Russia appears to have remained unable to 
capitalize on the trend of increasingly decentred globalism. This 
has been due largely to the increased prominence of centrist and 
conservative departures as well as the demise of the liberal ones in 
8 For a comprehensive treatment of the theme, see Viacheslav Morozov (2015), 
Russia’s Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Europcentric World. 
London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
9 On this, see Iver Neumann, ‘Status is Cultural: Durkhheimian Poles and Weberian 
Russians Seek Great Power Status’, in Paul, T.V., Larson, Deborad and Wohlforth, 
William (eds.), Status in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
109.
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internal Russian politics. In consequence, Russia has then pursued 
externally various self-limiting policies as indicated, among other 
things, by its strong emphasis on the sovereign rights of the state10 
as well as reservations vis-á-vis democracy and human rights if seen 
as universally valid values.11 Moreover, the growing emphasis on 
hard geopolitics at the expense of geo-economic departures has 
contributed to Russia’s marginalization, with various geo-economic 
trends pertaining to integration and increased international 
interdependence seen as threatening if not hostile intensions targeted 
specifically against Russia. 
On the one hand, there is no way back for Russia to a core 
that consisted above all of two superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, Russia seems unable to 
pursue policies that would make it integrally part of the new and 
broader core of current-day international relations. Rather than a 
great power, it is more often than not viewed as a ‘semi-peripheral’ 
actor, and seen as a declining one that is particularly reluctant to 
accept a decline in status.12 Iver Neumann basically concedes and 
notes that Russia is once again applying a rationality of government 
that has its firm precedents in Western Europe, but that has since 
been abandoned by the Western European states and, according 
to Buzan and Lawson, in the sphere of international relations at 
large. He concludes that Russia’s standing as a great power must 
remain seriously in doubt. What is required does not merely consist 
of material resources or coercive abilities, but also includes good 
governance and social compatibility. It is not enough to parade what 
Russia itself considers “strength” in order to be recognized as a great 
power, and it is an error to seek status according to criteria that the 
10 As noted by Iver Neumann, among others, the Russian insistence of a strong 
state as a guarantor of the system of governance runs against the key liberal trend 
“where the question is always how the state may govern less”. For an elaboration 
of this issue-area, see Iver Neumann, ibid.
11 See Viacheslav Morozov, ‘Russia and the West: Dividing Europe, Constructing 
East Other’. Paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, March 2007.
12 For such and evaluations, see for example Clunan, Anne, L., (2009), The Social 
Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Ted Hopf, ‘Russia’s Place in the World. 
An Exit Option?’ PONARS Eurasia Political Memo, no. 79, September 2009.
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relevant circle of recognition does not find to be relevant. In short, 
Russia is arguably playing the wrong game.13 
Similar problems appear also to be present in the way that 
Russia views regionalization and in the policies pursued in the post-
Soviet area. Russia has in general found it difficult to capitalize on 
the increased importance of regionalization. In the first place, there 
is little left of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and 
the construction of the Eurasian Union, although highly prioritised 
by Russia, has been proceeding slowly. The aspiration to restore 
its standing as a great power combined with an emphasis on hard 
geopolitics as well as hard geo-economics as basic approaches has 
contributed to the emergence of rather disintegrative dynamics in the 
post-Soviet sphere. The Baltic countries have, for their part, stayed 
aloof from Russia by joining the EU as well as NATO. As to the 
internal situation in Russia, order had to be restored in Chechnya 
through rather harsh measures, i.e. large-scale military operations. 
The relations with Ukraine have been more than strained, in particular 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and her support for 
dissident forces in eastern Ukraine. Overall, many of the conflicts 
in the region, both external, as in the cases of Transnistria, Georgia 
and Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia and 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as internal on the part of Chechnya, 
Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kirghizia and Tajikistan, have stood out as 
serious obstacles to region-wide cooperation.14 Moreover, rather 
than being settled, virtually all of them can be described as ‘frozen’. 
The settling has been significantly hampered by Russia’s increasing 
insistence on framing the post-Soviet area in terms of hard geopolitics, 
with this then leaving little space for the pursuance of soft geo-
economics. Such a framing has also been conducive to a clash with the 
EU. Overall, and instead of siding with the EU’s claim concerning the 
conduct of soft geo-economics, Russia has locked itself into a contest 
if not a conflict premised on the view that the policies of the Union also 
13 Neumann, ibid, pp. 110–111.
14 On Russia’s approach in regard to local conflicts in the post-Soviet space, see 
Stanislaw Ivanov (2010), ‘Russia and Local Conflicts on the Post-Soviet Territory’, 
in Russia, Arms Control and International Security. IMEMO Supplement to the 
Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2010, pp. 104–115. 
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remain embedded in geopolitics, or at least hard geo-economics. It has 
been frequently argued that the EU’s basic aim consists of contributing 
to wider Western efforts of encircling and isolating Russia. Importantly, 
the lack of a joint frame of interpretation between the EU and Russia 
has by no means been conducive to a meeting of minds, and instead 
the outcome has consisted of frustrations, serious quarrels and even 
open conflicts. In general, the security practices that have emanated 
from Russia’s emphasis on hard geopolitics have, in addition to the 
widening conflict with the West, also seriously undermined Russia’s 
ability to utilize the potential embedded in the increased importance 
of regionalization.
conflict resolution and arms 
control as geopolitics
It appears that the Russian policies in the fields of conflict resolution 
and arms control were initially quite pragmatic and conciliatory in 
nature. They were in line with the changes that took place in the 
unfolding of wars and conflicts, above all the declining probability 
of power political wars, and hence also in tune with the changes 
discernible in the fields of conflict resolution and arms control. 
Russia, for example, as a precondition set by the Western powers 
to their approval of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE), completed the withdrawal of its military forces 
from Moldova and Georgia. Among other things, an active process 
of negotiation was initiated between Moldova and Transnistria 
in the mid-1990s, with Russia elaborating a complex proposal 
of conflict resolution. The country also found it quite possible to 
participate in multilateral talks such as those pertaining to the Kiev 
document negotiated in 2002 internationally and elaborated with 
the participation of Russian and American diplomats. 
However, with increased stress on hard geopolitics and the assumed 
need to counter-balance the West and keep NATO out of Russia’s 
neighbourhood, a different and more unilateral approach gradually 
took over. This change in the overall approach to international 
relations, with relations between states again predominantly seen as 
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a zero-sum territorial competition in a military/political mode, has 
subsequently impacted Russia’s approach to conflict resolution and 
arms control. The reading has also been quite state-centred ,thereby 
downgrading emphasis on various approaches that include or rest 
on the participation of non-state actors in the spheres of conflict 
resolution, arms control and peace mediation, including national 
dialogues. In short, Russia has stayed oblivious to the many changes 
and discontinuities present in the international efforts of conflict 
resolution. In fact, the line pursued has remained in many ways quite 
traditional, but it has also turned far less cooperative and become 
reactive instead of being proactive and innovative, although the 
reactions entail both efforts at preserving the status quo as well as 
changing it if it is regarded as necessary by Russia’s geopolitically 
determined interests. 
The preservationist approach, and in particular the aim of still 
remaining as one of the Big Two, has basically underpinned Russia’s 
policies in the sphere of nuclear issues and nuclear arms control. The 
latter type of endeavours have, among other things, amounted to 
resistance to the US plans to move towards and implement measures 
of anti-ballistic missile defence, while Russia’s decision in 2007 to 
suspend its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) stands for the latter type of change-oriented 
policy.15 The change in standing is quite crucial in the sense that 
the Treaty initially stood out, and did so particularly according to 
Russian interpretations, as one of the cornerstones of the European 
security system agreed upon and implemented after the demise of 
the Cold War.
Furthermore, the increased emphasis on hard geopolitics has 
also impacted Russia’s approach to cooperation with various 
international bodies such as the OSCE or the EU in the field of 
conflict resolution and arms control. It has in general amounted 
to a decline in cooperation and increased stress on unilateral 
endeavours. For example, between 2003 and 2011 the EU made a 
15 On nuclear issues, see Alexei Arbatov, ‘Transition to Multilateral Nuclear 
Disarmament. Abstracts’, in Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament, and International 
Security. IMEMO Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2013, 
pp.1–26.
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series of attempts to break the status quo around the Republic of 
Moldova and Transnistria by suggesting a multilateralization of the 
efforts of settling their conflict. However, Russia’s reactions were 
quite negative and amounted to rather harsh rhetoric about the EU 
aiming at installing an economic blockade. The reactions clearly 
indicated that there was little space for any broad and cooperate.
ve endeavours.16 The various proposals made by the US and the 
OSCE have equally been turned down by Russia and seen as unduly 
intrusive. More recently, the Meseberg process initiated in 2010 by 
the German and Russian leaderships has suffered a similar fate. The 
aim of the initiative was to make the settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict into as kind of test case for the advancement of cooperation 
between the EU and Russia in general in order for Russia to be 
further integrated into European political space. In this vein, the 
Memorandum envisaged the creation of a Security Committee 
between the EU and Russia once substantial progress had been 
reached in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. 
Notably, neither the offering of carrots nor the use of sticks 
seems to have been conducive to a more cooperative Russian stance. 
Instead, Russia has preferred to stay with its largely unilateral 
course as indicated among other things by the issuance of the Kozak 
Memorandum, which listed Russia’s own preferences for the solution 
of the Transnistrian conflict.17 In general, Russia has pursued rather 
protective policies, and has therefore also favoured a status quo. It has 
in some cases opted for initiatives premised on soft geo-economics, as 
indicated by what has been labelled a ‘humanitarian project’ initiated 
in 2007 in Transnistria by contributing to the building of nursery 
schools, hospitals as well as school and university buildings. The 
project also added to the monthly retirement benefits of pensioners 
and entailed investments in small-scale business and agricultural 
projects. Yet, the policies pursued have remained mainly political and 
military in nature, and the soft aspects have arguably been framed by 
16 See, Andrey Deviatkov (2014), ‘Giving “Assymmetric” Responses to the EU-
Russian Soft Power Experiment in Transnistria’. EU-Russia Paper no. 17. Centre 
for EU-Russia Studies. University of Tartu, p.5.
17 Multilateralization and Marginalization’. Problems of Post-Communism, 59(3): 
53–62.
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geopolitical aspirations, including efforts of geopolitical balancing.18 
Although some success may have been achieved in Transnistria, the 
outcome has been the opposite for the side of Moldova, with Russia 
thus seen as having sided profoundly with one side in the conflict.
Regionalization has in some sense figured as a kind of fall-back 
option for Russia once the ability to pursue effective and successful 
geo-economics within the broader sphere of international relations 
has left much to be hoped for. However, the emphasis on hard 
geopolitics also in a regional context has implied that Russia has not 
been seen as consensual and legitimate within the international society 
at large or by many actors in the region. This has clearly hampered 
Russia’s possibilities of advancing and utilizing the unfolding of 
decentred globalism as outlined by Buzan and Lawson. Setbacks have 
been encountered in international relations as well as in a regional 
context. As to the post-Soviet sphere, almost all of the conflicts remain 
unsettled, with the situation deteriorating rather than improving. 
Generally speaking, the increasing emphasis on hard geopolitics 
has both ideologically and politically defined Russia’s approach and 
interests also in the sphere of conflict resolution and arms control. 
As to the post-Soviet sphere, almost all of the conflicts remain 
unsettled, with the situation deteriorating rather than improving, 
and with internationalization as well as direct talks between the 
parties themselves being mostly excluded among the approaches to 
settlement, Russia’s toolkit has remained far too traditionalist and 
narrow in view of the nature of the conflicts to be solved. Efforts 
to achieve results have continued in some traditional fields such as 
nuclear non-proliferation, and some new platforms for the settlement 
of conflicts have also been established, as evidenced by the recent 
Minsk-talks on conflict prevention and arms control in Eastern 
Ukraine. The results have been modest, though, and in particular the 
latter talks have been accompanied by a rather deep mistrust between 
Russia and the Western participants. It has become quite obvious 
that the parties do not disagree on matters of substance and clash 
because of divergent interests. Above all, they seem to deviate rather 
profoundly from each other in their framing of conflict resolution 
and arms control, with Russia largely in a category of its own.
18 For this conclusion, see Devyatkov, op. cit., pp. 2–3, 15. 
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Alexander Sergunin
introduction
Conflict resolution and mediation (CRM) is an important priority 
for the Russian scholarly community. This can be explained by 
the fact that in the post-Soviet era the Kremlin had to deal with 
numerous conflicts – both domestically and internationally – and, 
for this reason, badly needed academic expertise in this field. The 
lack of such expertise or poor expertise or the Kremlin’s deafness 
to experts’ recommendations – all this has led to Russia’s inability 
to prevent or successfully resolve ethno-religious conflicts in the 
Northern Caucasus and local conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In 
addition to the frozen conflicts of Transnistria, Nagorny Karabakh, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has recently found itself 
amidst another dangerous conflict – in and around Ukraine.
Such a complicated situation dictates the need to develop both 
the CRM theory(ies) and practical methods and techniques that 
could be adequate for dealing with the existing and future challenges 
to Russian internal and external security and enable Moscow to 
contribute to stabilizing the international environment in the post-
Soviet space. Moreover, Russia can be a valuable partner in CRM 
in some other regions, such as the Middle East, East Asia, Africa 
and Latin America where Moscow still has CRM authority and 
capabilities.
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This study aims at examining different Russian social science 
disciplines’ and schools’ approaches to CRM. The similarities 
and dissimilarities between various approaches are studied. More 
specifically, this paper explores different schools’ perceptions of 
issues, such as the causes of conflicts, the role of violence, key units 
of analysis and major actors, typologies of conflicts, CRM methods 
and techniques, and Russia’s role – current and future – in CRM and 
peace-building in various regions.
In accordance with its research objectives, the paper is organized 
in three main parts: It starts from describing how various Russian 
social sciences interpret CRM. The second part is devoted to 
examining what kind of the CRM arsenal (methods and techniques) 
the Russian scholarship offers to the practitioners. Finally, an 
institutional dimension of CRM research is examined.
crm as an intra- and interdisciplinary 
problem in the russian social sciences
It should be noted that almost every social science in Russia has an 
approach to CRM of its own. However, to make this paper concise 
and, at the same time, policy-oriented, I’ll focus only on three major 
approaches developed by law, sociology and political science (PS)/
International relations (IR).
The legalist approach, which was influential in the Russian 
CRM since the Soviet time, is based on the assumption that the 
sources of conflicts lie in the sphere of legal relations between 
people or states or other social actors and can be resolved with 
the help of law (Kudryavtsev 1994: 5–9 and 1995: 23–33; Levin 
1977; Pushmin 1970). According to this approach, conflicts have 
either an interest-based or cognitive nature. In the former case some 
important interests of conflicting parties are involved. In the latter 
case a conflict emerges from the disagreement between the parties on 
whether their statements, concepts, judgments, postulates, beliefs, 
etc. are false or true. 
According to this school, the first type of conflict can be managed 
and resolved by legal means. The second type of conflict is difficult 
35
to solve by juridical instruments; other, non-legal tools should be 
used. These could include direct bilateral dialogue, public debates (in 
various forms), NGO-based mediation, etc. The legalist school is not 
really interested in this type of conflict because the law – national or 
international – cannot be implemented in full.
The so-called false legal conflict constitutes a class of its own. 
According to the legalist approach (Kudryavtsev 1995: 207), such 
type of conflict can be caused by a number of factors, including, first 
and foremost, misunderstandings and misreading of each other’s 
intentions and legal positions. For example, the parties involved 
can wrongly believe that the other side allegedly has aggressive/
expansionist intentions or be sure that the other side does not have 
a legitimate basis for its claims or, on the contrary, your own claims 
are legally grounded and solid. The legalist school believes that such 
type of conflicts can be successfully prevented or resolved with the 
help of qualified and timely legal assistance.
The legalist school differs from other approaches by its 
categorization of actors involved in conflicts. From this point of view, 
it is important to distinguish between legal and physical entities. If a 
conflict is generated by legal entities (organizations, institutions, states) 
it is of a juridical nature from the very beginning and, according to 
this doctrine, can be resolved only by legal means. If a conflict takes 
places between physical entities (individuals, groups) it can develop 
in either legal (if the conflicting parties are civilized enough or their 
conflict is of non-antagonistic character) or extra-legal forms. Hence, 
it is important to reduce the second type of conflicts between physical 
entities to the minimum and/or transform it to the legal form.
In solving conflicts, the legalist approach puts emphasis on 
the use of juridical instruments, bringing conflicting parties to the 
negotiating process (it is better to fight at the table rather than on 
the battle-ground), mediation, third party involvement, concluding 
binding agreements and creating reliable implementation 
mechanisms (Kudryavtsev 1995:287–299). This school believes that 
CRM should be based on the national and/or international law and 
legal entities – be it states or international organizations – should 
play a key role in these activities (although the role of civil society 
institutions and prominent individuals is not neglected).
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With due respect to the legalist school’s efforts to solve conflicts 
on the basis of national and international law and increase the role 
of law in regulating various forms of social activities, the following 
critical comments on this approach to CRM are made by the 
opponents:
•	 Most conflicts are generated not in the legal sphere; rather, they 
stem from those sectors of social life which are not covered by 
law.
•	 Most conflicts are of a mixed nature and generated by a 
combination of legal and non-legal causes.
•	 The legal system does not control the causes of a conflict and can 
only affect its current status. The implementation of the legal 
bodies’ decisions often depends on the good will of the parties 
involved; the possibilities to establish an efficient enforcement 
mechanism are limited (especially in the case of violent/armed 
conflict).
•	 The law is often is imperfect and lagging behind the reality. 
However, the legal doctrine cannot be changed at the moment 
when justice is administered. For this reason, many legal decisions 
are unsatisfactory for the conflicting parties and the causes of a 
conflict still remain (Dmitriev 2000: 40).
The sociological approach offers a broader understanding of conflict 
than the legalist school. This approach is based on the assumption 
that conflicts are a natural product of various contradictory processes 
in the society. The ‘sociologists’ do not reduce the causes of conflict 
to the legal ones; among the sources of conflict they identify the 
economic, social, identity, political, military, environmental, cultural, 
ideological, religious and other factors (Bikbulatova 2009; Dmitriev 
2000: 76–93; Orlyanski 2007: 19–22).
Thereafter, the ‘sociologists’ do not limit the CRM methods and 
techniques to the legal instruments and procedures. This school 
believes that to resolve a conflict and preclude its reemergence, its 
causes should be eliminated first and foremost. For this reason, this 
school’s CRM arsenal is much richer and more complex. In addition 
to the instruments that the ‘legalists’ suggest (e.g. negotiations, 
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cease-fire, truce and peace agreements, peace-keeping and peace-
enforcement mechanisms, etc.), the ‘sociologists’ offer a broad 
agenda for post-conflict peace-building and development that 
envisage a radical transformation of the society and its institutions 
with the aim to eradicate the causes of the conflict (Stepanov et al. 
2007; Stepanova 2003).
To prevent new conflicts the ‘sociologists’ suggest creating an 
early warning/monitoring mechanism. The latter should be based on 
a system of indicators that should monitor dangerous developments 
and identify conflict-prone areas. Such a system could be helpful in 
detecting and preventing conflicts at an early phase.
In contrast with the legalist approach which relates the CRM 
activities basically to the state and statist instruments, the sociological 
school believes that conflicts can be resolved and lasting peace is 
possible if not only governments but also societies talk to each other 
and develop non-hierarchical, horizontal contacts. That’s why the 
‘sociologists’ welcome an active participation of non-state actors in 
the CRM activities: people-to-people, NGO-to-NGO, company-to-
company contacts, the so-called ‘people’s’ or ‘civil diplomacy’.
The PS/IR approach is based on the sociological one but prefers 
to focus on political conflicts – domestic or international. Since this 
school is not monolithic, various paradigms differ by their views on 
CRM.
The Russian realists (like their foreign counterparts) tend to 
believe that the political conflicts are perennial and interminable 
ones because of the vicious nature of man and inevitable collision 
of interests in politics. The political actors, they underline, prefer to 
use power and violence rather than negotiations and other peaceful 
instruments to attain their goals. The realists are quite skeptical about 
the CRM activities because they believe that the opponents usually 
stick to the ‘zero-sum game’ logics and aim to achieve complete 
victory. The CRM efforts can be timely and efficient only if the 
situation is ripe enough. Normally, the realists maintain, it happens 
when the conflicting sides are exhausted and short of resources to 
continue the confrontation. Provided that there are authoritative 
and dedicated mediators, peaceful negotiations and further truce 
and peace agreements are possible. 
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If the adversaries are not ready for a compromise or there is no 
consensus among the mediators or there is a lack of trust among 
the parties involved, any CRM efforts are eventually doomed to 
failure. For example, the Russian realists point to the Minsk-1 
(September 2014) agreements on the Ukrainian crisis as an example 
of inefficient CRM because neither of the conflicting parties was 
ready to stop hostilities and observe the cease-fire agreement. They 
are quite skeptical about the Minsk-2 agreements (February 2015) 
as well because they believe that Kiev simply needs a respite to rearm 
and regroup its armed forces and receive foreign military assistance 
to prepare itself better for a new round of fighting. Moreover, the 
Ukrainian leadership does not trust Moscow as a mediator and 
continues to publicly call Russia ‘aggressor’ and ‘enemy’ while the 
breakaway republics of Donbass do not completely trust Berlin and 
Paris, accusing them of being ‘biased’ and ‘pro-Ukrainian’.
It should be noted that the realist paradigm is the dominant one 
in present-day Russia and this precludes other schools from having 
a major say in Russia’s foreign policy making, including the CRM 
activities.
The liberal paradigm is less influential than the realist one in 
the Russian academic debate on CRM. The liberals believe that 
despite the conflictual nature of politics, cooperation and consensus 
are possible and preferable. Similar to the legalist approach, the 
Russian liberals assert that most conflicts are caused by the lack 
of proper legal regulations and legal culture among the people and 
states. They also favor CRM as a proper instrument to restore peace 
and stability and strengthen national and international law. But the 
Russian liberals admit that the sources of conflicts are not limited 
to the juridical ones only and offer a variety of CRM methods and 
techniques that aim for substantial socio-economic and political 
transformations (Lebedeva, 1999, 2010 and 2011).
The Russian liberals are quite critical about President Putin’s 
policies on Ukraine (see Sergunin 2014b). They believe that Putin 
has overreacted to the anti-Yanukovych “revolution” by annexing 
Crimea and supporting the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine’s eastern 
regions. They think that Russia has violated all of its existing 
international legal obligations regarding Ukraine. Throughout 
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the past two decades, Russia has always recognized Ukraine as 
a sovereign independent state within its current borders. This 
recognition is codified within the framework of the UN, OSCE, 
CIS, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum as well as the Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation signed in 1997. Now, the liberals stress, Russia 
has trampled on all of those treaties, agreements and guarantees 
under the false pretext of protecting Russian-speakers in Crimea and 
Donbass from “persecution” (Ryzhkov 2014a). 
The Russian liberals believe that the Ukrainian crisis has multiple 
negative results for the European security system and Russia itself. 
Now Moscow has to face economic and political sanctions from the 
Western countries as well as NATO military build-up in its vicinity.
The liberals point out that by humiliating Ukrainian society and 
its political elites, Russia has created a hostile state on its Western 
borders. Ukrainians will not easily come to terms with the loss of 
Crimea and – potentially – eastern Ukraine. In turn, other former 
Soviet republics are watching Russia’s actions in Crimea and 
Donbass with great concern as their countries also have groups of 
ethnic Russians, which with the events in Ukraine may at any time 
serve as a pretext for Russian military intervention. 
The annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists in 
eastern Ukraine may torpedo Russia’s plans to build the Eurasian 
Union. Even though Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia formally 
joined the Eurasian Economic Union, they will likely sabotage any 
plans to deepen its integration in order not to strengthen Russia’s 
role as a regional leader.
The liberals warn the Kremlin that by annexing Crimea and 
supporting the Donbass separatists, Moscow has violated the 
principle of the inviolability of its neighbor’s borders. This will 
prompt other former Soviet republics to revise their own military 
and strategic policies and to seek additional security guarantees 
from countries other than Russia. According to this school, with 
these acts Moscow has destroyed all faith in Russia as a guarantor 
of any other state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. What’s more, 
the NATO countries that neighbor Ukraine and Russia now are 
seeking additional security measures from the alliance. The latter 
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has taken a respective decision at its September 2014 summit in 
South Wales.
The liberals believe that the Kremlin and the West should put 
pressure on the warring parties to fully implement the Minsk-2 
agreements, including the cease-fire agreement and providing greater 
autonomy for Donbass which should stay with Ukraine. Moscow 
should agree to organize a ‘real’ referendum in Crimea under the 
international control and accept its results regardless of the outcome.
The globalist paradigm differs from the above schools by its 
interpretation of the causes of political conflicts and their nature. 
For the sake of brevity I focus on the only globalist school – peace 
research. It should be noted that Galtung’s (1964 and 1969) theory 
of structural violence is very popular among the Russian peace 
researchers (Vorkunova 2009). This school tries to explain why the 
violence is deeply embedded both in the society and international 
relations system. This group of peace researchers believes that the 
structural violence as a socio-political phenomenon is deeply rooted 
in the capitalist society and economy and constantly reproduced 
by the capitalist mode of production. They believe that the forms 
of contemporary exploitation are different from those depicted by 
Marx, Engels and Lenin but the essence of this phenomenon is still 
the same and it will continue to generate violence and conflicts both 
domestically and internationally. 
It is interesting to note that along with the structural violence, its 
cultural variation is increasingly becoming a popular theme within 
the Russian peace research. The critical peace researchers believe that 
in the era of global communications the cultural violence can be even 
more effective than its direct or structural versions. They note that the 
so-called ‘color’ revolutions in the post-Soviet space and Arab countries 
were often generated or at least facilitated by the West with the help of 
public diplomacy based on the cultivation of liberal/democratic values 
among the local youth and political opposition. For this sub-school, 
the cultural violence can be even more dangerous than other forms of 
violence because it not only reinforces other ‘angles’ of the ‘conflict 
triangle’ (Galtung and Jacobsen 2000) but it can also have long-term 
negative and unexpected effects (Kubyshkin and Tzvetkova 2013; 
Sergunin 2014a; Stepanov 2014; Vorkunova 2009). 
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The Russian peace researchers note that different causes generate 
different types of conflicts. Some wars have their origin in domestic 
political weakness, others in a secure domestic political domination 
that allows free rein to an adventurous leader. Some are fought to 
establish domination over a weaker neighboring country, others 
to establish widespread hegemony, and others to defend oneself or 
to defend one’s existing hegemony over others against a vigorous 
challenge (Konyshev and Sergunin 2013 and 2014).
The peace research school notes that in general usage ‘peace’ 
conveys the notion of ‘the absence of war’ and not any particular 
ideal condition of society. This broad consensus view of peace is, of 
course, unsatisfactory from the point of view of this peace research 
sub-school since we need to know more about the nature of a 
possible world without armed conflict. According to Galtung (1985 
and 2006), peace seen merely as the absence of war is considered to 
be ‘negative peace’ and the concept of ‘positive peace’ has been used 
to describe a situation in which there is neither physical violence nor 
legalized repression. Under conditions of positive peace, war is not 
only absent, it is unanticipated and essentially unthinkable. A state 
of positive peace involves large elements of reciprocity, equality, and 
joint problem-solving capabilities. There have been many different 
proposals as to the positive definitions: integration, justice, harmony, 
equity, freedom, etc., all of which call for further conceptualization. 
Analytically, peace is conceptualized by the Russian scholars in a 
series of discrete categories ranging from various degrees and states 
of conflict to various states of co-operation and integration. 
The dominant trend in the Russian peace research is to interpret 
peace as synonymous to the category of sustainable development 
(Samarin 2008; Stepanov 2014). Some scholars believe that ‘positive’ 
peace can be seen as a sort of a social order where not only violence, 
exploitation and major security threats are absent but also the 
favorable conditions for human creativity are provided (Sergunin 
2012; Vorkunova 2009).
As far as this school’s positions on CRM are concerned they 
are very close to the sociological approach. The Russian peace 
researchers put emphasis on the need to identify the causes of the 
conflict and eliminate them. They also pay greater attention to 
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conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building rather than to 
conflict management, peace keeping and peace enforcement which 
are seen as technical/instrumentalist in nature and of secondary 
importance (Stepanov et al. 2007).
The postpositivist paradigm is better represented by the Russian 
social constructivism. This school tends to agree with the sociological 
approach to the extent that most conflicts are identity-driven. The 
constructivists believe that if the identity-making process derails 
from the dialogic/cooperative way to the confrontational one (‘we 
and they’-type perceptions) it almost inevitably results in a conflict 
(Barash 2012). For example, the Ukrainian search for its post-Soviet 
identity that had oscillated between the European and Eurasian ones 
has led to an open conflict with Russia which opposed Kiev’s pro-
European choice. The lack of dialogue between the parties involved 
and the rise of radical nationalist forces in Ukraine have provoked 
separatist movements in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and eventually 
led to an armed conflict in the breakaway regions and Russia’s 
interference. Hence, to make CRM effective the constructivists 
recommend avoiding steps that can entail shaping the conflictual 
type of identity and favor measures to promote dialogue and mutual 
understanding between the conflicting parties. 
The opponents, however, criticize the social constructivists 
for being too general, abstract and lacking specific political 
recommendations on both CRM and how make the identity-making 
process non-confrontational.
crm methods and techniques
The Russian academia distinguishes between several phases of CRM 
– conflict prevention, conflict de-escalation, conflict diagnostics, 
negotiations, mediation/third party involvement, international 
arbitrage and track-II diplomacy – where various instruments are 
available. The Russian specialists try to build upon the international 
CRM experiences and focus on the following methods and 
techniques:
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1. Conflict Prevention.
Most Russian CRM experts believe that it is preferable to prevent 
rather than manage or resolve conflicts (Dmitriev 2000: 231; 
Kudryavtsev 1995: 304; Lebedeva 2011: 215; Orlyanski 2007: 103–
118). They believe that the following approaches can be helpful in 
detecting and preventing conflicts at their earliest phases:
•	 Prevention through increased information/awareness, contact 
and exchange. The Russian CRM experts believe that what 
is primarily needed is more information about the parties 
of a potential conflict, and more direct contacts between 
them, in order to dispel antipathies, prejudices, tensions, and 
misunderstandings. At the early stage (the 1990s), the Russian 
peace researchers felt that increased knowledge, personal 
experience and contact, as well as joint activities will result in 
an increase in mutual sympathy and understanding between 
the parties involved. As a result of intensive cultural exchanges 
the feeling of community and the intercultural sympathy thus 
generated will have a beneficial effect on political relations 
between different actors as well. As many Russian specialists 
pointed out, the vast majority of the post-Soviet conflicts 
have emerged because of the lack of information and proper 
communication between the parties involved. Some present-
day Russian CRM experts also tend to explain the outbreak of 
hostilities in Ukraine in early 2014 by the lack of knowledge 
about each other’s intentions and miscommunications between 
Kiev and the Russian-populated regions of Crimea and Donbass. 
The former has wrongly interpreted autonomist aspirations of 
these regions. Instead of being engaged in negotiations with 
the alleged separatists and finding out what they want, Kiev 
has opted for the military operation. On the other hand, the 
breakaway regions have probably exaggerated the influence of 
extreme nationalists on the Ukrainian government and, for this 
reason they were too hasty to take anti-government positions. 
In sum, these misunderstandings led to a bloody conflict in East 
Ukraine.
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The later and less naïve version of this contact/education hypothesis 
identified a number of preconditions to be satisfied: favorable prior 
attitudes; not-too-great socio-economic, political, cultural and 
religious differences between parties; majority/minority constellations 
not viewed by either side as threatening; adequate capacity to 
communicate; situations involving contacts and exchanges that 
foster proper learning, etc. It is easy to see that most of the post-
Soviet conflicts do not fit these criteria and cannot be resolved by 
simply increasing awareness and providing better communications.
The Russian post-Soviet experiences show that in dealing with 
deeply rooted conflicts, increased contact and exchange alone are 
insufficient to overcome tensions and aversions. However, on the 
other hand, only on the basis of open channels of contact and 
communication is any settlement of a conflict conceivable.
•	 Reconciliation through the reappraisal of historical 
entanglements. As the Russian experts maintain, in a general 
sense, reconciliation evokes the notions of the overcoming of 
enmity, the forgiveness of wrongs, and the creation of a new, 
harmonious world. Examples of reconciliation are given by 
Germany, on the one hand, and France, Belgium and Denmark, 
on the other hand, Finland and Russia after the World War II. 
The primary task of the reconciliatory process is to examine 
the history of the conflict with the aim to establish a common 
basis on which to work out what can and should be reconciled 
with one another. A key role here is played by the collective 
identities of the actors involved in the situation, identities which 
have grown up in the course of history. Precisely because these 
identities have been shaped by the mutual competition and 
conflict, examination of them is central to the development of a 
reconciled approach to one another.
•	 Overcoming prejudices and enemy images. According to the 
Russian analysts, this is central to conflict prevention, since 
prejudices and enemy images are a major cause of the willingness 
to resort to aggression and violence. To overcome prejudices 
it is important to understand what kind of socio-economic, 
political, cultural, religious and psychological factors govern 
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perceptions of other actors. As with the first method, education 
and enhanced contacts play a key role in the efforts to overcome 
prejudices and enemy images. However, in this case education 
and communication go beyond the simple transfer of factual 
information on most dangerous stereotypes; they should bring 
knowledge about the background, mechanisms of generation, 
and functions of prejudices. Moreover, the simple idea that 
prejudice and enemy images must be taken away is therefore not 
sufficient. One must also make clear what is to take their place 
to avoid the rise of new prejudices and stereotypes.
•	 The creation of supranational and transnational loyalties. The 
most radical Russian peace researchers suggest going beyond 
national identities and developing transnational ones to prevent 
the rise of any conflicts on the inter-ethnic or inter-religious 
basis. This can be done by either all-embracing political entities 
(e.g. Europe, CIS, ‘Russian world’, etc.) or social movements 
that cut across the nations (e.g. peace or ecological movements). 
That’s why they encourage people-to-people contacts on 
the international level as well as various forms of cross- and 
transborder cooperation between local and regional governments 
and private/non-state actors.
The problem, however, is that the trend towards the development 
of transnational loyalties can be reversible. The fact that the 
transnational identities tend to regress to the ethno-national 
level during economically and/or politically tense phases was 
demonstrated by the anti-Western and anti-foreigner trend which 
emerged in Russia with the series of the ‘color revolutions’ in the 
post-Soviet space and especially with the start of the Ukrainian crisis 
in 2014. 
That’s why the moderate versions of the Russian peace research 
school are quite cautious or even skeptical about this conflict 
prevention tool.
•	 Creating an early warning monitoring system. The Russian CRM 
experts (Kudryavtsev 1995: 287–288; Orlyanski 2007: 110–113) 
believe that to detect and prevent conflicts at the earlier phase a 
monitor system can be helpful. In turn, such a system should be 
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based on the indicators that identify conflict-generating factors 
and areas. Hence, it is crucial to select proper indicators that 
reflect the most important trends in the potentially conflictual 
areas. For example, in the 1990s the Institute of Ethnology 
and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Science, has tried to 
develop a monitoring system in the Russian ethnic regions which 
were most exposed to inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts. 
These activities, however, have stopped when the funding from 
international sponsors was halted.
2. Conflict Stabilization and De-Escalation.
If the efforts to prevent a conflict had failed and such a conflict has 
actually happened, the Russian CRM experts recommend focusing 
on stabilizing and reversing the situation as a precondition for an 
efficient conflict resolution process. 
The Russian analysts note that unlike escalation, which often 
occurs rapidly and unintentionally, de-escalation tends to be slow 
and only happens intentionally through much effort. They believe 
that a variety of approaches are possible:  the gradual reciprocal 
reduction in tension approach (GRIT), cooling off periods, media 
management, changing communication strategies and patterns, and 
others.
The GRIT approach (Charles Osgood) is especially popular 
among the Russian CRM specialists. The basic idea of this approach 
is that the disputant can initiate de-escalation by making a small, 
unilateral (one-sided) concession to the other side, and at the same 
time, communicating an expectation that this act will be matched 
with an equal response from the opponent.  If the opponent does 
respond positively, the first party can make a second concession, and 
a “peace spiral” is begun. If the first initiative is ignored, the GRIT 
proponents suggest that it be followed by a second – or even a third 
– attempt.  These concessions should be designed to build trust, but 
should not be terribly costly (materially or strategically), nor should 
they suggest weakness. However, they should indicate a willingness 
to transform the conflict to a more cooperative and less adversarial 
approach.
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More specifically, the Russian experts (Kudryavtsev 1995: 
295–296; Orlyanski 2007: 75–86) believe that the conflict will de-
escalate if:
•	 Attention is focused on the problem, not the participants.
•	 There is a decrease in emotion and perceived threat.
•	 The parties to the conflict are able to listen to each other (when 
other parties think that you have not listened to their concerns, 
they will almost invariably see you as a threat). 
•	 The parties were friendly prior to the conflict.
•	 They know how to make peace, or have someone help them do 
so.
•	 There is a desire to reduce conflict.
•	 The focus is on the future, not on the past (if you are talking about 
the future you engage both yourself and the other participant(s) 
in a problem-solving activity rather than a fault-finding exercise; 
you create hope, and you make yourself less threatening).
3. Conflict Diagnostics as a Prerequisite for Successful 
CRM.
Before entering the negotiations both the parties involved and 
mediators should develop their knowledge of the sources and 
previous dynamics of the conflict. In so doing the Russian CRM 
experts (Kudryavtsev 1995: 206) are based on two key assumptions. 
First, deeply rooted and protracted social conflicts generally have 
their roots in the denial of basic human needs in regard to security, 
identity and participation. These basic needs are universal and are 
not open to compromise. Conflict resolution must contribute to the 
satisfaction of such needs. Second, it is possible that a joint solution 
to the conflict will be found by fostering mutual empathy and by 
informing those involved of alternative modes of behavior open to 
them, and of the costs involved in these. In other words, by means of 
empathic and rational discourse, it is in principle possible to satisfy 
the basic needs of all parties to the conflict in regard to security, 
identity and participation.
The more concrete conflict diagnostic techniques include 
(Orlyanski 2007: 79–83):
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•	 Identifying the causes of conflict. To successfully resolve the 
conflict it is important to know the factors that caused it. Since 
the parties involved cannot be objective a third-party intervention 
is desirable at this stage. It is equally important to invite experts 
who are qualified to professionally study the sources of the 
conflict and make recommendations how to remove the causes 
of the confrontation.
•	 Explaining the motivation of the conflicting parties. It is important 
for both the conflicting parties themselves and mediators to fully 
understand the motivation which drives the parties to dispute. 
It is necessary to identify any ‘hidden agenda’ if it exists as well 
as to distinguish between the ‘real’ and ‘false’ motives that can 
derail the future discussions and talks.
•	 Defining initial positions, SWOT-analysis. It is also important to 
clearly define initial positions of the parties in conflict before they 
start negotiations. It is equally important to make them realistic; 
otherwise the proposed talks can fail from the very beginning (or 
even before their start). 
Some Russian experts suggest making a sort of SWOT analysis 
of the conflictual situation with the aim to evaluate the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats  involved in a conflict 
resolution project. It is well-known that the SWOT analysis, which 
was born within the business administration discipline, can be 
carried out for nearly any project or undertaking and it involves 
specifying the objective of the project and identifying the internal 
and external factors that are favorable and unfavorable to achieve 
that objective. Users of the SWOT analysis need to ask and answer 
questions that generate meaningful information for each category 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) to make the 
analysis useful and find their competitive advantage.
In the case of the CRM activities, it is also quite helpful to identify 
factors that can facilitate or impede the conflict resolution process. 
Identification of SWOTs is important because they can help develop 
later steps in planning to achieve the CRM objective.
The Russian experts believe that the decision makers should 
consider whether the CRM objective is attainable, given the SWOTs. 
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If the objective is not attainable, a different objective must be selected 
and the process repeated.
•	 Risk-benefit analysis. The Russian peace researchers believe 
that the risk-benefit analysis (RBA) is one more business-like 
approach which could be useful for the conflict diagnostics. 
The RBM method seeks to quantify  the risk and benefits and 
hence their ratio. Exposure to risk(s) is recognized by various 
actors as a normal aspect of everyday life. We accept a certain 
level of risk in our lives as necessary to achieve certain benefits. 
With most of these risks we feel we have some sort of control 
over the situation. When individuals, organizations and states 
are exposed to involuntary risk (a risk over which they have 
no control), they make risk aversion their primary goal. Under 
these circumstances, actors require the probability of risk to 
be significantly smaller than for the same situation under their 
perceived control. 
In the case of conflict resolution, for the parties in dispute, it is very 
important to be sure that if they enter the negotiations with their 
opponent(s) they will get more benefits than risks or negative results 
in the end of the process.
The Russian specialists suggest the following categorization of 
the future risks in the CRM process:
 – Real future risk, as disclosed by the fully matured future 
circumstances when they develop.
 – Statistical risk, as determined by currently available data.
 – Projected risk, as analytically based on system models structured 
from historical studies.
 – Perceived risk, as intuitively seen by actors.
The CRM experts believe that ideally the perceived risks should 
match the real future risks otherwise the outcome of the conflict 
resolution process will be unclear.
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4. Negotiations.
The next step after the conflict diagnostics is the negotiations. But, 
as the Russian CRM experts note, there should be a pre-negotiation 
phase which should create some favorable conditions for successful 
talks. They recommend before you enter the negotiations you should 
respond to several questions (Kudryavtsev 1995: 205–206; Lebedeva 
2010; Orlyanski 2007: 89–90):
•	 What does this negotiation mean to you? According to the 
Russian negotiation experts, there are only two reasons why 
we enter into a negotiation. The first  reason occurs when out 
of necessity, we have to.  This could be due to either some 
immediate need, such as urgency to stop fighting, or it could 
be that we face severe problems in further financing of war/
military conflict. The second reason occurs when we are seeking 
out an opportunity. This situation may arise simply because an 
opportunity has sprung up where we can solve the conflict to our 
benefit and/or improve our international positions and image at 
an opportune time.
The reason for entering into a negotiation will affect both 
negotiation approach and strategy, and also relative negotiating 
power of one participant in comparison to another one.
•	 The Ripple effect. The Russian CRM specialists believe that 
the conflicting parties also need to ask themselves whether 
the results of the negotiation they are conducting will affect 
other negotiations or agreements later. It’s vital that they, as 
negotiators, consider the impact or consequences of an agreement 
in developing their negotiation strategy.
•	 Do  we need to make an agreement? The Russian peace 
researchers underline that parties either enter into negotiations 
because they have to, or because they want to. Part of negotiation 
strategy will involve a careful analysis of participants’ BATNA 
(Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). If an agreement 
is absolutely essential, and the parties in conflict have few 
alternative options, in the event of talks collapsing, this will 
affect their strategy. Or, if the negotiated agreement is not 
essential because parties have a strong option, and can walk 
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away with confidence, this also influences the approach to their 
strategy.
•	 Do other parties need to formally approve the agreement? 
Many agreements made during the negotiated process require 
formal approval, or ratification, before an agreement is official. 
And the outcome of the approval/ratification process is not one 
hundred percent predetermined. A head of the state or national 
parliament may need to review and ratify an agreement, before 
it comes into effect. They may not necessarily agree with text of 
the agreement that was worked out by the country’s delegation 
at the negotiations. For example, to the resent of other countries, 
the U.S. Congress has a formal right to make amendments to, 
reservations on and interpretations of international treaties. 
There are numerous cases when the Capitol tried or managed to 
pass amendments to some international agreement. In some cases 
it led to the abrogation of treaties because the U.S. international 
partners did not agree with such amendments. This, for example, 
has happened with the U.S.-Soviet trade treaty of 1972 because 
of the Jackson-Vanick amendment that deprived the USSR from 
the most favored nation status. To give another, more recent, 
example: in contrast with what has been signed at the Minsk-2 
summit (February 2015), both the Ukrainian President Pyotr 
Poroshenko and Rada (Parliament) passed the legislation that 
provided more autonomy only to those Donbass regions that 
have been mentioned in the Minsk-1 agreement (September 
2014) rather than to all the territories which are factually 
controlled by the rebels. Such a decision has put in jeopardy 
the whole peaceful process in East Ukraine because it was not 
accepted by the Donbass side.
•	 Is there a time constraint? Time has an impact on the course 
of negotiations from two perspectives. First, there are deadlines 
that might be imposed, to either make or break an agreement. 
Secondly, the negotiation participants all know that ‘Time is 
money’. Negotiations use up time, and if, for example, the gas 
supply from Russia to Ukraine is about to be stopped while the 
clock is ticking because of a disagreement on prices between 
Moscow and Kiev, then this is costing money. Or, it could be due 
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to some other resource issue, such as waiting for a badly needed 
IMF tranche, in order  to revive the Ukrainian economy and 
financial system. The point to remember is that the longer the 
negotiations on, say, a cease-fire agreement between Kiev and 
Donbass drag out, the more negatively affected the bottom line.
•	 Is there a need for a third party? It is well-known that third parties 
have many different functions and roles to play in developing 
a negotiation strategy. They may act as agents, intermediaries, 
translators, consultants, or other specialists who have expertise 
that one or both parties require. There are occasions when a 
neutral third party will act as a facilitator or chairperson, to 
manage the negotiations. Then, there are the other occasions 
when a roadblock or impasse in negotiation should be hit. 
During these times the conflicting parties may use a neutral third 
party to act as a mediator or an arbitrator, to either facilitate an 
agreement or to impose an agreement.
•	 Who is going to start first? The Russian negotiation experts 
admit that there are situations when the parties involved have to 
decide how a proposal or offer is to be presented, or in deciding 
who is going to go first. Will they make an informal proposal 
before they start the negotiations, or wait until they meet face 
to face? Will they be prepared to make an offer after listening to 
each other’s proposal, or do they need more information? Will 
they respond right away, or refer the matter to the experts for 
additional discussions? Will it be to one of the negotiating sides’ 
advantage to be first in making an offer or proposal, to set an 
anchor around which the talks revolve? Or will it be better to 
hold cards tight to one’s chest and let the other side go first? 
Of course, this will all relate to the issues, positions, goals and 
objectives that will determine a negotiation approach. These are 
very serious questions that the participants need to intelligently 
address, before they begin their talks.
•	 Who are the decision makers? Before the parties enter into 
the negotiations, they must establish who is going to make the 
decisions. What is their authority and who do they report to 
in their supreme body, if any? Similarly, what are the authority 
levels of their counterparts? Finally, can they make an agreement 
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in principle, or an unofficial agreement that will likely stand the 
test of scrutiny?
•	 How far will the negotiators push it? As the CRM specialists 
note, negotiations can be a one-shot occurrence where one party 
comes right out and says “This is a one-time offer – take it or leave 
it.” On the contrary, there are some instances where haggling is 
not considered acceptable, and will not be tolerated by the other 
party. Other situations will drag out into the equivalent of a 
marathon ping-pong match, as each party bounces offers and 
counter offers, back and forth between them. The parties need to 
know who they are dealing with, before they get too cute and find 
themselves cut out of the opportunity altogether. It also depends 
on the offer and proposal, in relation to the circumstances such 
as time considerations, need, and many other factors.
•	 Are we strong or weak? The negotiation experts point out that two 
or more parties who are about to engage in a negotiation seldom 
operate from an equal power base. If one party has something 
that the other side desperately needs for its survival and it has 
no alternatives, then this side may find itself negotiating at a 
disadvantage. This all relates to the question whether the parties 
have alternative negotiation strategies and how they stack up 
against their potential counterparts. One side’s weakness can be 
countered by strengthening its alternative negotiation strategies, 
or even by finding allies to support its position and add to its 
strength. Also, one should seek ways to diminish the power base 
of the opposing party where possible, before the beginning of 
negotiations, or even during the negotiation process itself.
To sum up, the pre-negotiation strategies need to be developed by 
considering a whole host of factors, which might have a powerful 
impact on one’s success. It is also wise to remember that negotiation 
strategy has to be flexible and will need to be adjusted as the game 
plays itself out. The parties involved cannot know everything before 
they go into the first meeting, so they need to prepare to adjust their 
strategy and tactics, as the situations warps and changes shape. As 
the negotiation experts stress, flexibility is vital, but good preparation 
is essential.
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As far as negotiation strategies are concerned the Russian 
CRM specialists distinguish between two main types of behavior 
– bargaining and joint problem-solving (Dmitriev 2000: 261–267; 
Lebedeva 1999: 70–74 and 2010; Orlyanski 2007: 90–94).
The bargaining strategy, in a sense, is a continuation of the 
conflict but at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. It 
is of competitive/confrontational nature where one of the parties or 
both aim at achieving maximal unilateral gains rather than conflict 
resolution as such. Parties in dispute understand that the ‘zero-sum 
game’ is hardly possible but hope to gain as much as possible. The 
bargaining strategy usually paves a bumpy way for negotiations and 
may involve the risk of interruptions, stalemates and even a complete 
failure. Since bargaining does not aim at achieving mutually beneficial 
solutions, even in the case of success, this strategy may lead to a 
(temporary) compromise rather than to a removal of the causes of 
the conflict, i.e. conflict resolution. There is always a high risk that the 
conflict can reemerge when the situation changes and one of the sides 
decides that it is in a better position to resume the conflict.
The Russian specialists differentiate between three types of the 
bargaining tactics:
(1) The hard-line one, when the parties start negotiations from the 
deliberately ambitious claims and continue with permanent 
pressure on the opponent demonstrating the lack of flexibility. 
The aim of such a tactics is to get the maximum number of 
possible advantages and conclude an agreement with the vis-à-
vis on its own conditions. 
(2) The soft-line tactic is based on the assumption that by keeping 
the competitive spirit of bargaining it is, however, more efficient 
and helpful to exchange by mutual concessions in the course of 
the talks.
(3) The compromise tactic when the hard- and soft-line types of 
negotiation behavior are combined – depending on the specific 
situation.
The Russian peace researchers, however, favor the non-conflictual 
type of the negotiation strategy – joint problem-solving. In contrast 
with bargaining, this type of the negotiation strategy aims at building 
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a partnership with the other side and joint search for a mutually 
beneficial solution. For this reason, this kind of negotiation strategy 
is labeled as a partnership-type, cooperative or win-win strategy. 
Normally, such a strategy results in a real conflict resolution and 
establishing a lasting peace and stability. Both sides perceive an 
agreement resulting from the negotiations as fair and just and, hence, 
acceptable and satisfactory. 
Unfortunately, the win-win strategy is rarely met in the 
international conflict resolution practice because the extent to which 
the animosity between the conflicting parties develops is so large and 
the sources of the conflict are so deep that the negotiators are often 
unable to see each other as potential partners and jointly seek the 
best solutions. For instance, there are only few examples of when 
Russia was able to promote the win-win type of the negotiation 
strategy among the post-Soviet states, mostly in those cases when the 
conflicts between the CIS countries were of economic/trade/financial 
nature. For example, despite numerous controversies between the 
potential partners, Moscow has managed to bring Belarus and 
Kazakhstan first to the three-partite Customs Union and then to 
the Eurasian Economic Union. Moreover, Armenia has also joined 
the EEU in early 2015 and Kyrgyzstan has expressed its interest in 
this integrationist project. From the very beginning, negotiations 
between these countries were based on the win-win approach.
Along with the above two ‘classic’ negotiation strategies some 
Russian experts believe that in some cases the BATNA (Best 
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) can suggest an alternative 
type of negotiating strategy (Lebedeva 1999: 33–35). BATNA is an 
alternate plan when the talks start to wobble out of control. The 
experts believe that are several ways to determine the best alternatives 
to a negotiated agreement. First, the negotiator has to dissect both 
his/her position and his/her interests. Then, he/she should look at the 
sum of these parts relative to all the alternative options available and 
pick the best option. Finally, the negotiator should do the reverse 
from the counterparts’ perspective. A well-prepared negotiator looks 
at the whole picture.
The specialists advise that some of the most crucial factors which 
should be considered by the BATNA strategy users include:
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•	 The cost – The negotiators should ask themselves how much 
it will cost to make the deal relative to the cost of their best 
alternative. Cost estimation may entail both the short term and 
the long term. It boils down to figuring out which of the options 
is the most affordable.
•	 Feasibility – Which option is the most feasible? Which one can 
be realistically applied over all the rest of the available options?
•	 Impact – Which of the options available will have the most 
immediate positive influence on the BATNA strategy user’s 
current state of affairs?
•	 Consequences – What do you think or estimate will happen as 
you consider each option as a possible solution?
As some Russian CRM specialists note, it is very difficult to find a 
‘pure’, ‘ideal’ type of any kind of the negotiation strategies in reality 
(Dmitriev 2000: 245; Lebedeva 1999: 73). In real life, the negotiation 
strategies can vary and tend to be applied in a combination or 
alternatively, one after another – depending on the circumstances and 
parties’ negotiating skills and capacities. It is impossible to suggest 
the best universal recipe for negotiation behavior and strategy.
5. Third-party involvement.
The Russian CRM experts believe that in the most complicated cases 
conflict resolution through third-party involvement can be efficient. 
The third-party’s main job is to ensure an atmosphere conducive 
to engaging the conflicting parties into a dialogue and providing 
stimuli for a joint resolution of the problem by them.
The Russian specialists (Grishina 2008: 363–371; Lebedeva 1999: 
48–49 and 2010; Orlyanski 2007: 95–97) distinguish between two 
types of the third-party intervention: firstly, legalistic-authoritative 
approach where the third party more or less determines the outcome 
of the conflict; and, secondly, voluntary approach where the third 
party merely mediates between the participants in the conflict and 
advises and supports them in reaching agreement. 
The first approach includes different methods which range from 
arbitration and legal settlement of disputes to the monopoly on 
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force exercised by the third party which has at its disposal measures 
of sanctions that it can use to lend weight to its intervention 
(Kudryavtsev 1995: 296; Lebedeva 1999: 51–55). 
In the case of voluntary approach, the Russian experts make further 
distinction between, on the one hand, third party’s own preferred 
approaches, namely, consultation and facilitation, and, on the other 
hand, mediation in the narrow sense of this word. In mediation, the 
third party itself puts forward suggestions as to how the conflict might 
be solved. It works out compromises and assesses the suggestions of 
the parties to the conflict to see how susceptible they are to consensus.
The Russian CRM specialists note that there could be a problem 
of choosing a proper mediator because of the lack of either authority 
of or trust to a potential third party. For example, for the Ukrainian 
side, it was very difficult to accept Russia as a mediator at the Minsk 
talks because Kiev considered Moscow as an active participant of 
the conflict rather than an impartial actor. For the same reason, 
the Donbass delegations were quite skeptical about France and 
Germany as third parties suspecting Paris and Berlin of being 
biased towards/favoring Kiev. In turn, the lack of trust between the 
negotiating parties and mediator(s) can result in the failure of talks 
or inefficiency of an agreement, if concluded.
To select a proper mediator the Russian CRM experts suggest 
the following procedures:
•	 The negotiating parties should make a voluntary choice of a 
third party; nobody should put pressure on them or impose on 
them a mediator.
•	 A potential third party should demonstrate and prove its 
neutrality, objectiveness and impartiality regarding the conflict 
to be mediated.
•	 A candidate for a mediator should have enough clout to bring 
the conflicting parties to an agreement and enforce such an 
agreement’s implementation, including its economic/financial 
capabilities.
According to the Russian peace researchers (Grishina 2008: 357–
358; Lebedeva 1999: 56–61), the mediator should contribute to the 
solution of the conflict by:
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•	 Initiating the conflict resolution process by carrying out a 
detailed analysis of the area of conflict, setting up the necessary 
infrastructure, and raising the necessary funds.
•	 Selecting proper participants and seeing to their preparations for 
negotiations.
•	 Taking measures to assure the parties to the conflict of the honest 
intentions of the initiators.
•	 Defining basic rules for communication and interaction during 
the talks.
•	 Selecting and structuring the themes to be tackled over the 
negotiations and, at the same time, being flexible in terms of the 
agenda and prepared for a ‘rolling program’, in which the themes 
can be later changed in consultation with the participants.
•	 Intervening in such a way as to help participants become aware 
of the dynamics of the conflict and to enable them to work 
constructively at the solution of a problem.
The most important precondition for the third-party efforts’ success 
is that there should be some willingness and ability on the part of 
those involved in a conflict to communicate with each other in a 
non-violent manner. The first step will then be to expose and deal 
with the distorted perceptions and barriers to communication, which 
have arisen as a result of the dynamics of the conflict. Methods to 
overcome prejudices and enemy images that have been mentioned 
earlier offer suitable means of achieving this.
It should be noted that this phase is probably one of the most 
difficult parts of the whole process, since participants still feel a lot 
of mistrust and skepticism in regard to the project. In addition, the 
most common rules of communication during the talks, namely the 
appeal for ‘openness’ and ‘empathy’, can be felt to be one-sided or 
unbalanced in the case of majority-minority conflicts (like between 
Ukraine and Donbass ‘separatists’). For example, if it is part of the 
survival strategy of a minority to keep ‘openness’ to a minimum in its 
conduct vis-à-vis the majority, this kind of demand in a negotiation 
situation will put it under considerable pressure. Conversely, the 
empathy rule can ‘privilege’ the minority, since it is generally forced 
to a much greater extent than the majority to put itself in the opposite 
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position, and therefore has fewer difficulties with this demand than 
does the majority.
As the Russian peace researchers underline, the final, but decisive 
phase in the mediating process aims to secure a solution that is 
beneficial to all. The solution is conceived of not as a final state, in 
which all problems have been solved, but rather as an intermediate 
stage in the quest to do justice to the basic needs of all the parties 
involved. Of decisive significance at this point, the Russian experts 
maintain, is the idea that the classical ‘zero-sum game’ resulting 
from a heightened conflict (one side’s gain is the other side’s loss) 
is transformed into a configuration that produces a positive total. 
In the case of ethno-national or majority-minority conflicts, this 
involves a readiness to take the basic needs of the other groups 
related to their security, identity and participation as seriously as 
one’s own. Working on this basis, various methods designed to 
promote creativity can be used to aid the CRM process in relation 
to the particular issue in hand.
The Russian CRM experts (Lebedeva 1999: 48–50; Pushmin 
1970) distinguish between different types of the third-party activities 
and strategies: 
•	 ‘Good services’ missions (GSMs) which were included to the 
CRM arsenal as early as in the 1907 Hague Convention. The 
GSM’s main aim is to create favorable conditions for conflict 
resolution by providing its territory for peace negotiations or 
assistance in establishing contacts between the warring parties 
and organizing talks between them. Generally speaking, the GSM 
is a rather passive conflict resolution method that helps to create 
pre-conditions and a favorable environment for the negotiation 
process rather than suggests any active role for the third party. 
The Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko’s role in 
providing the contact group on Ukraine and the Normandy-4 
summits with premises for their meetings in Minsk exemplifies 
the most recent case of the GSM activities.
•	 Neutral observer to the negotiations. This type of strategy 
presupposes even a more passive role for the third party than 
the previous one. The observer can only monitor the negotiation 
process but it is not supposed to intervene in the talks themselves. 
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However, the observer’s role is positive nonetheless because the 
very fact of its presence over the negotiations can pacify the 
conflicting parties, make them more moderate and create the 
conditions conducive to a compromise.
•	 Mediator. In contrast with the two previous cases, the status of 
a mediator implies an active rather than a passive role of the 
third party in the peace process. The mediator not only assists in 
facilitating contacts between the conflicting parties or creating 
favorable conditions for negotiations but also can set up the 
framework for negotiations, intervene in the negotiation process, 
put pressure on the participants to bring them to a consensus 
and even enforce the implementation of a concluded agreement. 
In contrast with the GSM-type of the third party which can 
in principle act on behalf of one of the conflicting parties, the 
mediator’s candidature should be approved by all the parties 
involved. Otherwise its role will be useless or inefficient.
•	 Arbitrator forms the class of its own (see the next section).
It is, needless to say, the same third-party actor that can combine or 
change different roles – depending on a situation.
6. Arbitrage.
Arbitrage is a form of alternative dispute resolution, a technique for 
the resolution of disputes outside the courts. The ability to resolve 
disputes in a neutral forum and the enforceability of binding decisions 
are often seen by the Russian CRM experts as the main advantages of 
international arbitration over the resolution of disputes in domestic 
courts. There is solid legal support for this view. The principal 
instrument governing the enforcement of commercial international 
arbitration agreements and awards is the UN Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(the New York Convention).  This convention was drafted under 
the auspices of the United Nations and has been ratified by more 
than 140 countries, including most major countries involved in 
significant international trade and economic transactions. The New 
York Convention requires the states that have ratified it to recognize 
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and enforce international arbitration agreements and foreign 
arbitral awards issued in other contracting states, subject to certain 
limited exceptions. These provisions of the New York Convention, 
together with the large number of contracting states, has created an 
international legal regime that significantly favors the enforcement 
of international arbitration agreements and awards.
The theme of arbitrage as a means of mediation is studied by 
mainly the Russian legalist school. Depending on the degree of 
institutionalization of international arbitrage the Russian experts 
point out institutional and ad hoc arbitrage (Shevchuk 2009: 67). 
The institutional arbitrage is an arbitration done by the permanently 
functioning body on the basis of its statute and regulations. The 
examples of the institutional arbitrage bodies in the commercial 
sphere are the International Chamber of Commerce, International 
Center for Dispute Resolution, London Court of International 
Arbitration, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, etc. 
As far as the interstate conflicts are concerned some 
institutionalized arbitrage mechanisms are also available. The 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences addressed arbitration as a 
mechanism for resolving state-to-state disputes, leading to the 
adoption of the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes. The Conventions established the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration and a rudimentary institutional framework 
for international arbitration of inter-state disputes. The PCA is still 
functioning although Russia did not apply for this court’s mediation. 
At the same time, similar to other maritime powers, Russia regularly 
deals with another interstate arbitrage body – the UN Commission 
on the Limits of Continental Shelf to solve disputable questions 
concerning its Pacific and Arctic shelves.
The ad hoc arbitrage is done on the basis of specially established 
organs and procedures of temporary nature. Ad hoc arbitration 
allows the parties to tailor the arbitration process to the specific 
circumstances of their dispute. The parties decide the seat of the 
arbitration proceedings. Where the procedural rules are silent, the 
laws of the seat will govern the procedure. As far as the international 
commercial disputes are concerned, the UN Commission on 
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International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, adopted in 1976 and 
revised in 2010, are among the most popular rules for this purpose. 
While some Russian companies were involved in the ad hoc 
arbitration over the last two decades (Shevchuk 2009: 67), Moscow 
has never used this legal mechanism to solve interstate conflicts.
Using the arbitration methods as a criterion the Russian legal 
experts (Dmitriev 2000: 242–244; Kudryavtsev 1995: 300–302; 
Orlyanski 2007: 95–96) identify the following types of international 
arbitrage:
•	 Binding arbitrage: the conflicting parties nominate the neutral 
and authoritative arbitrators whose decisions have a decisive 
and binding character.
•	 Recommendatory arbitrage: this type of arbitration is similar to 
the previous one but its decision is of a recommendatory rather 
than mandatory character. The parties in dispute can either 
accept the arbitrator’s decision or bring the case to the binding 
arbitrage or international court.
•	 Pendulum arbitration, otherwise known as final offer arbitration 
(FOA), being a variation of the binding arbitrage, is a type 
of interest arbitration in which the arbitrator chooses one of the 
parties’ proposals on each (or perhaps all) disputed issues.
•	 Limited arbitrage is another variation of binding arbitrage 
where the conflicting parties reach an agreement on the limits 
of the arbitration’s scope and powers even before the start of 
the arbitration process itself. It is done to limit potential risks 
for the sides involved, particularly to prevent the arbitrator’s 
undesirable decisions and keep the status quo situation.
•	 Intermediary arbitrage is a mixed form of arbitration where the 
third party should play a role of both arbitrator and mediator. 
The third party is supposed to find a solution to the problem 
which could be acceptable for all sides involved.
•	 Arbitral tribunal. The arbitrators which determine the outcome 
of the dispute are called the arbitral tribunal. The composition 
of the arbitral tribunal can vary enormously, with either a sole 
arbitrator sitting, two or more arbitrators, with or without a 
chairman or umpire, and various other combinations. In most 
jurisdictions, an arbitrator enjoys immunity from liability for 
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anything done or omitted whilst acting as arbitrator unless the 
arbitrator acts in bad faith. The decisions of the arbitral tribunal 
are final and mandatory.
7. Track II diplomacy.
In addition to the ‘official’ (Track I) diplomacy there are diverse 
international activities exercised by common people and NGOs 
(Kudryavtsev 1995: 302; Lebedeva 2011: 215). This type of activities 
is called ‘citizens’ diplomacy’ or ‘Track II diplomacy’. As a rule, 
such activities are conducted by idealistically-minded, committed 
individuals or/and groups who do not identify exclusively with any 
one party. Unlike official, inter-state diplomacy, Track II diplomacy 
can operate outside the conflictual structure dominated by power 
politics.
In Russia, the Track II diplomacy is in its embryonic phase 
because the civil society and its institutions are still in a creative 
stage. Very few Russian NGOs were involved in the CRM activities. 
For example, ‘Soldier Mothers’ served as intermediaries in contacts 
between the federal government and Chechen rebels in the two 
Chechen wars to release prisoners of war. The Russian, Georgian and 
Ukrainian Orthodox churches served as informal channels during 
the conflicts between these countries and helped their governments 
to establish contacts and start negotiations between them.
The Russian peace researchers believe that the Track II diplomacy 
should not only help to solve day-to-day problems; rather, it should 
aim at developing a civic culture of peace and non-violence both in 
Russia and world-wide. This school refers to the UNESCO Program 
of Action for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence (1999) as a 
relevant strategy for achieving this goal (Stepanov et al. 2007).
the institutional dimension
The CRM studies – in its embryonic form – have emerged in the late 
Gorbachev era. A number of research institutes within the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences (SAS), such as the Institute of World Economy 
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and International Relations (IWEIR), Institute of the U.S. & Canada 
(IUSC), Institute of Europe (IE), Institute of Scientific Information on 
Social Sciences (ISISS) as well as some universities, such as Moscow 
State University (MSU), Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MSIIR), Diplomatic Academy, etc., have been involved 
in the conflict, arms control and disarmament/conversion studies 
(Busygina-Thranert 1994; Politika Sily ili Sila Razuma 1989). The 
same institutions were invited to develop the New Political Thinking 
(NPT) that to a larger extent has incorporated the CRM agenda 
(Gorbachev 1987; Gromyko and Lomeiko 1984; Sergunin 2007: 
21–22).
In 1989, the SAS established a Peace Research Institute led by Dr. 
Alexander Kislov. However, this institute, which had been created 
on the basis of the IWEIR, has always lacked finance, resources, staff 
and attention from the government. In the 1990s, its activities were 
eventually stopped.
In 1990 the Russian Conflict Resolution Center, headed by Dr. 
Andrei Shumikhin, was established within the IUSC. It managed 
to conduct several research seminars on conflict resolution with 
its American counterparts. Its activities were undertaken in close 
contact with the Russian Parliament and some local governments in 
different parts of Russia (Kremenyuk, 1994: 40). 
It should be noted that from the very beginning, the Russian 
CRM took a syncretic form and this made it difficult to identify 
which centers belong to the peace research tradition and which 
can be attributed to its opposite – security studies. Sometimes the 
dividing lines can run within the same institution. For example, the 
MSU’s Faculty of World Politics develops the CRM research as a 
part of security studies while the faculties of political science and 
sociology offer a peace research approach to the same field.
In the post-Soviet period the Russian CRM has been developed 
within four major sectors – the Russian Academy of Sciences 
(RAS); university/higher education system; NGOs/independent 
think tanks/public policy centers, and professional associations 
(see figure 1). 
Similar to the Gorbachev period, in the post-Soviet era the RAS 
has again pioneered in developing the CRM studies. In 1991, the 
65
Center for Conflict Studies has been established within the RAS 
Institute of Sociology (IS). The center eventually developed a network 
of conflict studies centers in the Russian regions, such as Astrakhan, 
Nizhny Novgorod, Stavropol and Yoskar-Ola (Republic of Mari-El) 
(http://www.conflictolog.narod.ru/OldSite/). The center’s research 
is based on the theoretical and methodological assumptions of the 
classical peace research (Galtung’s structural violence theory, culture 
of peace, etc.) although it prefers to focus on Russia’s internal 
socio-political and ethno-religious conflicts. International conflict 
resolution and peace- making is mainly studied in the context of 
globalization’s contradictory implications and of minor significance 
for this institution (Stepanov 2014). As a result of the IS’s radical 
reorganization in 2006 the status of the center was reduced to a 
working group (task force) on sociology of conflict within the 
Center for Regional Sociology and Conflict Studies. The group 
led by Prof. Yevgeny Stepanov, however, still manages to publish 
occasional papers and the Conflictology (Conflict Studies) journal 
(in cooperation with the International Conflict Studies Association 
and St. Petersburg State University).
The same – domestic – focus of conflict research is characteristic 
of the RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, headed by 
Academician Valery Tishkov. The IEA has managed to develop a 
number of theories to explain inter-ethnic and religious conflicts 
and offer some conflict resolution methodology. Moreover, as it 
was mentioned, in the 1990s it tried to establish a monitor system 
in Russia’s conflict-prone regions to detect potential conflicts at 
an early phase. Moreover, Tishkov has suggested creating a State 
Committee on the Nationalities Affairs to become its first minister 
in March 1992 (Kremenyuk, 1994: 40).
The IWEIR is the leading RAS institution in the field of 
international CRM. It has several research units dealing with these 
issues. For example, the Peace and Conflict Research Group (part 
of the institute’s Department of International Political Problems), 
headed by Dr. Yekaterina Stepanova, covers issues, such as peace 
and conflict theory, conflict resolution and mediation methodology, 
conflict comparative studies, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement 
operations, responsibility to protect doctrine, etc. (http://www.
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imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=587). The group edits the IWEIR’s 
journal Ways to Peace and Security. The Department of Arms Control 
and Conflict Resolution, led by Dr. Andrei Zagorsky, focuses on 
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, non-traditional 
(soft) security threats and challenges, conflict management and 
resolution, etc. (http://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=589). 
The Regional Problems and Conflicts Research Unit – being a part 
of the Department of European Political Studies – deals with specific 
conflicts on the Balkans, East Europe and Black Sea/Caspian area 
(http://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=603).
Figure 1. Russian CRM research network
Figure 1. Russian CRM research network 
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To coordinate its peace and conflict research, the RAS has established 
a Center for Conflict Studies in the early 1990s. However, with the 
beginning of the RAS reform in 2013 it was abolished because of a 
lack of funding (http://www.ras.ru/win/db/show_org.asp?P=.oi-852.
vi-.fi-.id-852.oi-861). 
There are also some CRM-related bodies under the auspices of the 
RAS Presidium: the Scientists’ Committee on International Security 
and Arms Control (http://www.ras.ru/win/db/show_org.asp?P=.oi-
2096.vi-.fi-.oi-2354) and the Russian Pugwash Committee (http://
www.pugwash.ru/). These bodies’ main function is to coordinate the 
multidisciplinary research and political activities in areas such as 
arms control and disarmament.
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It should be noted that the ongoing RAS reform that aims at its 
streamlining is not conducive for the further development of CRM 
research within the Academy. Because of structural changes and 
lack of funding some centers are being closed down while others are 
being merged or transferred to other units.
The university-based CRM studies centers have been developed 
in a more dynamic way than the RAS ones. For instance, the inter-
faculty Centre for Conflict Studies was organized at the MSU in 
early 1990s. The center has dealt mainly with the theoretical and 
methodological aspects of CRM studies. By mid-1990s the MSU 
conflict studies were divided between the sociology and political 
science departments. Currently, the Department of International 
Relations Sociology and the Department of Political Sociology and 
Psychology deal with the theory of conflict and conflict resolution 
while the Department of Comparative Politics and Public Policy 
Department focus on examining specific domestic and international 
conflicts. The Department of Russian Politics is charge of running 
the recently established Conflict Studies B.A. program (http://polit.
msu.ru/conflicts/).
The MSIIR traditionally focuses its research both on conflict 
resolution theory and methodology (Khrustalev 1991 and 2008; 
Lebedeva 1999, 2010 and 2011; Tyulin 1991 and 1994) as well as 
on specific international conflicts (Bogaturov 1997; Borishpolets 
2005; Davydov 1993; Solodovnik, 1995; Strel’tsov 2013; Torkunov, 
1995; Torkunov and Mal’gin 2012; Voskresensky 2008; Zagorski 
and Lucas, 1993).
The Department of Conflict Studies has been established at the 
St. Petersburg State University (SPSU) in 1999. This department 
runs B.A. and M.A. programs in Conflict Studies and publishes 
the Conflictology journal together with IS and ICSA. A number 
of other SPSU departments (International Relations Theory and 
History; World Politics; Post-Soviet Studies, etc.) conduct research on 
international security, conflict resolution, territorial disputes and arms 
control (Achkasov and Lantsov 2011; Achkasov and Yeremeev 2009; 
Konyshev and Sergunin 2011, 2013 and 2014; Smorgunov 2012).
In 1993 a Center for Peace and Conflict Research was established 
at the Nizhny Novgorod State University (NNSU) by a group of 
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local scholars who were inspired by the Scandinavian peace research 
activities. This center has dealt with issues such as international 
security, regional conflicts, peace-keeping, conversion, arms trade, 
regionalism and history of peace research (Kolobov et al. 1992; 
Kolobov 1995; Kornilov 1996; Makarychev 1997; Sergunin 1994 
and 2007; Sergunin and Subbotin 1999; Kolobov, Kornilov and 
Sergunin 1991; Malhotra and Sergunin 1998). At the peak of its 
activities in the 1990s the center published the Nizhny Novgorod 
Journal of International Relations and a newsletter Angelos 
(Peace Herald) on an occasional basis. Together with some other 
organizations the center has co-organized a series of seminars and 
conferences on international security, Russian and American foreign 
policies, divided nations, NATO enlargement and so on (Kolobov 
and Makarychev 1998). In the 2000s, the center’s activities were 
absorbed by various units within the NNSU Faculty of International 
Relations.
In 1999 the UNESCO and the Republic of Tatarstan jointly 
established a Kazan State Institute for the Culture of Peace of 
UNESCO. The institute runs the training courses for mediators 
and civilian peace-keeper on the regular basis. It helps the Russian 
universities to design course and program curricula on conflict 
studies. In terms of research activities, the institute develops the 
projects on inter-civilization cooperation and the role of Islam in 
promotion of the culture of peace (http://kazan.culture-peace.ru/
ikm_unesco_eng.html).
Currently, several dozen Russian universities run B.A. and M.A. 
programs in conflict studies.
Along the RAS and universities, the civil society institutions and 
independent think tanks are engaged in peace and conflict research 
in post-Soviet Russia. In 1991, a Center for Ethno-Political and 
Regional Studies (CEPRS) was established by the Foreign Policy 
Association. Since 1993 the center has become an independent 
think tank led by Emil Pain who was a presidential advisor from 
1996–1999. Although the center’s research is mostly on Russia’s 
domestic conflicts, the CEPRS has implemented a series of projects 
on international security, conflict resolution and migration processes 
in the post-Soviet space (http://www.indem.ru/Ceprs/Sphera.htm).
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In early 1990s, Olga Vorkunova established two NGOs – 
a Center for Development and Peace Studies FORUM and a 
Russian Academy of Peace that tried to promote peace culture 
and preventive diplomacy (Vorkunova 2008 and 2012). These 
institutions established extensive international contacts, including 
the International Peace Research Association (IPRA).
In 1997 the Moscow School of Conflict Studies was created 
with the aim to organize training in conflict resolution and 
mediation. The school strives to study and sum up the Russian 
higher education institutions’ experiences in developing conflict 
studies programs.
As far as the professional associations are concerned the Russian 
CRM specialists failed to establish a branch of the IPRA or European 
Peace Research Association (EuPRA) although the Russian peace 
researchers are represented in these organizations, including their 
executive committees. 
The International Conflict Studies Association was established 
in 1992 to coordinate both research and educational activities in 
the field of conflict studies (http://www.confstud.ru/). The Russian 
Sociological Society has a Research Committee on the Sociology 
of Conflict (http://www.ssa-rss.ru/index.php?page_id=22&id=87). 
These associations, however, unite only sociologists while most 
Russian political scientists and international relations experts remain 
uninvolved. It should be noted that the two leading professional 
associations in the field of international relations – the Russian 
International Studies Association and Russian Political Science 
Association – do not have any units either on peace research or 
conflict studies. The lack of a specialized peace research association 
remains a serious obstacle to the further development of the Russian 
CRM studies.
To sum up, the Russian CRM research is not properly 
institutionalized: there is neither a coordinating center nor specialized 
professional associations; research and educational activities are 
rather chaotic; few higher education institutions train experts in 
conflict resolution, etc.
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conclusions
The Russian academia made great strides in studying issues such 
as causes of war, history of specific conflicts, conflict prevention 
and resolution, mediation, peace-keeping and peace-making, 
humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect, the role of 
the UN and other international organizations in conflict management 
and resolution, etc. In terms of theory and methodology it has 
overcome the dominance of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
become open to the dialogue with other social science paradigms.
However, presently, the Russian social sciences face serious 
intellectual and institutional challenges. Theoretically, it is still unable 
to produce concepts and research approaches of its own, being 
heavily dependent on foreign (Western) schools. The Russian CRM 
research has in fact stuck at the ‘negative peace’ stage being unable 
to develop ‘positive peace’ theories. It has difficulties with developing 
an early warning/conflict prevention system either domestically or 
internationally. This school is not properly institutionalized either 
in terms of having a professional association (like IPRA) or being 
embedded in university curricula. It is unable to seriously affect 
neither the Russian national security doctrines nor the decision-
making system.
Despite the above-mentioned problems, the vast majority of Russian 
social scientists acknowledge an increasing importance of conflict 
resolution at the present-day world. They believe that conflict and 
crisis management, aimed at preventing, containing, and terminating 
acute wars, once again assumed a central position in international 
politics. The end of the Cold War has created a new international 
environment with entirely new requirements for conflict resolution. 
This offers scholars an opportunity to engage in policy-relevant basic 
research to generate findings that can assist policy-makers to arrive 
at sound diagnoses of conflicts and effective policy actions. There 
are numerous basic phase models for the analysis of conflicts which 
identify stages such as early warning, conflict prevention, conflict 
resolution, mediation and post-conflict peace-building.
The CRM research continues to provide the Russian scholarship 
with innovative approaches and useful insights into basic IR issues 
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such as causes of war and conflict, nature, sources and manifestations 
of violence, essence and ways of achieving both ‘negative’ and 
‘positive peace’, transformation of the international relations system 
in the post-Cold War era and so on. In addition, this type of research 
continues to challenge Russia’s predominant IR paradigms, thus 
forcing them to develop their concepts, argumentation and research 
techniques.
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russia’s conFlict 
settlement and mediation 
practises: proBing the 
inFluence oF national 
deVelopment strategies
Yulia Nikitina
russian international versus  
regional mediation efforts: 
differences in perceptions 
Russia is an important international mediator in the Syrian conflict, 
a participant in P5+1 negotiations on the Iranian nuclear dossier, 
and also a member of the Middle East Quartet and the Six Parties 
talks1. However, Russia’s own experience of conflict resolution and 
mediation in the post-Soviet space, especially in the 1990s, is often 
described as biased. While Russia’s international efforts have been 
seen as an important contribution to international as well as regional 
security and stability, the contributions to regional mediating and 
peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space has not been viewed as a 
“good model”. 
The problem might lie in one of its aspects pertaining to the 
perception that the international community has in general on the 
1 Geographic priorities in Russian mediation efforts are presented in Table 1 
(Annex) and discussed below in this chapter.
78
role of external actors and their neutrality. External actors can, 
on the one hand, be neutral, as they do not have “a direct stake 
in the outcomes of the process”2. Yet, and on the other hand, this 
detachment and lack of insight into the local and regional processes 
can amount to ineffectiveness concerning external involvement 
in conflict-settlement. A key question in this case is thus whether 
peacekeeping and mediating is carried out by a neutral and external 
actor or a biased internal one, or perhaps even a party to the conflict. 
Overall, there does not appear to be any international consensus 
on the role of regional mediators and regional peacekeepers. In the 
2009 report on enhancing mediation, the UN Secretary General 
states the following: “Regional politics can play either a positive or 
a negative role. In some cases, regional influence may have more 
impact on the warring parties than international influence; in others, 
the opposite may be true. While regional approaches are often 
effective, vigilance is required in situations where regional rivalries 
and cleavages cause Governments to take sides, thus leading to a 
wider conflict.3”
Thus, one of the questions in the analysis of Russian mediation 
and peacekeeping in post-Soviet conflicts is whether to analyze 
Russia as a neutral external or biased internal actor? Is the Russian 
regional peacekeeping practice of the 1990s a success or failure 
case? Obviously, perceptions differ in Russian and Western expert 
communities.
The post-Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR: Legal and 
political frameworks for conflict-settlement
The collapse of the USSR was proclaimed in the Agreement 
on the creation of the Commonwealth of the Independent States 
(CIS) signed by Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders on 8th of 
December 1991 in the Belovezhskaya pushcha. The document was 
premised on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-interference in each other’s affairs, as well as the right to self-
2 National Dialogue and Internal Mediation Processes: Perspectives on Theory 
and Practice. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014. – P. 36.
3 Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support 
Activities, 8 April 2009 S/2009/189 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N09/278/78/PDF/N0927878.pdf?OpenElement 
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determination and an obligation to respect the rights of national 
minorities and assurance of equal rights concerning representatives 
of all ethnic groups. Adopted in January 1993, the CIS Charter 
stipulated the same principles: respect for sovereignty of CIS member-
states and inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and to 
decide their own fate without external interference; inviolability of 
frontiers and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of all disputes. 
All these principles, including both the principle of territorial integrity 
and the right to self-determination, were seen as “interdependent and 
equal”, which inevitably led to mutually exclusive interpretations 
of these principles by the parties to separatist conflicts in the post-
Soviet space4. 
Furthermore, in the case of a threat to sovereignty, security or 
territorial integrity of a member-state, CIS heads of states have 
been granted the right to start immediate consultations in order 
to coordinate their position and undertake measures to eliminate 
the threat. The measures taken could also include peacekeeping 
operations. Individual or collective self-defense, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, is also mentioned as a legal basis for 
the use of force needed to counter threats. A decision concerning a 
joint use of forces can be taken either by the Council of the Heads of 
States, which consists of all CIS member-states, or it can be taken by 
“interested states”. The approval of all member-states is hence not 
required for the conduct of a CIS peacekeeping operation. 
It may yet be noted that the discipline as to implementation in 
the CIS has since its start remained quite low. In fact, only about 
10 percent of the approved documents have entered into force and 
this is then also why concrete practice has remained important 
despite the fact that these practices do not always fully correspond 
to international standards. Peacekeeping is a case in point. This may, 
however, also entail that the practices of peacekeeping and conflict-
settlement in the post-Soviet region amount to some new patterns of 
conflict settlement. This is an issue to be explored further in what 
follows.
4 The term “post-Soviet space” is used in Russian expert community to designate 
12 former Soviet republics out of 15, except for three Baltic states that later became 
members of NATO and the EU and, thus, became part of another region.
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On the eve of the collapse of the USSR and after its breakdown 
in 1991, altogether five military conflicts emerged in the post-Soviet 
space: in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Transnistria (Moldova), 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), and a civil war in Tajikistan. 
Russia participated in four peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet 
space after the collapse of the USSR (there was no peacekeeping 
operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, although Russia took part in the 
mediation process). Notably, operations in Abkhazia and Tajikistan 
were conducted under the mandate of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, and Russia was the major funding and troop 
contributor to these two regional operations, while other CIS 
members were reluctant to participate. Operations in Transnistria and 
South Ossetia were legally based on multilateral agreements between 
Russia and parties to the conflict, with this then implying that Russia 
figured as the only “external” peacekeeper. No full-scale UN or 
OSCE peacekeeping operations took place as these actors restricted 
themselves to the conduct of political and observer missions.
It may be noted that various Western commentators often regard 
Russian and CIS peacekeeping as biased towards the government 
in case of Tajikistan and towards separatist republics in cases of 
Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For example, Dov Lynch 
compares the practice of Russian regional peacekeeping in the 1990s 
with UN norms of peacekeeping and concludes that Russia broke all 
the UN norms in its conflict-settlement activities. He therefore prefers 
to refer to Russian actions “peacekeeping” in inverted commas5. 
Russia, in turn, perceives its role in conflict-settlement in the post-
Soviet space in the 1990s as a neutral one and that of a third party 
in the sense of acting completely in line with UN norms. Russia 
thus views itself as an external actor. It may be noted, though, that 
this approach is not favorable for Russia. The underlying motives 
can be questioned, and Russia’s willingness to lead peacekeeping 
operations in the post-Soviet space can be viewed as part and parcel 
of a neoimperialist strategy aimed at restoring its status as a great 
power. The question thus emerges whether there are any alternative 
and different explanations for Russia’s motives.
5 Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, 
Georgia and Tajikistan. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
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state-Building and nation-Building as 
aspects of conflict settlement in the 
post-soviet space 
The strategies pursued by Russia during the first half of the 1990s 
have clearly been related to the stages of state-building and nation-
building in new independent states and may also be analyzed as 
such. The collapse of the USSR is often analyzed in the field of 
International Relations research by separating between the process 
that took place prior to December 1991 and the fait accompli 
unfolding after this date with the emergence of 12 independent 
CIS states. In IR as a discipline there has been the inclination to 
analyze relations among the newly independent post-Soviet states 
as inter-national in nature despite that for the first two or three 
years after the collapse these relations still largely retained their 
nature of intra-state relations due to the incompleteness of state-
building in former Soviet republics. The central Soviet government 
has frequently been blamed for inaction in late years of the USSR 
in view of the revival of ethnic conflicts. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russia played the mediating and peacekeeping role 
that had been expected from the central Soviet authorities, but 
since Russian actions were undertaken in a situation of interstate 
relations, Russia has frequently been criticized for interference. In 
sum, the policies pursued by Russia have been perceived as biased 
in the framework of international relations, although they can 
also be perceived as neutral and seen as aiming at creating the 
conditions conducive to a status quo from the point of view of 
intrastate relations.
There is, however, a kind of middle road available in the 
interpretations applied. It is possible to draw on the concept of 
incomplete sovereignty as introduced by Alexander Cooley and 
Henrik Spruyt6. In general, once empires collapse, mixed forms 
of sovereignty tend to emerge. They further note that when “the 
sovereignty-related underlying sources of conflicts among states—
6 Alexander Cooley & Hendrik Spruyt. Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in 
International Relations. Princeton University Press, 2009. 
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contested assets, territory, borders, and functions—can all be split, 
shared, and reapportioned in a mutually beneficial manner”7. 
Incomplete agreements concerning the sharing of sovereignty 
generate political uncertainty, but such uncertainty is accepted by 
contracting parties as they prefer to postpone any final arrangement 
and preserve the option of renegotiating the amount of their 
sovereign rights. 
The state of incomplete sovereignty lasted among the CIS states 
till the end of 1993. For the part of the economic sphere, the end of 
this stage was marked by the collapse of the Russian ruble zone in 
August 1993, whereas in the security sphere it took place in the form 
of the transformation of the General Headquarters of the CIS Joint 
Military Forces into the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination 
Headquarters in December 1993. 
At large, it appears that Russia’s approach changed after the two 
first years of shared responsibility towards an increased emphasis on 
its own national interests. In fact, Russian relations with the newly 
independent states had basically features of international relations 
after 1993. This implies that there have been two different stages 
of Russian peacekeeping and mediation in the post-Soviet region 
in the 1990s. Firstly, there was the stage of incomplete sovereignty 
during the years 1992–1993, and secondly, the one based on the pre-
eminence of national interests since late 1993. The most disputed 
period of Russian peacekeeping consists of the early 1990s and 
pertains to the situation of incomplete sovereignty. 
nation-Building: implications for 
conflict-settlement
Notably, the approach applied by Russia in the sphere of nation-
building has been inherited from the USSR-period. As pointed out 
by Terry Martin, there existed a conflict during the Soviet rule. On 
the one hand there was the desire to promote centralization and on 
the other hand the need to cope with the national consciousness of 
7 Ibid. p. 7.
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various ethnic minorities8. Sergey Markedonov points similarly to 
Russia’s need to build a nation-state while simultaneously aiming at 
gaining control over the subjects (regions) of the Russian Federation 
and to obtain their loyalty9. 
It is further to be noted that after the collapse of the USSR no 
broadly shared understanding on what the Russian nation actually 
is emerged either among the political elites or within the Russian 
society at large. In consequence, the beginning of the new stage in 
state- and nation-building was marked by a constitutional crisis in 
September-October 1993 until the adoption of the Constitution in 
December 1993. This was the first official document based on the 
concept of a unified Russian nation. In hindsight, several Russian 
scholars disagree with the approach applied and argue that 
Russia’s political elites actually failed to choose properly among 
many possible variants of Russian macro-identity. This missing of 
the opportunity has then restricted a further consolidation of the 
Russian society10.
In any case, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia opted for a 
civic nation-building premised on a model based on a macro-identity 
that could also possibly encompass the whole CIS region. The other 
CIS states opted in general for a more ethno-centric model of nation-
building.
The fact that Russia inherited largely the Soviet approach to 
nation- and state-building has three different, albeit rather practical, 
implications. The first one concerns the Soviet-time conceptual 
opposition of “good” defensive local nationalism and “bad” 
offensive imperial nationalism. After its emergence in 1917, the 
Soviet government had to deal with the decolonization of the Russian 
Empire by creating Soviet Republics and autonomous republics. 
Rising nationalism during the civil war (1917–1922) was of surprise 
to Bolsheviks, in particular as they had failed in devising any coherent 
strategy concerning the different nationalities. They erroneously 
assumed that class identities would surpass national identity after 
8 Martin T. The Affirmative Action Empire. Cornell University Press, 2001.
9 S.Markedonov. Turbulent Eurasia. Interethnic, civil conflicts, xenophobia in the 
new independent states of the post-Soviet space. ‘Moscow, Academia, 2010. p. 13.
10 Ibid.
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the proletariat revolution. The strategy that they developed included 
a specifically understood right to self-determination within the 
framework of a unitary Soviet Union11. As such, nationalism was 
seen by Lenin and Stalin as an unavoidable phase on the historic 
path leading to internationalism. It was thought that the granting 
of some form of nationhood would prevent the emergence of claims 
concerning independent statehood12: “Nationalism will be disarmed 
by granting the forms of nationhood”13. Overall, the Bolsheviks 
used policies of indigenization (korenizatsiya) as a way to tackle the 
imperialism of the Russian Empire. They kept apart the nationalism 
of the oppressing nation (offensive great power nationalism) and 
the defensive local nationalism that was officially justified in Soviet 
years14.
an altered approach 
Also President Boris Yeltsin’s famous slogan “take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow” has the same conceptual and 
ideational background and it may equally be noted that Russia’s 
sympathy for separatist territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria had initially similar roots, although the rise of separatist 
movements in the country itself has then over time altered Russia’s 
approaches to nation- and state-building. 
Yet another implication for the settling of conflicts that flows 
from the nation-building strategies consists of the distribution of 
Russian passports as well as attempts since 1993 to introduce double 
citizenship with CIS states. The passport policies conducted by Russia 
in separatist republics have usually been analyzed in the framework 
of conflict-resolution rather than applying the framework of the 
11 Martin T. The Affirmative Action Empire. Cornell University Press, 2001. – 528 
p.
12 Ibid. p. 5.
13 Ibid., p.8
14 S.Markedonov. Turbulent Eurasia. Interethnic, civil conflicts, xenophobia in the 
new independent states of the post-Soviet space, p. 7. Moscow: Academia, 2010 – 
C. 7).
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wider Russian policies of nation-building, i.e. policies that started 
in the 1990s. For example, passportization of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia has been portrayed as an action that subverted Georgian 
sovereignty and undermined Russia’s efforts to act as a mediator in 
these conflicts15. 
Yet also another and broader interpretation is conceivable. It can 
be assumed, departing from the wider context of Russian policies 
of passportization and double citizenship, that these were actually 
Russian attempts to coin and contribute to the emergence of a 
regional macro-identity that would, inter alia, be conducive to the 
incorporation of the Russian-speakers left in the new independent 
states after the collapse of the USSR. As Dmitry Furman formulated 
it in 1997, “Russians and Russian-speakers are a divided nation”, 
because 17% of all Russian live in the “near abroad”16. In any case, 
the effort to introduce double citizenships failed with some exceptions 
in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan17. Views have in general remained 
critical as also indicated by Russia’s search for a unifying macro-
identity as a substitute for its not yet formed civil nation identity has 
often been seen as containing ‘neo-imperialist’ connotations, and 
in consequence also Russia’s engagement in peacekeeping has been 
regarded as biased.
The third implication of the inherited Soviet strategies has been 
that the search in the other CIS states for a durable national identity 
ended with the prioritization of an ethnically premised model of 
nation-building with the so-called “titular” ethnic groups “usurping” 
all power18. This contrasts with Russia’s choice and in the post-
Soviet political and academic circles there exists a widely-shared 
perception that an acknowledgement of the civic nation would imply 
15 Scott Littlefield, ‘Citizenship, Identity and Foreign Policy: The Contradictions 
and Consequences of Russia’s Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of 
Georgia’. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 8, October 2009, p. 1473. 
16 Interethnic Relations and Conflicts in post-Soviet States. Annual report of the 
Network of ethnologic monitoring and early warning of conflicts, 1998, p..32.
17 I.Zevelev. ‘Compatriotes in Russian Politics on the Post-Soviet space’. Russia in 
Global Affairs, 2008, Issue 1, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10265
18 V.Tishkov, Yu.Shabaev. Ethnopolitology: Political Functions of Ethnicity. 
Moscow: MGU Publishing House, 2011, p .91.
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a negation of ethnic nation as a concept19. This conceptual approach 
is problematic as to the definition of ethnic minorities. According 
to Tishkov and Shabaev, the difference between understanding of 
the concept of national minority in the post-Soviet states and the 
Western understanding consists of minorities in the Western states 
being included in the entire nation, while minorities in post-Soviet 
states are perceived as a separate group not really belonging to the 
titular nations20. Overall, it appears that the inertia in mentality 
as well as lingering influence of ethnic nationalism makes it quite 
difficult to move over from the concept of ethnic nation to civic one 
in the post-Soviet states.
Interestingly, it appears that the post-Soviet leaders expected 
interethnic and interfaith conflicts to prevail over other types of 
conflicts in the CIS-region. Article 16 in the CIS Charter, adopted 
in January 1993, proclaims that CIS member-states will take 
all possible measures to prevent conflicts, first of all, between 
different ethnic and confessional groups (“na mezhnatsionalnoy i 
mezhkonfessionalnoy osnove”) that might lead to an infringement 
of human rights. Such a pledge does not cover Transnisitrian and 
inter-Tajik conflicts, because these pertain to other reasons than the 
interethnic or interfaith ones. Notably, no other types of conflicts 
have been brought up in the Charter.
the consequences of incomplete 
sovereignty in the Years 1992–1993
Russian involvement in the regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space 
has been partly induced by the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, 
Russian troops have been stationed on the ground from the very 
outset. This has been due to the reorganization of the Soviet Army 
as well as transfer of these military forces to Russia. The Russian 
President officially established the Russian Armed Forces only in 
March 1992, but until the 7th of May 1992, they were assigned to the 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, pp.91–92. 
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General Headquarters of the CIS Joint Military Forces, and became 
national Russian Armed Forces only after this date. Other former 
republics also decided to create their national armed forces instead 
of the CIS Joint Military Forces. Not surprisingly, partition of Soviet 
military heritage between former republics was a thorny process. 
For example, in 1992 Russia and Ukraine had a dispute over the 
Black Sea fleet stationed in Sebastopol, as both states pretended to 
include the fleet in their respective national armed forces. Until 1995, 
during the so-called transition period, the fleet was simultaneously 
subordinated to both Presidents, and later it was transferred to the 
Russian Armed Forces. 
Moreover, quite frequently, Russia has been unable to control 
what was happening on the ground, and on occasions Russian 
military units have also been left to themselves and have been forced 
to get along without financing from Moscow. Sometimes military 
equipment and armaments were seized by local illegal armed groups.
For example, in Tajikistan both the central government and the 
opposition endeavored, throughout 1992, to win over the 201st 
division in order to gain access the stocks of weapons. Arguably, 
the general attitudes on the ground were in this sense instrumental 
rather than political. The instrumental reasons disappeared once 
the division was manned with more contingents from Russia, and it 
gained the capacity to protect itself.
Various plans to create a unified command, and pool CIS military 
forces existed up to the year 1993. This implied among other things 
that also the Russian military forces remaining in Tajikistan, which 
used to be Soviet military forces, were mainly perceived as future 
components of a joint CIS force21. Moreover, Russia and Tajikistan 
proclaimed in their Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, signed on 25th May 1993, that they opt for a “joint defense 
policy” as part of joint CIS Military Forces22. This treaty then also 
provided the basis for the Russian troops (201st division) to engage 
themselves legally in the protection of Tajik borders and efforts of 
infiltrations by Tajik opposition groups based in Afghanistan.
21 Alexander Nikitin. Peacekeeping operations: Doctrine and Practice, 2000, p. 80.
22 Ibid., p. 82.
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law enforcement and economic 
Functions
The incomplete sovereignty and lack of efficient law enforcement 
institutions on the ground implied that Russian troops and Russian 
peacekeeping contingents had to frequently perform various functions 
that actually belonged to local institutions. This was also impacted 
by the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, representatives of the 
peacekeeping contingents on the ground continued to perceive the 
citizens of the newly independent states as their compatriots.23 It 
was hence natural for them to contribute to local affairs.
Similarly, towards the end of 1992 and early 1993, the Russian 
14th Army based in Moldova usurped law enforcement functions 
and partially functions of peacekeeping force in Transnistria. This 
was, as such, welcomed by the local population, but nonetheless 
quite illegal24. 
The same pattern was also present in South Ossetia in 1992–1993. 
The Russian peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia engaged itself in 
law enforcement. It did so as the Ossetian and Georgian peacekeeping 
contingents were unable to perform such a function in being allegedly, 
and according to various reports, mainly staffed by former participants 
to armed conflict as well as local criminals. In some cases, the Russian 
peacekeepers gradually shifted from their initial function to economic 
tasks. Thus, after the consolidation of political regimes in Georgia and 
South Ossetia in December 1994, all peacekeeping contingents on the 
ground were united under the control of the Russian General Anatoly 
Merkulev. This took place with the consent of all the parties. Later in 
1995 this contingent switched from law enforcement to restoration of 
local economy. Among other things, they organized weekly meetings 
between Ossetians and Georgians in order to address local economic 
problems.
23 A.Sokolov. Russian peace-keeping forces in the post-soviet area, in: Restructuring 
the global military sector. Vol. I: New wars, (ed.), M. Kaldor and B.Vashee on behalf 
of The United National University / World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, Pinter, London, GB, 1997, pp. 207–230. http://www.memo.ru/hr/
hotpoints/peace/peacekeep.htm 
24 Ibid. 
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In the economic sphere, Russia also shared some responsibilities 
of the Georgian state: in September 1993, Russia and Georgia signed 
an intergovernmental agreement (expired in 1997) stipulating that 
both sides assumed responsibility for the financing of reconstruction 
work in the zone of the conflict.
russia as party to conflict?  
legal issues
The agreement on the principles concerning settlement of the 
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, signed in June, 1992,25 stated that 
the Mixed Control Commission established to monitor the 
implementation of this agreement was to consist of the “parties 
involved in the conflict”. This implied that also Russia, along with 
North Ossetia, was viewed as party to the conflict. 
The Agreement reached between Moldovan and Russian 
governments and signed in July 1992 created a similar 
constellation. It was further endorsed by Igor Smirnov, the head 
of the Transnistrian republic. It amounted to the creation of a 
joint trilateral Control Commission that aimed at controlling the 
implementation of the agreement. This then also included Russia26. 
The agreement stipulated, among other things, that the 14th Army 
had to observe neutrality. Alarmed by the independent position 
held by the Commander of the 14th Army General Lebed, Moldova 
insisted that the Russian peacekeeping contingent should not be 
recruited from the 14th Army, because the 14th Army consisted 
25 Agreement on the Principles of Settlement of Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict 
of June 24, 1992. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902246 
26 On Principles of Peace Settlement of Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region 
of the Republic of Moldova on July 21, 1992 http://www.operationspaix.net/
DATA/DOCUMENT/1651~v~Accord_de_cessez_le_feu_entre_la_Transnistrie_
et_la_Moldavie_du_21_juillet_1992_-_document_en_russe_anglais_roumain.
pdf 
90
mainly of inhabitants of the Transnistrian region27. Russia agreed 
and acted accordingly. Thus, an agreement on the withdrawal 
of the 14th Army from Moldova within a period of three years 
was signed in October 1994. In addition, the withdrawal was 
linked to the search for a political settlement to the Transnistrian 
conflict, which allowed for recurrent postponement of withdrawal 
in absence of political settlement. The issue of Russian troops’ 
withdrawal appeared later on the agenda of the OSCE Istanbul 
1999 summit. 
Debates about Russia’s role in the settlement of the conflict 
circulated around the question whether Russia was a party to the 
conflict or if it was instead to be viewed as a neutral third party. In 
cases of South Ossetia and Transnistria peacekeeping operations 
were premised legally on multilateral agreements. As these did not 
correspond to the norms set by the UN, the operations could not 
be considered as proper forms of peacekeeping. However, if the 
same multilateral agreements are analyzed with an assumption 
that relations between states remain incomplete as to their 
sovereignty, these agreements can be considered as legitimate, 
because incomplete sovereignty allows for agreed involvement in 
domestic affairs without considering it a break of sovereignty. Of 
course, from the point of view of the UN Charter, an incomplete 
sovereignty situation contradicts the universal value of sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, the voluntary nature of agreements on conflict 
settlement in the post-Soviet space makes them legitimate at least 
for regional actors. 
27 The Commander of the Russian 14tg Army in Transnistria Alexander Lebed’: 
“They can scream under my window as long as they want, this will change 
nothing…”, Zerkalo nedeli. Ukrain 28.10.1994. http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/
komanduyuschiy_14-y_rossiyskoy_armiey_v_pridnestrovie_aleksandr_lebed_pod_
moimi_vorotami_mozhno_vizz.html 
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russian approaches to nation-
Building: shifts in support to the 
parties of the conflict 
Initially Russia’s supporting of separatist territories was accounted 
for by pointing to the fact that Russian troops were stationed in the 
regions of conflict. They had thus developed close ties with local 
populations. Moreover, Russia then still believed in “good” local 
nationalisms and approved, if not encouraged the taking of as much 
sovereignty as possible. Therefore, also the support provided by 
the Russian contingents on the ground for separatist parties to the 
conflicts was left without proper attention by the central Russian 
authorities who, in the early 1990s, were more preoccupied with 
Russian domestic political economic developments. Yet, somewhat 
later Russia shifted its position in order to support territorial integrity 
of the new independent states. Thus, a shift took place as Russia 
was confronted with a possible collapse of the Russian Federation 
and in consequence centralization as well as the preservation of 
territorial integrity pushed aside the Soviet-time inertia, i.e. the idea 
of supporting some forms of local nationalisms as a means to avert 
state collapse. The change was epitomized by the address of President 
Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly in 1995. He insisted in his speech 
that state integrity is primordial, and that separation from this “civic 
organism” is legally conceivable only under quite special conditions. 
As a case in point he approved the use of force against the Dudaev 
regime in Chechnya in order for Russia’s territorial integrity to be 
re-instated28. 
Another change in Russia’s conceptual approaches to regional 
peacekeeping has evolved since 1995 with Russia requesting various 
international institutions to get involved in the conflict-settlement 
process in the CIS region. In his address to the Federal Assembly, 
Yeltsin blamed the UN and the OSCE for their “unduly modest” 
28 Address of the President of Russia to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation “On the Effectiveness of State Power in Russia”, 1995. http://www.
intelros.ru/strategy/gos_rf/psl_prezident_rf_old/72-poslanie_prezidenta_rosii_
borisa_elcina_federalnomu_sobraniju_rf_o_dejjstvennosti_gosudarstvennojj_
vlasti_v_rossii_1995_god.html 
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practical support to the CIS and Russian peacekeeping activities in 
the post-Soviet space. He complained that “the conduct of full-scale 
operations under the UN flag, namely in Georgia and Tajikistan, has 
been restrained by a number of UN Security Council members”29. 
Another document on the “Strategic course of Russia with CIS 
member-states”, approved in September 1995, stipulates that Russia 
should undertake efforts to make regional peacekeeping truly 
collective. Among other things, other CIS states should be invited 
to participate more actively. In addition, Russia should aspire for 
real and extended participation of the UN and OSCE in conflict-
settlement in the CIS30. This was called for as the UN and the CSCE/
OSCE remained disinterested during the years 1992–1994 in any 
full-scale international peacekeeping operations covering the CIS 
region.
Transnistria
The 14th Army, based in Transnistria, was transferred to Russia only 
in April 1992. It was, as a contingent, inclined to favor Transnistrians 
while the region then also preferred to utilize the Army as de 
facto peacekeepers, although formally the 14th Army was not part 
of peacekeeping contingents. In fact, the Head of the 14th Army, 
General Alexander Lebed, openly supported Transnistria against the 
central Moldovan government and promised to intervene in case 
the armed conflict continued. Notably, a declaration along these 
lines was neither coordinated with Russia, nor was it disavowed by 
Moscow. 
However, Transnistria opting for Russian troops made Moldova 
search for more neutral assistance. Thus, prior to accepting Russian 
peacekeeping, the government aspired for the formation of an 
international peacekeeping contingent. It would have consisted 
of peacekeepers from Bulgaria, Belarus, Romania, Russia and 
29 Ibid.
30 Strategic Course of Russia with CIS Member-States, September 14, 1995. http://
www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/4e3d23
b880479224c325707a00310fad!OpenDocument 
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Ukraine31. Once this attempt failed, and before entering into an 
agreement with Russia in late July, Moldova’s President Snegur 
called in early July 1992 for a CIS peacekeeping mission consisting 
of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian as well as Belarusian troops. 
However, this request was turned down and hence Russia became 
the only actor ready to provide peacekeeping services at that time.
However, there were budgetary constraints that had to be 
taken into account. Russia decided to retrieve some peacekeepers 
stationed abroad to economize on their allowances. Thus, in 1995 
Moscow decided to reorganize its forces in Moldova by renaming 
the 14th Army into an Operational group of Russian troops in 
the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. It was also 
concluded that there was no longer any need for a Head of the 14th 
Army. Overall, the influence of the Army on the local developments 
declined due to these measures. As part of this reorganization, part 
of these renamed forces was re-trained as peacekeepers in order for 
them to step into the place of the Russian peacekeeping contingent 
that returned to Russia. This policy may, on the one hand, be 
perceived as some kind of support for Transnistria, because the 
former 14th Army mainly consisted of inhabitants of Transnistria. 
However, on the other hand, a wider context of reorganization of the 
Russian army explains that this, most probably, was an unintended 
consequence of economization strategy. 
Georgia
The Russian troops in Abkhazia that arrived after the collapse 
of the USSR were stationed in the conflict zone and unofficially 
supported the Abkhaz side of the conflict. This did not resonate with 
the position of the Russian government, as the government aimed 
at staying neutral and endeavored at introducing sanctions against 
both parties to the conflict. 
31 Gribincea. Politica Rusa a Bazelor Militare:’ Georgia si Moldova’ [The Russian 
policy of military bases: Georgia and Moldova]. Chisinau: Civitas.1999, 156–57, 
quoted in: ‘The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles for 
trust building (2009–2010)’, Stanislav Secrieru Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011, pp. 241–26
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The agreement on the principles regarding settlement of the 
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, reached in June, 1992, included a 
provision that stressed the necessity to deprive the Russian forces 
of any option of involvement in the conflict. In line with this 
provision, Russia withdrew two regiments located in the conflict 
zone. Russia’s official policy on the Georgian conflict with Abkhazia 
was proclaimed in August 1992, with Russia deciding to support the 
territorial integrity of Georgia.
In line with this, Russian troops supported Georgia’s President 
Eduard Shevardnadze by taking control over major transport 
networks in Georgia, thereby also preventing the supporters of the 
former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia from approaching 
Tbilisi. As part of the deal, Georgia entered the CIS32 and allowed 
Russian bases to be located on Georgian territory. Georgia also 
joined an agreement concerning the initiation of CIS peacekeeping 
operation in Abkhazia. The UN, in turn, decided to abstain from 
sending UN peacekeepers to the region due to a lack of conditions 
required for a peacekeeping operation, although the Secretary 
General expressed his view that Russian troops could proceed as 
peacekeepers. Likewise, the option was kept open for these Russian 
troops to be included in a UN peacekeeping contingent. 
Crucially, the mandate for the operation in Abkhazia was more 
in line with the international peacekeeping norms than other Russian 
peacekeeping operations conducted within the CIS. It is also to be 
noted that in contrast to other operations in the region, Russian 
peacekeepers exceeded their powers only once. This took place in 
early September 1994, with Colonel-General Georgy Kondratiev, 
head of the Russian peacekeeping contingents, threatening to start 
unilaterally a returning of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and fending 
off any efforts of intervening in this process. Yet, the initiation of 
this operation was cancelled from Moscow, and Russian Minister of 
Defense Pavel Grachev visited Georgia as a mediator in Georgian-
Abkhaz consultations on refugees. At large, the unwillingness of the 
Abkhaz side to cope with Georgian refugees was settled politically 
and not militarily.
32 Georgia was accepted as a member of CIS in December 1993. 
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Furthermore, the Georgian authorities, since spring 1995, called 
for a change in the mandate of the peacekeeping contingent advocating 
that they also receive police functions to have more control over 
Abkhazia region, whereas the Abkhaz representatives would like to 
reduce the powers of the Russian peacekeepers. Basically the aim of 
the Abkhaz representatives was that security-related services unfold 
only within their own law enforcement structures.
Tajikistan
The first CIS document on conflict in Tajikistan, issued in October 
1992, proclaimed that the CIS was ready to send peacekeepers on 
the basis of an official request from the Tajik government33. In the 
same document, the heads of states supported “peacekeeping activity 
initiated by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and efforts by other CIS 
states to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan”. The issue of Russia’s 
role on the borders with Afghanistan was not brought up.
Yet, CIS initially refrained from intervening in order to support the 
Tajik government. The policies pursued changed only with Emomali 
Rakhmonov becoming the new president in the aftermath of the so-
called People’s Front having defeated the forces of the opposition. 
The logic applied by CIS in supporting the new Tajik government 
and the regime of the newly elected President Rakhmonov pertained 
to the idea of avoiding a failure and collapse of the state.
The first step in the internationalization of the operation in 
Tajikistan took place in September 1993 with the signing of three 
agreements pertaining to CIS Collective peacekeeping forces. The 
agreements were signed by five CIS states, i.e. Russia and four 
Central Asian states except for Turkmenistan. 
Further steps were taken once the Council of the CIS heads of 
states took, in February 1995, a decision to support an appeal of 
these same five states to the Chairperson of the UN Security Council. 
33 Declaration of the CIS Council of Heads of States on October 9, 1992 
(Заявление Совета глав государств СНГ от 9 октября 1992) http://docs.pravo.ru/
document/view/19381323/?search_query=%D0%A2%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%
B6%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD&fr
om_search=1 
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They pledged for a full-fledged peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan 
under UN mandate34. They further announced that the parties to 
the conflict were ready to accept international assistance in their 
endeavors. In order to facilitate the launching of a full-fledged 
UN peacekeeping mission, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan were ready to submit their contingents already based in 
Tajikistan and allow them to function as CIS Collective peacekeeping 
forces to be used in a capacity of UN peacekeepers during “the first 
stage of the operation”35. However, the plan did not materialize as it 
did not get the required support in the UN Security Council. 
Russia did not sign the cease-fire agreement (Protocol on the 
Fundamental principles of establishment of peace and national 
reconciliation in Tajikistan of August 1995) as it did not consider 
itself as a party to the conflict. Signing would have implied that 
Russia does not merely contribute to the cease-fire but also lends 
support to the Dushanbe government. Russian position was that it 
was only responsible for the border security of the external borders 
of the CIS as an organization.
It is notable in this context that the idea of providing military 
assistance to Tajikistan was strongly opposed within domestic 
Russian policies. It was resisted as it had strong connotations of 
the Soviet Afghan experience. Similar feelings existed also in other 
CIS states. Therefore, when the Commander of the Collective 
peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan addressed the Council of the CIS 
ministers of defense in April 1995 and requested that the number of 
troops in Tajikistan be increased with up to 16,000 soldiers to assist 
the border guards, the request was turned down.
Finally, in January 1996, Boris Yeltsin declared that Russian 
troops would not be used in military operations in Tajikistan. He 
stressed that their mandate only entails a safeguarding of the Tajik 
border with Afghanistan.
34 Protocol Decision of February 10, 1995 on Address of the President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, of the President of the Russian Federation, of the President 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and of the 
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Conduct in Tajikistan of a Full-Scale 
Peacekeeping Operation under the Auspices of the UN http://docs.pravo.ru/
document/view/17355596/15005871/ 
35 Ibid. 
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russian strategies of mediation  
and settlement of regional  
and international conflicts: 
continuity and coherence 
It seems that the current Russian strategies of mediation and conflict 
settlement are quite coherent and comparable across different cases, 
both regionally and internationally. However, recent developments 
on the post-Soviet space (Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014) 
seem to point to Russia having returned to the beginning of the 
era of incomplete sovereignty and support provided for “good” 
nationalisms against “bad” nationalisms. In fact, many of Russia’s 
current-day approaches appear to be grounded in the experiences 
of the regional peacekeeping pursued in the 1990s, i.e. experiences 
rooted in Russia’s domestic strategies of state- and nation-building 
rather than the requirements set by the dominant external conditions. 
Yet another factor consists of Russia’s self-perceptions as a global 
great power. It then follows that on occasions these two set of 
approaches, the first one based on domestic strategies and the other 
one on strategies of “greatpowerness” (velikoderzhavnost’)36, may 
clash with each other. 
The identification of influences and tracking changes in the 
conduct of foreign policy has significantly improved as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs started to publish detailed yearly reviews in 2007. 
Considerable shifts in Russia’s self-perception and attitudes towards 
the West towards more assertive ones took place in 2006–2007. The 
turning-point was marked by President Putin’s speech at the Munich 
Security Conference37. 
The foreign policy reviews also cover, as part of the section on 
multilateral diplomacy, Russia’s activities in the sphere of conflict 
36 For Russian “greatpowerness”, see in: M.Y.Urnov.’‘Greatpowerness’ as the 
Key Element of Russian Self-consciousness under Erosion’. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies. 2014. Vol. 47. No. 3–4. pp. 305–322. 
37 Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy February 10, 2007 http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_
type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml 
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settlement and crises management. This then allows for a tracking of 
changes in the Russian priorities over time in these fields (see Annex 
1). 
Overall, the Middle East seems to have been constantly 
prioritized in the Russian efforts of mediation and conflict 
settlement, whereas regional conflicts such as those of Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transnistria have a bottom rank. However, in the 
“Geographic directions of foreign policy” section, the CIS region 
gains a top ranking while the Middle East is positioned in 6th place. 
The explanation might be that the conflicts in the Middle East do not 
present an immediate threat to Russian national security, in contrast 
to the nuclear issues connected to Iran or North Korea. 
One may further note that the two nuclear dossiers have gained 
a low place on the list of conflicts where Russia actually has a 
mediating role. The explanation could possibly be that Russia 
prioritizes conflicts where it has influence as a great power instead 
of having to confine itself to the role of a regional one. The conflicts 
with Russian mediation fall in general in three groups: 1) conflicts 
where Russia inherited its role as a mediator from the USSR or is 
able to build on good relations with former Soviet allies or satellites; 
2) nuclear security issues; 3) regional conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space with internationalized mediation. At large, the first two 
types of conflicts present Russia with an opportunity to display 
its international influence and act as a global power, whereas the 
third type of conflicts are problematic in the sense that issues part of 
domestic state-building and strategies pertaining to nation-building 
frequently clash with great power ambitions. 
the central role of the un and osce
The UN is presented in all Russian foreign policy documents and 
official statements as the cornerstone in the global and regional 
security architecture. Much emphasis is thus placed on the UN 
system, not least because of the permanent seat in the Security Council 
inherited from the USSR. It furnishes Russia with the stance of a 
great power. It is, however, broadly claimed that the US and NATO 
endeavor at a usurping of the role of the UN in conflict settlement 
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by introducing and highlighting the principle of responsibility to 
protect. 
In general, Russia supports the principle of responsibility to 
protect, while questioning Western approaches to implementation of 
this principle. Syria figures as the most recent example of the clash of 
Russian and Western approaches. Russia managed, perhaps even to 
its own surprise, to promote an agenda of conflict settlement based 
on Russia’s preferred normative approach: direct talks between the 
parties to conflict without any prior international intervention and 
regime change. At the Geneva II conference on Syria in January 
2014, differences between U.S. and Russian views on the role of 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a transitional government 
remained. There was change, though, in the sense that his resignation 
was no longer viewed a precondition for direct talks between the 
Syrian opposition and government. Russian diplomacy turned out 
to be successful, albeit the outcome may in part also pertain to an 
“intervention fatigue” on the side of the U.S.38. 
Apart from the UN, Russia recognizes the importance of the 
OSCE in the settling of regional conflicts. According to a speech by 
Foreign Minister Lavrov, delivered at the OSCE ministerial meeting 
in 2014, the OSCE has a unique opportunity to take the lead in 
the security processes in the Euro-Atlantic space. It may harbor the 
competence to overcome negative trends and work out a positive 
agenda39. Whereas disagreements prevail in many fields, the OSCE 
appears to remain a more trusted international structure and is by 
Russia viewed at least as less biased that NATO and the EU.
When comparing formats of international mediation on 
Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, Minister Lavrov stated that the 
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs was “an exemplar of international 
mediation”. It stood for good coordination among mediators, while 
38 The ideas on the responsibility to protect were earlier published as part of my 
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo: Yulia Nikitina. Russia’s Policy on International 
Interventions: Principle or Realpolitik? PONARS Eurasia policy memo No. 312. 
February, 2014. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russia%E2%80%99s-policy-
international-interventions-principle-or-realpolitik.
39 Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov at the 21st meeting 
of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Basel, 4th of December 2014. http://www.mid.ru/
brp_4.nsf/0/9D9EB8C37342D1C1C3257DA400446D54 
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the Transnistrian 5+2 model had a lot of pitfalls as each mediator 
and observers tended to pushed forward their own ideas40. As to 
Transnistria, the role of the US is not viewed as a constructive one 
as the US has, according to Russian perceptions, “usurped” the 
position of the OSCE representative on Transnistria settlement for 
almost 20 years. Moreover, the US has refrained from signing a joint 
US-Russia declaration regarding principles to be applied in settling 
the Transnistrian conflict, i.e. principles suggested by the Russian 
side in March-April 201441.
While critical in view of the US involvement in Transnistrian 
mediation, Russia perceives its own role in the post-Soviet space as 
quite special. Along these lines, President Putin believes that Russia 
has special relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan due to common 
history, with this then allowing Russia to be engaged in a sincere 
exchange of views concerning a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue42. Overall, Russia appears to respect international formats of 
mediation but it also holds the view that these formats do not allow 
for the same level of openness that Russia has achieved in its bilateral 
dialogues with former Soviet republics. That is exactly the case 
where Russian global and regional ambitions clash with each other. 
As a global power, Russia should prioritize international mediation 
formats to confirm its status of a center of global influence. However, 
in such multilateral international formats Russian authority is often 
perceived by the parties to the conflict as less important than authority 
of, for instance, the US or the EU. Thus, Russia tries to establish its 
authority on the regional level through exclusive formats of bilateral 
cooperation with parties to the conflict. 
40 Speech and answers to the questions by media representatives of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov during the press-conference on his 
participation in the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Basel, 5 December 2014, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/E0A75921311AFD98C3257DA5004B253A 
41 Open lecture by S.V.Lavrov on actual questions of the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation, Moscow, 20 October 2014, http://interaffairs.ru/read.
php?item=11949 
42 President Putin, ‘The Russian Federation supports international mediation 
in Nagorno-Karabakh’, RIA Novosti, 10 August 2014, http://ria.ru/
politics/20140810/1019495204.html#ixzz3PSD74TCw
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external mediation,  
not participation in conflicts
In the case of Ukraine, the West and Kiev claim that Russia should 
be considered as a party to the conflict, whereas Russia denies 
involvement in the separatist conflict in South-Eastern regions of 
Ukraine. Russia does in general not consider itself a party to the 
existing frozen conflicts on the post-Soviet space and this approach 
has also been applied to the Ukrainian conflict. 
For the part of Georgia, Tbilisi hold the view, based on the 
Medvedev-Sarkozy plan signed on 12 August 2008, that Russia is 
a party to the conflict. Foreign Minister Lavrov does not share this 
stance and stresses that the first version of this document in Russian 
contained a preamble in which Russia and France called upon the 
conflicting parties to stop violence. Russia does hence not recognize 
itself as a conflicting party43. However, when President Sarkozy 
brought this version of plan to Tbilisi, President Saakashvili crossed 
out the preamble and this is why the Russian and Georgian sides 
proceed from different versions of the plan44.
Russian unwillingness to be considered a party to the conflict is 
more generally grounded in a desire to remain above the fray and 
present itself as an international mediator, not a regional actor.
issues of territorial integrity
The Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008 seems to prove that Russia 
changed its stance on territorial integrity and self-determination. In 
1999, Russia vehemently protested against the NATO operation in 
43 The Russian version of plan in a format of UNSC resolution draft presented 
to the UNSC on 21 August 2008 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Georgia%20
Blue%20draft%20resolution.pdf
44 Speech and answers to the questions by media representatives of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov during the press-conference on his 
participation in the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Basel, 5 December 2014, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/E0A75921311AFD98C3257DA5004B253A
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Kosovo, and Russia still does not recognize Kosovo’s independence. 
Moreover, Russia continues to support Serbia in all international 
forums where Serbia protests against Western recognition of Kosovo. 
However, in the same year of Western recognition, Russia itself 
recognized South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence. Thus, there 
seems to be a shift in Russian logic. Meanwhile, if in 2008 Russia 
really intended to create a precedent that was more accepting of 
interventions and separatism, then it would have altered its position 
on other frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Notably, this did 
not happen because in cases of Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Russia continues to insist on the principle of territorial integrity.
For example, in the framework of the Transnistrian “5+2” 
mediation process, Russia holds that Transnistria should be 
furnished with a special status in the framework of a sovereign and 
neutral Moldova whose territorial integrity should be respected. This 
approach implies that if Moldova becomes part of Romania or gains 
membership in NATO, Transnistria would have a right to make an 
independent decision regarding its own status, without taking into 
account Moldova’s position.
Another evidence of Russia’s support for territorial integrity 
consists of Russia having no intentions to invite separatist territories 
to formally participate in Eurasian economic integration formats. 
Sergey Lavrov clearly stated that the current status of Transnistria 
does not allow it to enter the Customs Union or the Eurasian 
Economic Union45. Yet, and according to the Memorandum of 1997 
on the freedom of external economic activity of Transnistria, this 
republic has a right to have economic relations with any external 
actors. As to Armenia’s accession to the Customs Union and 
Eurasian Economic Union, both the Russian and Armenian sides 
have confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh will not be included in this 
process46.
45 ‘Lavrov: the EU elaborates for Moldova and Transnistria the Ukrainian 
“scenario”’, News Agency Regnum, 21 October 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/
news/polit/1858602.html#ixzz3PZvFdffu 
46 ‘Lavrov: the situation in Karabakh will not influence Armenian accession 
to the Customs Union’, RIA Novosti, 10 August 2014, http://ria.ru/
world/20140810/1019502429.html 
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Palestine stands out, however, as an exceptional case in view of 
the Russian international mediation practices. Whereas the latest 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 is premised on the principles 
of territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs, and 
this principle is taken to apply also in the case of Russia’s activities in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa region, the goal for the part of 
the Israeli-Palestine conflict Russia has been to promote the creation 
of an independent Palestinian state. It should be independent but 
co-exist with Israel in peace and security. The way to achieve this 
solution consists of negotiations between the parties to the conflict. 
The negotiations should be assisted by the international community, 
including the League of Arab states.
This background to Palestine forming an exception to the general 
Russian attitudes to territorial integrity consists of the fact that the 
USSR officially recognized the independence of Palestine in 1988. 
As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, Russia stays with the 
previous stance, and this is also reflected in the approach towards 
mediation.
the Freezing of conflicts 
One of the Russian mediation strategies in the post-Soviet space 
pertains to the freezing of conflicts. The only settled conflict consists 
of the civil war in Tajikistan. Thus, the question is whether this lack 
of additional cases is due to a conscious strategy or just shortage 
of political will and resources. The West commonly suspects for its 
part that the freezing of conflicts may stand for a strategy aimed at 
preserving a status quo until various separatist territories succeed in 
gaining independence.
It goes without saying that non-recognized states or partly 
recognized states endanger stability and are conducive to security-
related problems. It may, however, also be noted that the only settled 
conflict in Tajikistan is the longest and has the most significant death 
toll out of all conflicts in the post-Soviet space: the costs amount 
to more than 60,000 human lives and include also hundreds of 
thousands of refugees. The death toll in other post-Soviet conflicts 
was significantly lower because Russian or CIS mediation helped 
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to freeze these conflicts early in their military stage and allowed for 
further political negotiations. Thus, the strategy of freezing could 
against this background be considered as a realistic pattern of coping 
with conflicts. As such, this view is to some extent broadly shared. 
Thus, in Syrian conflict, the plan discussed in late 2014 at the UN 
to freeze the conflict in Aleppo, was called “concrete and realistic”47. 
Moreover, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for 
Syria Mr de Mistura called this plan “a new way for approaching 
the de-escalation of violence”48.
security guarantees
At large, some patterns of continuity seem to be present in Russia’s 
approach to security guarantees in the settlement of frozen conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space. One of these consists of Russia frequently 
presenting itself as a major guarantor providing peacekeeping 
contingents with the aim of preventing attacks against the weaker 
side. More often than not that tends to be the separatist side. 
In some cases, active involvement in mediation and conflict 
resolution has fuelled the conflict rather than the other way around. 
Thus, Russia’s military response to the actions of Georgia towards 
South Ossetia was accounted for not only by pointing to the right 
to self-defense. It was also argued that it followed from Russia’s 
obligations as the mediator in the conflict between Georgia and 
South Ossetia. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is 
hence viewed as a form of security guarantee, a guarantee provided 
as other inroads have been blocked due to the refusal of the President 
Saakashvili to sign a legally binding agreement on the non-use of 
force. 
the need for inclusive national 
47 Plan to ‘freeze’ conflict in Aleppo ‘concrete, realistic,’ says UN Syria envoy, 
UN News Centre, 11 November 2014 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=49308#.VMCnACx6T48 
48 Ibid.
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dialogues
According to the Foreign Minister Lavrov, Russia’s approach to 
the settlement of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space consists 
of encouraging the parties to the conflict to reach agreement. This 
is mandatory as only those who started a conflict can solve it, and 
external actors can only assist them49. As to the Ukrainian crisis, 
Russia’s position is that significant results can be achieved only through 
a direct dialogue between the conflicting parties. The exclusion of 
the representatives of Luhansk and Donetsk separatist republics 
is in this perspective counterproductive. It is claimed that national 
reconciliation and restoration of trust calls for an open and unbiased 
investigation of all war crimes, including the tragedies that took place 
during Maidan protests as well as in Odessa and Mariupol. The crash 
of MH17 also belongs to the issues to be investigated.50
Russia holds a rather similar view on international mediation. 
In May 2011, Russia aspired to add to the unity of Palestinian 
political forces by organizing an inter-Palestinian meeting between 
mid-level representatives of Fatah, Hamas and five other political 
factions. All participants signed a declaration stating that they agree 
on the frontiers of the future Palestinian state within the borders 
as to 4 July 196751. For the part of conflict mediation in Syria, 
Russia has contacts and meetings with Syrian opposition groups 
operating inside and outside Syria. In general, Russia argues that 
Syrians themselves should peacefully solve their conflict on the basis 
of inclusive dialogue without external interference.
49 Speech and answers to the questions by media representatives of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov during the press-conference on his 
participation in the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Basel, 5 December 2014, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/E0A75921311AFD98C3257DA5004B253A 
50 Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V.Lavrov at the 21st meeting 
of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Basel, 4 December 2014, http://www.mid.ru/
brp_4.nsf/0/9D9EB8C37342D1C1C3257DA400446D54
51 On the situation in the Middle East settlement process, 6 October 2011, http://
www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rkonfl.nsf/90be9cb5e6f07180432569e00049b5fb/c32577c
a00173e57c32578f40030438c!OpenDocument 
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the option of Federalization
In addition to stress on territorial integrity and inclusive national 
dialogues, Russia has frequently favored federalization as an 
instrument of conflict-settlement for separatist conflicts. The latest 
case is Ukraine. From the very beginning of the conflict in the 
south-eastern regions of Ukraine in spring 2014, official Russian 
representatives several times brought up federalization as a solution 
for this conflict. Being a federation itself, Russia considers that it 
is the only strategy that allows for peaceful coexistence between 
different ethnic groups as part of civic nation-building.
Notably, the federalization of Moldova was in 2003 actually 
not that far from realization. Russia’s initiative was based in the 
so-called “Kozak Memorandum”, i.e. a plan advocating the coining 
of asymmetric federation. On the eve of the signature procedure, 
the Western partners allegedly persuaded Moldova to withhold 
its consent. The problem consisted of the Kozak Memorandum 
including a provision pertaining to the full demilitarization of a 
federalized Moldova. Prior to the completion of demilitarization, 
the Russian peacekeeping contingent of 2,000 peacekeepers would 
have remained in Moldova (although their precise location was not 
specified in the draft) in order to prevent any military attempts to 
change the status quo52. The Memorandum also included a clause 
that allowed subjects (regions) of this future federation to leave 
the federation after a referendum. This clause could have provided 
Transnistria and Gagauzia the option of becoming independent even 
without consent of the other federal regions. Russia did, however, 
not aspire for the creation of independence of separatist republics, 
but the aim was instead one of allowing Moldova and Transnistria 
to gain experience of peaceful co-existence in a format of federation 
that, in case of success, could preclude further separatism. 
Similarly, according to Russia, the only working solution as to 
the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis consists of a constitutional 
reform in Ukraine. Such an approach was agreed upon between 
52 “Kozak Memorandum: the Russian plan of uniting Moldova and Transnistria”, 
23 May 2005 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/458547.html 
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former president Yanukovych and the opposition in February 201453 
and in the Geneva Statement from 17 April54. According to Russian 
views, the Ukrainian crisis pertains to problems part of an unstable 
unitary system of government as well as a lack of a constitutional 
balance as to the representation and division of interests between the 
various regions.
Reintegration of Crimea into Russia arguably allows Moscow 
to demonstrate to Ukraine and the West in general that the Russian 
state- and nation-building models are more effective. If so, it will 
also reassure Russia itself that it is on the right track of development.
conclusions
Since Russia gained independence in 1991, its conflict settlement 
and mediation practices have been heavily influenced by the 
processes of its national development strategies, and in particular, 
by Russia’s nation- and state-building strategies and evolution of its 
self-perceptions as a great power.
The Russian practices in the sphere of regional conflict settlement 
in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s are quite specific and should 
not be compared for example with those of the UN. They also seem 
to vary over time. Thus, the early years of independence of former 
Soviet republics pertained to incomplete sovereignty, i.e. conditions 
originating in general with the dissolutions of empires. The newly 
independent states that endured conflicts on their territory, and were 
yet short of the resources required for solving the conflicts, had to 
compromise on sovereignty. They shared their sovereignty with 
Russia in order to gain assistance in the processes of stabilization. 
In addition to this Soviet legacy, Russia continued to hold on 
to the idea of “good local nationalism” as a way of averting state 
collapse. This forms the background to the policies pursued in the 
53 Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine – full text, theguardian.com, 
21 February 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-
the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text 
54 Geneva Statement on Ukraine, Geneva, 17 April 2014 http://eeas.europa.eu/
statements/docs/2014/140417_01_en.pdf 
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years 1992–1993 with support to separatists. However, in the mid-
1990s Russia shifted its positions as to the support of nationalism, and 
this appears to have occurred mostly due to internal factors. Instead 
of the previous emphasis on nationalization, an internationalization 
of the conflicts became priority for Russia in 1995. It was realized 
that the “burden of peacekeeping” is too heavy and should be shared 
with the international community. 
It further appears that Russia’s policy in the sphere of regional and 
international conflict settlement rests on a variety of approaches that 
undergird Russian mediation practices. The UN and the OSCE are 
seen as important in facilitating conflict settlement and in providing 
the ground for efforts of mediation. Mediation should remain as 
external in nature and not amount to engagement in conflicts. 
Furthermore, there is emphasis on territorial integrity as a core 
principle, the freezing of conflicts at an early stage in a situation of 
balance of forces, as well as the supporting of the weaker side in a 
conflict in order to give the conflicting sides more or less equal chances 
in political negotiations. The providing of security guarantees stands 
out as one favored option and this goes also for inclusive national 
dialogues between the parties to conflict. In addition, federalization 
stands out as an approach favored by Russia.
The incoherence that is arguably on occasions present in the 
international and regional mediation and conflict settlement practice 
pursued by Russia seem, in some of their aspects, to be related to 
the Soviet legacy such as attitudes towards nationalism, but pertain 
also in some regards to great power ambitions. More recently the 
policies have been impacted by the strategies part of the post-1991 
national development in Russia, including those pertaining to civic 
nation-building and problems with separatism. Overall, Russia still 
has to find a balance between different strategies and merge them 
into a more coherent one, and this is obviously related to Russia’s 
search for durable national identity and viable national development 
strategy.
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russian eXpert 
discussions aBout recent 
trends in the settlement 
oF the nagorno-KaraBaKh 
conFlict
Vadim Romashov
introduction
The dissolution of the Soviet Union left the Eurasian continent with 
numerous spots of tense inter- and intra-state relations. Many of 
these spots exploded during the process of disintegration of the state 
and were neutralized, as is in the case of civil war in Tajikistan, 
and some were “frozen”, as in the case of conflicts in Transdniestria 
and the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the collapse of the USSR 
planted ‘delayed-action bombs’, such spots of tension that did not 
develop to full-scale conflicts in the early 1990s due to various 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the source of tension in these zones 
has not been eliminated, and the development of the conflict has 
continued, although at a much slower pace. However, aggregating 
internal and external destabilizing factors have rapidly awakened 
such conflicts, an example of which we have witnessed in Ukraine 
since the end of 2013.
The foundations for conflict developments in the territory of 
the former Soviet Union were laid within the unified economic and 
political space. The preservation of close relations between new 
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independent states and Russia, as their main unifier, determined 
the interconnectivity of conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The 
manifestation of a crisis in any of these states has a serious negative 
impact on conflict zones in other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
In addition, the involvement of these countries as ‘pawns’ in 
geopolitical confrontation between Russia and other centers of global 
and regional influence reinforces the chain reaction. The so-called 
“frozen conflicts” have become a litmus paper for transformational 
developments in the post-Soviet space and in the relationship between 
Russia and the Western countries. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue is 
certainly one of such conflicts, which is sensitive to the changing 
political situation in Eurasia. The conflict is defined as frozen, 
because the status quo has remained unchanged for the last twenty 
years (in May 1994, in Bishkek, with the assistance of Russia, the 
conflicting parties signed a ceasefire agreement). However, judging 
the actual implementation of this agreement, the conflict can hardly 
be called “frozen”: shootings and diversions regularly occur in the 
Line of Contact and on the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border, which 
result in military and civilian causalities.
The mediation activity of Moscow in resolving this, perhaps 
‘hottest’, frozen conflict in the former Soviet Union is directly 
affected by changes in the security environment along the borders 
of the Russian Federation. The progressive worsening of the security 
situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004 was followed 
by a radical change of the status quo in these conflict zones in 
2008 that resulted in the sharp deterioration of relations between 
Russia and Western countries and triggered the mediation efforts 
of Moscow in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2009, the then Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev held three trilateral meetings with his 
Armenian and Azerbaijani colleagues, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham 
Aliyev. Simultaneously, the work of the Russian delegation in the 
Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE MG) intensified. In the aftermath of the war 
with Georgia, Moscow diplomats realized the need for the earliest 
possible peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
The maintenance of the status quo cannot continue indefinitely, 
and under certain circumstances, another explosion may occur at 
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Russia’s Caucasus border. At that time, the Minsk Group ‘updated’ 
the Madrid principles for the peace settlement, but their practical 
implementation has not started thus far. Furthermore, the summers 
of 2010 and 2012 were marked with violent armed clashes between 
the conflicting parties.
In 2013, the face-off between two alternative integration projects 
for the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Eurasian Customs 
Union and the Association with the European Union (EU), has reached 
its peak. The South Caucasus direction seemed to be unsuccessful 
for Brussels: Azerbaijan decided to refrain from participating in the 
Association Agreement, and the Russian government managed to 
sway Armenia to join the Eurasian integration instead of the European 
path. However, a more significant loss for the EU was Ukraine, when 
in October 2013 President Viktor Yanukovych decided to postpone 
the signing of the Association Agreement. The decision became a 
trigger for a serious political crisis in the country, which eventually 
led to the development of a ‘deferred conflict’ on the axis dividing 
the country into “Eastern” and “Western” parts. The influence of 
the Ukrainian crisis on frozen conflicts of the former Soviet Union 
requires comprehensive and systematic studies.
This article’s research task is to provide an analysis of the views 
of the Russian expert community on potential developments in 
Nagorno-Karabakh in light of conflict in Ukraine. Focusing on 
Russia’s role as an intermediary between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
the emphasis is placed on such issues as Russia’s use of the Eurasian 
integration processes in its efforts to establish cooperation between 
Baku and Yerevan, and furthermore, the implications of the 2014 
Crimean precedent for the settlement of the conflict. A serious 
escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place in late July – 
early August 2014 with numerous causalities on both sides and was 
followed by the increase in peacekeeping efforts of the mediators. 
In November, a military helicopter was shot down in the conflict 
zone. These recent developments in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
continuing violent trend in 2015 add to the necessity of this analysis.
Thus, it is important to understand the consequences of the 
worsening of diplomatic relations between the mediators and 
what Russian analysts anticipate for the continued functioning of 
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the negotiation mechanism on Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moscow’s 
ascribed role in the conflict settlement. The expert discussions create 
certain pressure on Moscow’s negotiating position, as the Russian 
diplomats have to take into account domestic expectations for the 
country’s place in regional and world politics. The environment in 
which Russia’s mediation efforts operate is affected by deliberations 
regarding developments in international affairs, the geopolitical 
situation, security challenges, and integration processes in the post-
Soviet space. This article analyses the opinions of leading Russian 
experts in the field of security, foreign policy, and international 
relations research, which seem to have an impact on Russia’s policy-
making towards the South Caucasus and, particularly, the mediation 
process in Nagorno-Karabakh. The sample of experts includes those 
analysts who both criticize and support Moscow’s line of conduct 
in the region. The article accounts for the discussions of experts that 
can be attributed to pro-Armenian or pro-Azerbaijani lobby as well 
as of those who take a ‘neutral’ stand between the two camps. The 
objective is to identify trends and prevalent discourses in a variety 
of Russian analytical discussions on the topic by examining policy-
oriented material produced by the expert community such as reports, 
articles, interviews, and comments.1
expert Views on the minsk group 
Format in the changing geopolitical 
environment
The organization of the post-Soviet borders has been continuously 
reshaped. In 2008, Moscow recognized independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in 2014, Crimea de-facto became a part 
of the Russian Federation. Officials from Western countries and 
Russia interpret the events in opposite ways: the former condemn 
the unilateral border reconsiderations, while the latter insist that the 
decisions are justified by prevention of threat to the safety of local 
1 The main sources of information are Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani media 
and research organizations’ accounts and social networking websites.
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population, who are mostly Russian compatriots and co-citizens. 
Following the Georgian events in 2008, the expert community 
in Russia anticipated serious difficulties for international peace 
mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh because of increased 
geopolitical confrontation. Nevertheless, with hindsight we can 
observe that the worsening of relations between Moscow and 
Western capitals did not extend to the OSCE Minsk Group: in 
2009, the co-chairs managed to develop a common approach to the 
conflict settlement, which was embodied in the so-called “updated 
Madrid principles”.
However, the conflict that followed in Ukraine has far-reaching 
consequences for European security and has become a stalemate 
between Russia and Western states. A large number of experts 
express serious concerns that, unlike in 2008, the contemporary 
geopolitical conjuncture may affect peace mediation in Nagorno-
Karabakh. Sergei Markedonov, Associate Professor at the Regional 
Studies and Foreign Policy department of the Russian State University 
for Humanities, notes that the conflict can ‘unfreeze’ in case of the 
“Ukrainization” of Russia-U.S. relations on the Karabakh issue, 
while the current limited diplomatic dialogue between the mediators 
is not conducive to the effective functioning of the settlement 
mechanism.2
Russian experts traditionally link mediation processes with 
geopolitics around the post-Soviet protracted conflicts. Andrei 
Kazantsev, Director of the Analytical Centre of Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations of Russia’s Foreign Ministry 
(MGIMO), notes that the Karabakh problem is intertwined with “a 
number of other unresolved problems in Central Eurasia and in the 
world, which generate Russian-Western confrontation”.3 The experts 
who follow the neorealist agenda commonly find the U.S. approach 
2 Sergei Markedonov, “Armyano-azerbaidzhanskii konflikt kak test na effektivnost’ 
posrednkov”, RIA, 4 Aug 2014, http://ria.ru/analytics/20140804/1018749328.
html, and “Vozobnovlenie voiny v zone Karabakhskogo konflikta maloveroyatno, 
schitayut eksperty”, Kavkazskii Uzel, 8 Aug 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/
articles/247133/.
3 Andrey Kazantsev, Interview, minval.az, 14 Feb 2014, http://minval.az/
news/38052/ (translation by the author).
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to the conflict resolution destructive, while mediation practices 
of Russia are seen as either positive or weak. Aleksandr Dugin, a 
Russian political scientist who is regarded as the main ideologist 
of “neo-Eurasianism”, repeatedly argues that it is in interests of 
Western states to activate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to 
undermine Russia’s position in the South Caucasus, while Moscow’s 
goal is to maintain stability in this strategically important region 
by all possible means. Therefore, the main task of Russia’s policy 
toward Nagorno-Karabakh, as Dugin sees, is to exclude Western 
states from the settlement process as destabilizing external forces. 
As a way of achieving this objective, he proposes the regionalization 
of the conflict settlement by including only the surrounding powers 
who have “vital interests” in the region, namely Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey.4 Maksim Shevchenko, an expert on ethno-religious issues 
and a member of the Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations, 
supports the idea of regionalization of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
settlement, which can be achieved only by the neighbors of the 
conflicting states. He asserts that Western states “are interested in 
[prolonging] the conflict, as they need leverages of influence on the 
South Caucasus”.5 Dugin believes that despite difficulties in finding 
a balance between interests of the regional powers, compromise 
is possible, unlike between Western states and Russia, whose level 
of mutual distrust is extremely high.6 From his point of view, the 
interests of Russia, Iran, and Turkey are not antagonistic and all of 
them are interested in the minimization of the U.S. and EU presence 
in the region. Thus, he notes that if the U.S. was isolated from the 
region and the interests of Russia, Iran, Turkey, as well as of three 
small states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were taken into 
account, a new geopolitical context would emerge, in which the 
problematic issues could find their solutions.7
4 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, newspaper Zerkalo, 21 Jul 2011.
5 “Maxim Shevchenko presents his view on Nagorno-Karabakh settlement”, 
Vestnik Kavkaza, 6 Nov 2014, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/politics/61837.
html.
6 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Nakanune.ru, 30 Oct 2008, http://www.nakanune.
ru/articles/13696/.
7 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Noev Kovcheg, 1–15 Jul 2014, No.12 (242): 1–2.
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Proceeding from this view the experts and observers with 
‘realpolitik’ thinking alleged that the unprecedented escalation of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Summer 2014 was an attempt to 
open a “new” or “second frontline” against Russia at its southern 
borders.8 However, they do not specify the sources and channels of 
U.S. influence on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is unclear 
how Washington can persuade Baku and Yerevan to resume warfare. 
Nevertheless, these experts are convinced that Russian diplomacy 
must be more active to resist U.S. regional policy in all directions, 
including in the Middle East and Ukraine. Dugin argues that only 
decisive actions of Moscow, “Iron Hand” as he calls it, in Ukraine 
can demonstrate Russia’s strength capable to counter the U.S. efforts 
to destabilize the South Caucasus.9
The presented opinion of a large part of the Russian expert 
community supports Moscow’s one-sided actions in Nagorno-
Karabakh. From the perspective of the existing format of the conflict 
settlement, the approach can be called unilateralism. Even though 
it underlines importance of involvement of Iran and Turkey in the 
peace mediation, the idea of regionalization of the conflict settlement 
implies the promotion of Russia’s actions separately from the OSCE 
Minsk Group based primarily on Russia’s bilateral relations with 
the regional powers and the conflicting parties. However, there is a 
contrasting trend within the Russian expert opinion, which promotes 
cooperation within the Minsk Group and therefore can be referred 
as multilateralism.
The futility of long-standing official peace negotiations 
has constantly challenged the latter approach. Therefore, the 
‘cooperationists’ are also critical to the functioning of the Minsk 
8 The ‘first frontline’ is considered to be on the Western direction, namely in 
Eastern Ukraine. For example, see Dmitrii Nefedov, “Boevaya trevoga vokrug 
Nagornogo Karabakha”, Strategic Culture Foundation, 4 Aug 2014, http://www.
fondsk.ru/news/2014/08/04/boevaja-trevoga-vokrug-nagornogo-karabaha-28760.
html; Anton Krivenyuk, “Kavkazskaya ‘razgermetizatsiya’”, Regnum, 11 Aug 2014, 
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1834674.html; Irina Jorbenadze, “Karabakh poka ne 
stal vtorym frontom”, Gorchakov Fund, 13 Aug 2014, http://gorchakovfund.ru/
news/12226/.
9 Aleksandr Dugin, “Zheleznaya Ruka Moskvy: Karabakh i Donbass – dva teatra 
odnoi voiny”, post on VK, 3 Aug 2014, https://vk.com/wall18631635_3640.
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Group and unconstructive political dialogue between the mediators. 
Against the backdrop of a crescent geopolitical rivalry between 
Russia and the West, the experts often express a pessimistic view 
on the prospects of conflict settlement in the near future. An 
analyst from the Center for Central Asia, the Caucasus and the 
Volga-Urals at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Aleksandr Skakov, considers that “for real progress 
toward resolving the conflict, the mediators need to put consistent 
pressure on the parties to the conflict”, and due to the absence of 
a “common tactic of the settlement” the region eventually “will be 
reformatted by one of the centers of power upon its own models 
and interests”.10
The experts who promote a multilateral approach underline that 
the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement differs from other international 
peace mediation arrangements in the post-Soviet space because 
the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the U.S. is not 
salient in this conflict. Andrei Kazantsev believes that Moscow, 
Washington, and Paris have always had “if not fully similar then 
[at least] compatible positions” under the framework of the OSCE 
Minsk Group.11 This belief is shared by the Russian former co-
chairman of the Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov, who notes that 
the present co-chairs (Igor Popov, James Warlick, and Pierre Andrieu) 
have a unified approach based on the inadmissibility of attempts to 
solve the conflict with military means and are working with good 
coordination, which was lacking in his time.12 In much the same way, 
Sergei Markedonov does not see an “antagonistic conflict” amongst 
the co-chairs whose concerted action continues, doing so at least 
because they themselves speak about the consensus on Nagorno-
Karabakh between the states they represent and emphasize the need 
10 “Russian experts talk about Karabakh settlement”, News.az, 17 Feb 2014, 
http://news.az/articles/karabakh/86577.
11 Andrei Kazantsev, Interview, VAKinfo, 30 Jun 2014, http://www.vakmos.org/ru/
ekspert-r-yi/13554-andrej-kazantsev-razvitie-imeyushchegosya-mezhdu-moskvoj-
i-baku-strategicheskogo-partnerstva-v-polzu-rossii-intervyu (translation by the 
author).
12 Mikhail Sheinkman, “Ukraina razbudila Karabakh? Armeniya i 
Azerbaidzhan priblizilis’ k voine”, RIA, 4 Aug 2014, http://ria.ru/radio_
brief/20140804/1018750069.html.
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for a peaceful resolution and express an optimistic view of the peace 
process.13
However, the experts who support cooperation with the West 
stress that the peacekeeping rhetoric is not enough and “real 
attempts” to resolve the conflict are required. They believe that in a 
situation when a military solution is impossible, the only effective 
method to solve the issue is an agreement between Moscow and 
Washington to put consistent pressure on Yerevan and Baku that 
they should refrain from hostilities and make mutual concessions.14 
Yet again, the overall geopolitical variance between Russia and the 
U.S. is impeding the drawing up of such an agreement. The Russian 
experts and media analysts highlight an “alarm signal” that may 
indicate the beginning of a “war of mediators” in the Nagorno-
Karabakh settlement, which might grow from a diplomatic 
confrontation to actual warfare in the South Caucasus, as it 
happened in the Georgian breakaway regions in 2004–2008. The 
experts draw attention to the statements of James Warlick made in 
the Washington Center of Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace on 7 May 2014, where he presented the key elements of 
a “well-established compromise” between the Minsk Group co-
chairs and the conflicting countries.15 Despite his references to the 
unified approach of Russia, France, and the U.S. and, in essence, 
repetition of the well-known “basic principles”, many Russian 
experts regarded the statement as an attempt of Washington to 
take the initiative and unilaterally exert pressure on Armenia and/
or Azerbaijan bypassing Russia.16 In particular, the Russian experts 
disliked that the Madrid Principles, which were jointly elaborated 
13 Sergey Markedonov, “Ne teryat’ pul’s nagorno-karbakhskogo protsessa”, Noev 
Kovcheg, 1–15 Jul 2014, No.12 (242): 1–2.
14 News.az, 17 Feb 2014.
15 James Warlick, “Statement of U.S. policy on the Nagorno-Karbakh 
conflict”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 May 2014, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/nagorny-karabakh-keys-to-settlement/ha7v.
16 For example, see Sergey Markedonov, 4 Aug 2014; “Andrei Areshev: Obostrenie 
konflikta v Nagornom Karabakhe negativno skazyvaetsya, prezhde vsego, na 
Rossii”, LraTVAKAN.COM, 14 Aug 2014, http://lratvakan.com/news/107059.
html; Irina Jorbenadze, “Nagorny Karabakh: tsvety zapozdalye”, Gorchakov Fund, 
14 May 2014, http://gorchakovfund.ru/news/11310/.
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by the Minsk Group, were presented as the U.S. policy on the 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the same time, there is a less suspicious opinion of the actions of 
the U.S. diplomats in the settlement process. Stanislav Chernyavskiy, 
Director of the Centre for Post-Soviet Studies at MGIMO, believes 
that because of the formally coordinated positions of the co-chairs, 
accusations against the U.S. that they use the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue to complicate Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia 
are unfounded.17 In general, many experts doubt that anyone from 
the international community is interested in a radical change in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.18 They believe that the resumption of war in 
this region is not beneficial for either foreign actor due to the great 
risks and uncertain outcomes it would bring for the international 
community. After all, the crisis in Ukraine in 2013–2015 shows 
that conflicts in the post-Soviet space involving international actors 
with competing geopolitical interests cannot have a clearly marked 
“winner” – all the rival forces have gains and losses typical of a zero-
sum game.
parallel platforms for the peace 
negotiations
Following the aggravation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 
late July and early August 2014, Russia made a statement that urged 
“the parties of confrontation to exercise restraint, to renounce the 
use of force and to take immediate measures aimed at stabilizing the 
situation”. A lower ranking official from the Russian foreign ministry, 
Maria Zakharova, the Deputy Director of the Press and Information 
17 Stanislav Chernyavskii, Interview, Eksperty MGIMO, 18 Jun 2014, http://www.
mgimo.ru/news/experts/document255449.phtml.
18 “Rossiya zainteresovana v ustanovlenii rovnykh perspektivnykh otnoshenii s 
Azerbaidzhanom – ekspert”, Trend, 24 Nov 2014, http://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/
karabakh/2336371.html; Aleksei Malashenko, Interview, First Armenian news and 
analyses, 24 Nov 2014, http://ru.1in.am/1070911.html.
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Department, signed this document.19 The official position of Moscow 
on the most serious, according to expert assessments, escalation 
of the conflict in last two decades, was expressed a day later than 
an analogous statement of the U.S. State Department.20 These two 
facts induced agitation among Russian experts and media analysts, 
who were afraid that Russia may ‘surrender’ Nagorno-Karabakh 
to the West. They called for the Russian government to mobilize 
political and diplomatic resources and decisively repel the claim of 
Washington as the leading actor in the peace settlement.
The situation calmed on 4 August, when a meeting of the 
Presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in Sochi was 
announced. Generally, the Russian expert community expected 
certain stabilization as a result of the talks.21 The media emphasis was 
on the fact that, traditionally, it was Moscow, and not Washington 
or Paris, who had assumed a role of “fireman to extinguish the flame 
of new escalation” in Nagorno-Karabakh.22 The timely Russian 
diplomatic intervention prompted the conclusion in expert circles 
that “only the diplomatic potential of Russia can bring peace to 
the Karabakh process and help the sides to reach a satisfactory 
agreement”.23 In a more reserved way, Vladimir Kazimirov noted 
that such meetings are not “a panacea” but “a momentary and 
relative relaxation of tensions”.24 A large number of analysts did not 
19 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Zayavlenie zamestitelya direktora 
Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii M.V. Zakharovoi v svyazi s 
obostreniem situatsii v zone nagorno-karabakhskogo konflikta”, 2 Aug 2014, http://
www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/66C2EC7960740FE944257D28003B1CDA.
20 U.S. State Department, “Statement By Deputy Spokesperson Marie 
Harf on Escalating Violence along the Line of Contact in the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict”, 1 Aug 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
texttrans/2014/08/20140801304767.html#axzz3P0YW45ux.
21 Mikhail Sheinkman, 4 Aug 2014.
22 Mikhail Agadzhanyan, “Karabakhskii konflikt i ‘zlopoluchnyi’ avgust”, Regnum, 
4 Aug 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1832593.html.
23 Yurii Glushkov, “Russia pacifies Karabakh”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 6 Aug 2014, 
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58482.html.
24 Vladimir Kazimirov, “Pervoprichinoi krizisa v zone karabakhskogo konflikta 
yavlyaetsya ‘topornya politika’ Baku”, Regnum, 5 Aug 2014, http://www.regnum.
ru/news/1833104.html (translation by the author).
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expect a breakthrough and prognosticated that the preservation of 
the status quo would be the maximum result of the meeting, which 
itself is not sufficient to significantly reduce hostilities and bring a 
stimulus for the conflict settlement. Thus, in the situation of strained 
international relations, new risks would continue to occur.25 At the 
same time, the experts noted that as Russia’s diplomatic efforts were 
distracted by the conflict in Ukraine, preserving the status quo in 
Nagorno-Karabakh would still be an achievement.26
Eventually, the best possible result of the talks in Sochi, namely a 
return to the status quo, was achieved. The experts positively assessed 
the role of Moscow in preventing the escalation of the conflict. 
Various media accounts presented the meeting’s output as one that 
consolidates Russia’s active and leading position in the OSCE Minsk 
Group, on which the conflicting parties agree. The lessening of the 
tense situation in the region was also shown as a personal success of 
President Vladimir Putin in a very difficult geopolitical situation.27 
The analytical community indicated several attainments of this 
diplomatic intervention. Firstly, Moscow at least in the short-term 
achieved stability in the conflict zone and demonstrated interest in 
sustaining stability in the region and readiness to invest time and 
resources for peace mediation. Secondly, Russia took the U.S. and 
French initiative in settling the conflict in the context of deteriorating 
geopolitical environment and made it clear that it will not give up 
its leading positions in the South Caucasus and will monitor the 
conflict-ridden processes in the entire post-Soviet space. Thirdly, 
the talks proved that Russia has great influence on the conflict 
settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the conflicting parties 
are confident in Russian mediating efforts and regard Moscow as a 
guarantor of peace in the region. Finally, the long-awaiting meeting 
of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents has shown that the sides 
25 Gai Borisov, “Obostrenie protivostoyaniya v Karabakhe ‘obostrilo’ i ‘tyrkskuyu 
solidarnost’”, Regnum, 7 Aug 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1833793.html.
26 “Mukhanov: RF mozhet ubedit’ Baku i Yerevan ne obostryat’ konflikt”, RIA, 8 
Aug 2014, http://ria.ru/world/20140808/1019329189.html.
27 For example, see Gai Borisov, “Zapad nedovolen tem, kak Putin ostanovil 
frustratsiyu Zakavkaz’ya”, Regnum, 25 Aug 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/
news/1839828.html.
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of conflict have a willingness to talk and understand the need for a 
peaceful resolution.28
Certainly, the trilateral meeting in Sochi was not a breakthrough 
for the peace process: no solutions to the conflict were proposed and 
no substantive compromises were reached. Therefore, the risks for 
the resumption of military clashes remain. However, those experts 
who urge for Russian pro-active and unilateral actions in the peace 
settlement noted that the distancing from the OSCE MG format 
may initiate a parallel negotiation mechanism based on Russia’s 
close ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that “gives a hope for 
some progress in the future”.29 As mentioned above, the belief in 
Russia’s capability to bridge Baku and Yerevan and thus solve the 
issue without involvement of other international actors is widely 
shared within the Russian expert community. The conviction is 
grounded in the interpretation of Russia’s historical role in the region 
as a pacifier and unifier of the Caucasian peoples that contributed 
to a good neighborly relationship also between Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians in the 19th century and during the Soviet time. It has 
been argued that the conflicting parties trust Russia more so than 
France and the U.S. because Moscow “better understands the 
problem”, “respects the neighbors”, and is “ready to consider and 
accept the logic of each of the parties” in order to find the most 
28 This part of the analysis is based in part on the following sources: “Vstrecha 
Putina, Alieva i Sargsyana v Sochi: itogi”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 11 Aug 2014, http://
www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/Vstrecha-Putina-Alieva-i-Sargsyana-v-Sochi-itogi.
html; Victoria Panfilova, “Putin’s peacemaking”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 11 Aug 
2014, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58663.html; “Ekspert: Putin 
predotvratil nachalo voiny v Karabakhe”, Regnum, 11 Aug 2014, http://www.
regnum.ru/news/1834891.html; “Rossiya nashla zolotuyu seredinu v Nagornom 
Karabakhe”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 Aug 2014, No. 168 (6216): 2; Victoria 
Panfilova, “Armenia’s lost opportunities”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 12 Aug 2014, http://
vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58686.html; “Rossiya garant mira v Nagornom 
Karabakhe”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 17 Aug 2014, http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/articles/
Rossiya-garant-mira-v-Nagornom-Karabakhe.html.
29 Mikhail Belyayev, “Only Moscow can defuse ‘Karabakh bomb’”, Vestnik 
Kavkaza, 13 Aug 2014, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58743.html.
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suitable and accommodating solution for them.30 Such an advantage 
stems from the fact that Azerbaijanis and Armenians have closer 
relations with Russians than with French and American people. As 
a result, it allows Moscow to conduct a multi-channel mediation 
and make concrete proposals for solving the conflict, and Russia 
in itself represents a unique negotiation platform for Baku and 
Yerevan, which enables the establishment of a good personal contact 
between the leaders of conflicting parties.31 The shift from escalation 
to political settlement, as the output of the 2014 Sochi meeting, was 
presented to be evidence that this platform is effective and must 
continue its work. However, recalling trilateral presidential meetings 
held by Dmitry Medvedev in 2009–2011, such a platform was not 
effective enough to bring the conflicting parties to compromise, and 
eventually Russian diplomats had to once again prioritize the OSCE 
MG format. Hence, some Russian experts are searching for a more 
solid basis for Moscow’s unilateral peacemaking efforts.
A number of experts present the Eurasian integration processes 
initiated by Moscow as an opportunity to resolve the long-lasting 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) and the simultaneous intensification of 
Russian-Azerbaijani military and economic cooperation are seen as 
the first steps towards this direction.32 The experts note that due to 
strategic importance of both Armenia and Azerbaijan in cooperating 
with them, Russia must keep the balance between their divergent 
interests, which requires systematic efforts aimed at bridging the 
positions of Baku and Yerevan.33 The statements of Sergei Glazyev, 
30 Vasilii Birkin, “Karabakhskaya Andorra”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 7 Aug 2014, http://
www.vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/Karabakhskaya-Andorra.html; “Karabakh: Russia 
participates in negotiations as a neutral party”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 18 Aug 2014, 
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/politics/58861.html. 
31 Pavel Ivanov, “Nagorny Karabakh: bez posrednkiov ne oboitis’”, RIA, 22 Aug 
2014, http://ria.ru/radio/20140822/1020984818.html.
32 For example, see Maksim Shevchenko, Interview, Vestnik Kavkaza, 4 Dec 2013, 
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/48267.html.
33 See Gai Borisov, “Rossiya vser’ez beretsya za Zakavkaz’e kak za edinyi 
geopoliticheskii organizm”, Regnum, 24 Jun 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/
news/1817897.html; and Andrey Kazantsev, Interview, Day.az, 2 Jun 2014, http://
news.day.az/politics/494803.html.
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an advisor to the Russian president, demonstrate that, in practice, 
Moscow attempts to bridge the interests of the conflicting parties by 
articulating the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict complicates 
Russia’s cooperation with the states in conflict, and furthermore the 
absence of a broader cooperation in the South Caucasus hinders 
economic development of the region.34 Vyacheslav Kovalenko, 
Russian ambassador to Armenia in 2009–2013, explains the logic 
of this approach:
A settlement may happen as a result of economic development, 
formation of an economic zone, a common market, when 
economic ties are so intertwined that people will prioritize 
the [economic] interests and [this approach will…] form a 
public opinion that would gradually transform from hostility 
to mutual trust.35
The Director of the Business Club of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, Denis Tyurin, highlights Russia’s “unifying and 
integrating power” in the post-Soviet space and peacebuilding 
efforts associated with the establishment of economic ties and 
humanitarian contacts between the conflicting parties.36 His 
argument is somehow based on a liberal approach, namely the 
creation of an integrated international peaceful system, which 
would satisfy basic social needs:
The long-term objective of all governments is to increase the 
well-being of the population, to increase living standards, 
to make the life of people better. It is in this framework 
that we need to talk about the future ways of resolving the 
34 “Sergey Glazev: Rossiya zainteresovana v nagorno-karabakhskom 
uregulirovanii”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 26 Jun 2014, http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/
Sergey-Glazev-Rossiya-zainteresovana-v-nagorno-karabakhskom-uregulirovanii.
html.
35 Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Interview, Vestnik Kavkaza, 1 Aug 2014, http://
vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58344.html.
36 “Rossiya vsegda vystupala v kachestve provodnika idei mira”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 
14 Aug 2014, http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/articles/Rossiya-vsegda-vystupala-v-
kachestve-provodnika-idei-mira.html.
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conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh… [I]t makes sense to open up 
opportunities for economic cooperation between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. Certainly, there are many possibilities for 
that in the framework of the single Eurasian economic space 
and it would be very impractical not to use them.37
Tyrin’s opinion about the importance of joint commercial projects, 
business and cultural contacts38 reflects what can be referred to as 
Russia’s Track Three approach to conflict resolution,39 which played 
a crucial role in establishing a dialogue between the conflicting 
parties in the early stages of the conflict. Anatolii Karpov, who was 
the President of the Soviet Peace Fund, points out that the meetings 
of Azerbaijani and Armenian civil society actors held by the Fund 
in the early 1990s facilitated the meetings of the politicians who 
in 1994 signed a ceasefire agreement.40 However, according to 
some experts, recently public diplomacy in the region has faced 
challenges, associated with the domestic policies of Azerbaijan 
aimed at suppressing autonomy of non-state actors in expressing 
their independent opinions on the settlement of the conflict. 
Vladimir Kazimirov believes that the arrests of journalists, human 
rights activists, and political experts, by Azerbaijani authorities in 
2014, are attempts to “suffocate” public diplomacy as an alternative 
channel for the conflict settlement based on direct contacts between 
the neighboring peoples.41
37 Vestnik Kavkaza, 18 Aug 2014.
38 “No unresolved problems in Russian-Azerbaijani relations”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 
21 Aug 2014, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/59069.html.
39 Unlike Tracks One and Two, which include interaction between traditional state 
and non-state actors in order to achieve a peace, Track Three diplomacy implies 
talks between various civil society actors and commercial and business-related 
contacts. (See, Pertti Joenniemi, “Conflict – Transformation through Dialogue 
and Mediation: Keeping Pace with the Times” in “National Dialogue and Internal 
Mediation Processes: Perspectives on Theory and Practice” ed. by Charlotta Collén, 
Publications of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 / 2014).
40 “Chess Champion Karpov wants conflicts to be resolved through negotiations”, 
Vestnik Kavkaza, 10 Jul 2014, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/57477.html.
41 Vladimir Kazimirov, “Novyi front v karabakhskom konflikte”, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 5 Jun 2014, No. 113 (6161): 6.
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Within the ‘Eurasianist’ community, there are also experts who 
do not share the belief in the primary role of economic relations 
in resolving the intricate Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and consider 
such an approach too simplistic. Grigory Trofimchuk, vice-president 
of the Center for Modeling of Strategic Development, argues that 
the way out from the conflict rests in political rather than economic 
solutions. In his opinion, an approach based on the mutual 
acknowledging of common and real threats posed by external actors 
to Caucasus and the Caspian region could bring closer positions of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia and allow them to depart from 
opportunistic motivations.42
Still, the main problem of the ‘Eurasianist’ approach is not the 
divergence in expert opinion regarding what should be the basis for 
the conflict resolution – mutual economic benefits or shared security 
space. It seems that economic, political, and security incentives are 
equally important and together can serve as an aggregating driver for 
the conflicting states and Russia, as an intermediary actor, to generate 
a consensus. The key question is whether Russia alone is able to 
create a platform that would enable parties to establish a sustainable 
dialogue leading to a comprehensive compromise. An incident with 
an Armenian combat helicopter shot down by Azerbaijani forces on 
12 November 2014, and the continued violations of the ceasefire 
in January 2015 demonstrated that the trilateral talks in Sochi had 
only a short-term effect. Thus, the political assistance of Russia in 
maintaining the status quo and building peace in the region has 
again been challenged. At the same time, although Moscow made 
no question of the updated Madrid principles and cooperation 
within the OSCE Minsk Group, the worsening of relations with 
Western countries led Russia’s leadership to the conviction to use 
all possible platforms to keep the situation in the South Caucasus 
stable.43 In addition to the trilateral talks, some Eurasianist experts, 
in particular Vladimir Lepekhin, the Director of the Institute of the 
Eurasian Economic Community, suggests a “2+2 format”, in which 
42 “Ekspert: Vstupleniyu Armenii v TS nichego ne ugrozhaet”, Regnum, 30 Apr 
2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1797264.html.
43 Sergei Markedonov, “Evraziiskaya integratsiya dlya Armenii”, RIA, 1 Oct 2014, 
http://ria.ru/analytics/20141001/1026476238.html.
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“Kazakhstan will be the guarantor of Azerbaijan’s participation in 
the negotiations and Russia will be the guarantor of the participation 
of Armenia”.44 He believes that this format would help the countries 
to solve the Karabakh problem and normalize relations between 
Baku and Yerevan.
In spite of the experts’ hopes that the post-Soviet integration 
processes initiated by Moscow creates new opportunities to resolve 
protracted conflict under an alternative negotiation format, it is 
doubtful that the ‘Eurasian platform’ can be viable. Indeed, the 
accession of Armenia to the EEU has complemented its security 
system formed jointly with Russia in the frame of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This development points 
to Moscow’s cementing inadmissibility of a military approach 
to the conflict resolution and the fact that the Russian diplomats 
will continue their mediating efforts following this guiding 
light. However, Armenia’s accession to EEU can be perceived in 
Azerbaijan as a way to consolidate the status quo in Nagorno-
Karabakh, and this scenario is unacceptable for Baku.45 Moreover, 
the participation of Armenia in an organization of deep economic 
integration have brought about ‘technical’ issues related to the 
position of business agents of “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” 
(NKR) within the EEU common market. The analytical discussions 
regarding the issues associated with the stalemate question 
surrounding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh have gained a 
new momentum against the backdrop of the Crimean events in 
spring 2014. The Crimean precedent has also revived the expert 
deliberations on the role of foreign military presence in a conflict 
area.
44 Vestnik Kavkaza (18 Aug 2014).
45 See Sergei Markedonov, “The Caucasian Factor in Eurasian Integration”, 
Russia in Global Affairs, 21 March 2014, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-
Caucasian-Factor-in-Eurasian-Integration-16500
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‘Post-Crimean syndrome’: status of Nagorno-Karabakh 
and foreign military presence
During the process of Armenia’s accession to the EEU the possible 
alterations in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh have been widely 
discussed. Even though Russia’s officials have underlined that 
Armenia joins the EEU “within the framework of the borders 
recognized by the UN”,46 pro-Azerbaijan observers predict that 
Yerevan will “push” products produced in Nagorno-Karabakh to 
the common market of the EEU countries, and eventually the region 
will be included into the Eurasian economic space without Baku’s 
permission.47 In their turn, pro-Armenian experts are concerned 
that due to the increased Russian influence on Armenia, Moscow 
may try to conclude a deal with Baku and start the economic 
detachment of the NKR from Armenia, for example, by setting up 
customs checkpoints on the border between Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh, which has now become the EEU external border. Either 
way, nearly all experts agree that in this new situation, Moscow 
faces a dilemma of how to balance between the interests of the two 
strategically important partners in the South Caucasus so as not to 
undermine the status quo in the conflict zone until a compromise 
between them is reached.
The dilemma requires a neutral approach to such sensitive issues 
as the status of “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”. The debates 
in the expert community over a question of whether Moscow 
shall recognize the NKR have intensified following Russia’s 
unilateral reconsiderations of the post-Soviet borders. In 2008, 
the majority of Russian experts concluded that the recognition of 
Nagorno-Karabakh would not be a step in the right direction at 
46 Sergei Lavrov, “Speech and answers to questions from the mass media during the 
joint press conference summarising the results of negotiations with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, Baku, 18 June 
2014”, The Russian Foreign Ministry, 18 Jun 2014, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/
Brp_4.nsf/arh/9A84F8CE51F0F48144257CFC004478F1?OpenDocument.
47 See “Preferences for Yerevan’s participation in integration projects are not 
expected from Karabakh separatists”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 4 Jan 2015, http://
vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/64208.html.
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this time when it is important to develop strategic relationships 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey, restore cooperation with Western 
countries, and generally, cool off the heated situation in the South 
Caucasus. However, the Crimean events in 2014 became a turning 
point in the attitude towards the conflict settlement processes 
in the post-Soviet space. Stanislav Tarasov, a Russian political 
scientist, believes that “the reunification of Crimea with Russia 
and, in general, the Ukrainian crisis, bring new opportunities for 
the political and diplomatic practices in the settlement of territorial 
conflicts”.48
Following the Crimean events, some pro-Armenian experts tried 
to fit the ‘Crimean scenario’ to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Vigen 
Akopian argued that the Crimean precedent creates a situation 
which opens up wide perspectives for Nagorno-Karabakh with “a 
chance to organize a new referendum for unification of NKR and 
Armenia”. He notes that if Russia will support this scenario, then it 
will be “the beginning of the end for Azerbaijan”.49 However, it is 
doubtful that the recognition, and above all the entry of Nagorno-
Karabakh into Armenia, would suit Russia’s contemporary strategic 
plans for the South Caucasus. There is a widely shared conviction 
amongst Russian experts that the recognition of the self-proclaimed 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic will result in the deterioration of 
relations with Azerbaijan, Moscow’s strategic partner in the region, 
who may finally turn to the West, and eventually the war may be 
resumed.50
Besides noting the poorly thought-out decisions of the USSR’s 
planners, who had demarcated the Soviet republics in such a way 
that in the post-Soviet time have led to violent conflicts, the Russian 
48 Stanislav Tarasov, “Chto predlozhit Frantsiya Alievu i Sargsyanu po Karabakhu 
v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh”, Regnum, 18 Oct 2014, http://www.
regnum.ru/news/1858074.html (translation by the author).
49 Vigen Akopian, “Postkrym: Zakavkaz’e”, Regnum, 10 Apr 2014, http://www.
regnum.ru/news/polit/1789461.html.
50 For exmaple, see Dmitrii Kiselev, Statement at a meeting of the Russian-Armenian 
Parliamentary Club, A1 plus Youtube channel, 11 Jun 2014, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=6TOn7UnxGLA; Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, First Armenian News 
and Analyses, 17 Apr 2014, http://ru.1in.am/42966.html; Aleksandr Dugin, 1–15 
Jul 2014.
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analysts have not indicated significant similarities between the 
Crimean and Nagorno-Karabakh issues. On the contrary, many 
experts do not support searching for similarities between the 
two issues as they represent different conflicting processes, which 
develop in their own way according to their own algorithms and 
logics.51 There is no premise from which to reach a conclusion that 
in the aftermath of the Crimean events, Moscow will change its 
policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh. Sergey Markedonov argues that 
the developments in Crimea will not affect the settlement process in 
Nagorno-Karabakh simply because Moscow’s positions toward the 
Crimean issue and the Karabakh conflict are unalike.52
The non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
simultaneous preservation of the status quo have helped Moscow to 
develop cooperation with both Baku and Yerevan. Nevertheless, an 
important condition for the Kremlin to reconsider the status of NKR 
was pointed out: if Azerbaijan or Armenia starts conducting ‘anti-
Russian policy’, the factor of Nagorno-Karabakh can be handled as 
a diplomatic ‘weapon’ to ensure Russia’s interests in the region.53 
According to Dugin, this ‘weapon’ is based on Russia’s special role 
as the main guarantor of the territorial integrity of the post-Soviet 
states:
The guarantor of the territorial integrity of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan is Russia, and the guarantor of Karabakh is 
Russia. If we imagine that Russia disclaims these functions, 
territorial integrity… will not be guaranteed… [T]he 
countries in the zone adjacent to Russia can preserve their 
territorial integrity exclusively through neighborly relations 
51 For example, see “Edinogo zagovora prisoedineniya territorii net i byt’ ne mozhet 
– ekspert o krymskom pretsedente”, Regnum, 17 March 2014, http://www.regnum.
ru/news/polit/1779145.html; “Govorit’ o vkhozhdenii Karabakha v Armeniyu ili 
Rossiyu echyo rano: eks-posol RF v Armenii”, Regnum, 18 March 2014, http://
www.regnum.ru/news/1779614.html; Sergei Markedonov, Interview, Regnum, 26 
March 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1782564.html.
52 “Markedonov: ‘Obnovlennye’ Madridskie printsipy – ne okonchatelnyi 
document karabakhskogo uregulirovaniya”, Regnum, 15 May 2014, http://www.
regnum.ru/news/polit/1802344.html.
53 Markedonov, 26 March 2014.
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with Russia. That is, either neutral or close relations. In the 
case of conducting anti-Russian policy while being in the 
post-Soviet space, territorial integrity can be questioned.54
This statement on Moscow’s policy in the post-Soviet space 
represents a view of those Russian experts who believe that Russia is 
under attack from Western states, and the ex-Soviet republics are the 
country’s “frontline”. From this perspective, the transformations of 
state borders in the region are seen as a way of Russia preserving its 
geostrategic interests in the situation of immediate security threat.
The decisive role of the Russian military presence in Ukraine 
during the 2014 Crimean events prompted expectations in expert 
circles that Russia’s 102nd military base in Armenia could be involved 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement if the security situation in 
the region rapidly deteriorated. Speculation surrounding Russia’s 
military involvement considerably increased since October 2013, 
when the commander of the base, Colonel Andrei Ruzinskii, stated in 
an interview that if Azerbaijan decides to restore its jurisdiction over 
Nagorno-Karabakh through military means, Russian soldiers under 
his command might enter into the armed conflict on the Armenian 
side in accordance to the Collective Security Treaty.55 This statement 
was interpreted as proof from Russia’s officials to an assumption 
that despite the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is de jure a 
part of Azerbaijan, the Russian military could step in should there 
be a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
This assumption proceeds from several dominant premises in 
the Russian analytical sphere based upon the interpretations of the 
actual state of affairs in the conflict zone. First, the resumption of 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh rapidly and inevitably will develop 
into a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, because Yerevan is 
the security guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh in much the same 
way as Russia is the security guarantor of Armenia. Second, the 
incidents between military forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan 
constantly occur on the border between the two states, and they 
frequently appear to be on a larger scale than the clashes in the 
54 Aleksandr Dugin, 17 Apr 2014 (translation by the author).
55 Andrei Ruzinskii, Interview, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 Oct 2013, No. 185 (26404): 6. 
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Line of Contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. Third, a large number 
of servicemen at the Russian military base in Gyumri are ethnic 
Armenians with Russian citizenship, and they might be willing 
to help the Nagorno-Karabakh people as volunteers. Fourth, if 
Moscow in this situation will refrain from supporting Yerevan 
with military, such a decision might turn out to be a serious blow 
to Russia’s reputation as a reliable ally not only for Armenia but 
also for other members of the CSTO, and as a result, the solidity of 
the alliance would be undermined.56
At the same time, a countervailing opinion within the expert 
community suggests that Russia’s military will not intervene into the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict due to serious geopolitical costs for the 
country. Dugin argues that in the case of war between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia there are no favorable scenarios for Russia: it cannot 
support Armenia because then the U.S. will assist, and so control, 
Azerbaijan, neither can it support Azerbaijan because Armenia is 
Russia’s strategic ally, and to stay neutral means that Washington 
will strengthen its influence on both Baku and Yerevan.57 From 
this perspective, Russia can use the factor of its military presence 
for only one end – to deter the conflicting parties from resuming 
the war. Shevchenko notes that even though Moscow has military 
commitments in the frame of the allied relations with Armenia, 
Russia remains prima facie a guarantor of the absence of war in 
the region and will act accordingly.58 This interpretation of Russia’s 
military role against the backdrop of conflict in Eastern Ukraine and 
56 This part of the analysis is partly based on Aleksandr Hramchikhin, “Kavkazskoe 
minnoe pole”, Nezavismoe voennoe obozrenie, 17 Jan 2014, http://nvo.ng.ru/
realty/2014-01-17/1_kavkaz.html; Markedonov, 4 Aug 2014; “Vozobnovlenie 
voiny v zone karabakhskogo konflikta maloveroyatno, schitayut eksperty”, 
Caucasian Knot, 8 Aug 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/247133/; Gai 
Borisov, “Nagornyi Karabakh – yubilei peremiriya na fone ugrozy novoi volny”, 
Regnum, 6 May 2014, http://regnum.ru/news/1798977.html.
57 Dugin, 3 Aug 2014. Some experts also believe that if Russian soldiers will 
participate on the Armenian side, the war between Russia and Turkey is inevitable 
(for example, see Malashenko, 24 Nov 2014).
58 “Maksim Shevchenko: azerbaidzhantsy dolzhny vernut’sya v Karabakh”, Vestnik 
Kavkaza, 24 March 2014, http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/Maksim-SHevchenko-
azerbaydzhantsy-dolzhny-vernutsya-v-Karabakh.html.
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the rise in violence in Nagorno-Karabakh has revived the proposal 
to introduce peacekeeping forces into the conflict zone.
In 2008, when Moscow’s peacebuilding efforts in Nagorno-
Karabakh reactivated, some experts argued that the Kremlin had 
developed a plan, which implies the substitution of the Armenian 
armed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh by Russian peacekeeping 
troops and thereupon return of the internally displaced persons 
and refugees to their former places of residence. Dugin was 
convinced that the main background idea of plans to introduce 
Russian peacekeepers in the region was to eliminate U.S. influence 
in the region.59 The aforementioned statement of the U.S. co-
chair in the OSCE MG, James Warlick, in May 2014 heated up 
the discussions on the advisability of a peacekeeping mission 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. Warlick called for “a well-designed 
peacekeeping operation that enjoys the confidence of all sides” 
as a necessary element of international security guarantees in the 
region.60 In Russia’s expert circles, the statement raised speculation 
about Washington’s intention to propose NATO troops for the 
role of peacekeeping forces. Vladimir Evseev, head of Caucasus 
Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States Institute, 
stressed that the peacekeeping operation would decrease the risks 
of military conflict but the participation of NATO peacekeepers is 
unacceptable for Russia.61 It has been argued that Moscow will not 
allow Western countries to introduce their peacekeepers because 
this contradicts its goal of pressing out rival forces from the region, 
in which Russia sees itself as a privileged peacekeeper. If Azerbaijan 
on its own decides to let a Western peacekeeping contingent into 
its territory, then relations between Moscow and Baku will become 
so strained that eventually it may provoke a new war in the 
region.62 There are expert reports that denote the fact that Russia 
59 Dugin, 30 Oct 2008.
60 Warlick, 7 May 2014.
61 “Lavrov letit v Baku ozhivit’ nagorno-karabakhskoe uregulirovanie”, Vestnik 
Kavakaza, 17 Jun 2014, http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/Lavrov-letit-v-Baku-
ozhivit-nagorno-karabakhskoe-uregulirovanie.html.
62 Irina Jorbenadze: “Ekspertnaya diskussiya: Chuzhie v Karabakhe”, Gorchakov 
Fund, 10 Jul 2014, http://gorchakovfund.ru/news/11920/.
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has not given up its plans to send its own peacekeeping mission 
to the region, which now are paralleled with increased pressure 
on Armenia to vacate at least some Azerbaijani territories around 
Nagorno-Karabakh and with the attempts to engage Azerbaijan in 
the Eurasian integration processes.63 Either way, there are doubts 
that the presence of peacekeeping forces would in itself bring a 
sustainable peace; it would rather keep the confrontation within 
the mode of ‘no peace and no war’.64
Russia’s efforts to deter the conflicting parties have long been 
manifest in maintaining the balance of power in the region, which 
is considered by Russian experts as an important guarantee of the 
non-resumption of war. The balance of power is based on Russia’s 
close military cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and supply 
of arms to both of them. By doing this, it is believed that Russia 
keeps the arms race in the region under control.65 However, this 
approach is a double-edged sword given the fact that for the last 
decade the region has been significantly boosted up with modern 
and destructive weaponry, which at some juncture could be used in 
a new war, potentially involving the Russian army. This situation 
is complicated by the uncertainty of the actual military capabilities 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan due to confidentiality of their military 
supplies. Therefore, the disputes about the military superiority of 
one conflicting party over the other are permanently present in 
the expert discussions. Whatever the case, the maintenance of the 
balance of power is a part of Russia’s policy to prevent the escalation 
of the conflict. The Russian ex-ambassador to Yerevan, Vyacheslav 
Kovalenko, describes this practice,
[The] emphasis is placed on forming some balance in the 
military potential between the two countries, in their standoff. 
This holds back the start of military actions… because both 
sides understand that a war would be destructive. The 
military potentials are about the same, despite the growing 
63 Ismail Agakishiyev, Interview, Vestnik Kavkaza, 8 Aug 2014, http://
vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/58567.html.
64 Jorbenadze, Ibid.
65 Markedonov, 1–15 Jul 2014.
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purchases of weapons by Baku. [Perhaps] the Armenians are 
losing in the quantitative aspect, but in qualitative terms, the 
balance keeps them at peace, not war.66
The suspended status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia’s military 
presence in the forms of the 102nd base in Gyumri and the large-scale 
military cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan are important 
factors of regional developments, which Moscow has operationalized 
in its relationships with Baku and Yerevan. The operationalization of 
these factors for foreign policy purposes requires a careful approach 
as not to upset Armenian and Azerbaijani interests and not to 
undermine the status quo. Russian analysts are almost unanimously 
convinced that the resumption of war will bring substantive political 
and economic costs for Russia, and the military intervention into 
the conflict is a last resort for Moscow, which will be used only 
when all other possible means to enforce peace are exhausted. It is 
believed that the direct participation of the Russian armed forces in 
the conflict between its two strategic partners is fraught with serious 
geopolitical consequences for the entire Caucasus and beyond, 
including the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions, 
and involving various international actors. These developments 
might completely destabilize the contemporary organization of 
international relations.
conclusions: the Balance Between 
immediate and (geo)strategic goals
Generalizing Russian expert opinion, one notices that Moscow’s 
policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement pursues both immediate 
and strategic goals, which are closely connected. The immediate goal 
is to keep the situation in the conflict zone within the state of ‘no-
war’ by all possible means at the disposal of Russian diplomatic, 
economic, political, and military arsenal. However, the increased 
frequency of violent clashes in the Line of Contact and at the state 
66 Kovalenko, 1 Aug 2014.
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border between Armenia and Azerbaijan points to the fragility of 
the status quo and further consolidates conviction among Russia’s 
experts and decision-makers that this frozen conflict as a potential 
“hot spot” at the country’s southern borders must be resolved 
without delay. In this situation, establishing a sustainable dialogue 
between Baku and Yerevan that would be effective in reaching a 
comprehensive compromise is an additional immediate goal.
The strategic objectives require that the compromise and the 
resolution of the conflict would not happen at the expense of Russia’s 
interests and presence in the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop 
of intensified confrontation with Western countries, Moscow’s 
suspicions toward the mediating activities of the U.S. and France 
are growing. Based on them, some Russian observers interpreted 
the prompt and unexpected diplomatic actions of Moscow to settle 
the escalation in summer 2014 as an attempt to take the initiative 
from Washington and Paris in the mediation process and to create 
an alternative platform for peace negotiations. However, the 
argument of the emergence of a new platform is ambiguous. Russia’s 
diplomatic practices in Nagorno-Karabakh have traditionally 
included trilateral meetings of Moscow, Baku and Yerevan, and if 
to recall Medvedev’s mediation in 2009–2011, they were not an 
alternative but rather complementing platform to the Minsk format, 
and the two other mediator-states openly supported the efforts from 
the Kremlin. The U.S. and France practice trilateral talks as well. 
The most recent of such meetings followed the August 2014 talks in 
Sochi. In early September, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
met in Newport with the U.S. State Secretary John Kerry, and in late 
October, French President François Hollande hosted counterparts 
from Baku and Yerevan in Paris.
A number of Russian experts have neglected the fact that the 
officials from the mediator-states continuously stress the importance 
of the Minsk Group work and underline their adherence to this 
platform of negotiations. Many analysts concluded that the 
consequent trilateral meetings organized by Russia, the U.S. and 
France may point to the beginning of “war of mediators”, competing 
for the leadership in the peace negotiations to shape agenda in 
accordance with one’s own strategic interests. However, the parallels 
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drawn with the developments in the mediation processes in the 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts are questionable. Unlike 
the situation in Georgia, where the government chose a pro-Western 
foreign policy direction and the separatist leaders favored Russia, 
the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is more complicated 
and there is no clear pro-Western versus pro-Russian division 
between the positions of Baku and Yerevan. Moreover, Stepanakert 
does not have an unequivocal foreign policy direction except the 
pro-Armenian one. In addition, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
important strategic countries in the region, and therefore the external 
actors cannot support only one side at the expense of the other.
The idea of the “war of mediators” stems from the belief 
that the interests of the Western states and Russia are mutually 
uncompromising and that this situation has been recently reinforced 
in the light of tensioning international relations. The widely shared 
assumption among Russian experts is that Russia is in the position 
of defense trying to preserve its presence in the South Caucasus 
and to repel attacks of the “Atlantists”, who seek to increase their 
influence on the region. From this point of view, Moscow needs to 
maintain the status quo and actively facilitate the negotiations in 
order to reach a comprehensive compromise as soon as possible, 
while the Western states strive for the destabilization of the region 
to complete a process, which began in Georgia, of cutting off the 
South Caucasus from Russia’s sphere of influence. However, there 
is also a contrasting opinion among Russian experts suggesting that 
there have never been considerable elements of the ‘West-Russia’ 
confrontation in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and therefore it 
is ungrounded to view the peace process only from the perspective 
of incompatible geopolitical interests.
Sergey Markedonov notes that the settlement process in Nagorno-
Karabakh has recently become “too ideologized” and risks being “a 
prisoner” of the Ukrainian crisis and the surrounding geopolitical 
conjuncture. He urges the saving of the established negotiation 
platform on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, as currently it is one 
of few areas of successful cooperation between Russian and Western 
diplomatic and expert communities.67 To preserve the cooperation, 
67 Markedonov, 15 May 2014; and Markedonov, 1–15 Jul 2014.
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it is necessary that diplomats and international experts continue 
discussions on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, monitoring regional 
developments and proposing unbiased and pragmatic ways out 
from the conflict. It is important to prevent the extension of the 
informational confrontation between Russian and Western experts 
to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which without this have 
been always affected by the media war of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Certainly, the contemporary set of relations between Western 
states and Russia is strained due to the Ukrainian crisis and has 
created a negative background factor for the Nagorno-Karabakh 
settlement which may bring about a ‘formal approach’ of the 
mediators. The clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces 
that continued escalating in the beginning of 2015 point to the fact 
that the future of a “Big Agreement” about which the mediators 
have recently spoken is still unclear. It seems that the search for a 
compromise will require additional time and further effort. In this 
situation, the skepticism within the Russian expert community on 
the prospects for conflict resolution is growing. The activity of the 
Minsk Group has been criticized for its inconsistency, the absence 
of concrete results, and general inefficiency. There are concerns that 
the infinite protocol meetings without tangible outcomes and the 
negotiations for the sake of negotiations will eventually become 
useless and incapable to fulfill even their main function to maintain 
stability in the conflict zone.68
The continuous ceasefire violations against the background 
of conflict in Ukraine have become a common challenge for the 
mediators and a test for the effectiveness of their work. Even 
though the prospects for conflict resolution are still ambiguous, 
the mediators must show their willingness to generate positive 
dynamics in the settlement process. This can be achieved by the 
minimization of ceasefire violations in the conflict zone through 
the international investigation of incidents, a joint reaction of the 
mediators condemning armed clashes, and creation of a punishment 
mechanism for the party responsible for ceasefire violations. On the 
‘battlefield’, the Minsk Group must ensure withdrawal of heavy 
68 Stanislav Tarasov, “Kto vyholostil sammit Olland-Aliev-Sargsyan”, Regnum, 28 
Oct 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1860890.html.
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arms and snipers from the Line of Contact. The experts believe that 
the unified firm position of the mediators backed by diplomatic and 
economic tools of influence could force Armenians and Azerbaijanis 
to accept these ‘rules’.
The Russian experts increasingly tend to associate a possible 
resolution of the conflict with the post-Soviet integration processes 
initiated by Moscow. This approach to conflict resolution has 
two apparent trends aimed at approximation of Baku’s and 
Yerevan’s positions. The first one can be viewed within the term 
of ‘cooperative security’ as Moscow seeks to create an indivisible 
security space in the Caucasus, a space which would include the 
Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Against the background of the 
contemporary geopolitical situation, Moscow is persuading Baku 
and Yerevan to take joint efforts to counter extra-regional threats. 
The second, ‘integrationist’ trend is connected with the Eurasian 
initiatives and conceptually is similar to the EU’s approach to the 
resolution of the Balkan conflicts, which is based on the integration 
of new independent states of the region, including Kosovo, into the 
common European society. There is a belief among integration-
supporters in Russia that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot 
be solved by the two nation-states and has better chances for 
the settlement at the level of a supranational organization or an 
interstate association.69 However, the joint participation of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan in an association of deep integration seems too 
unrealistic for the near future. Understanding this situation and 
following a liberal approach to international integration, Russian 
analysts urge Moscow to develop economic, social, and cultural 
cooperation to induce the chain reaction that would lead to 
political cooperation. Eventually, pragmatic reasons of cooperation 
would drive public opinion towards a peaceful community, and 
these positive dynamics in the interaction between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan would create the conditions for a stable regional order 
and would decrease the likelihood of the resumption of military 
conflict between the states.
69 For example, see Pyotr Akopov, “Yuzhnyi flang”, Vzglyad, 15 Sept 2014, http://
vz.ru/politics/2014/9/15/705762.html.
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Obviously, Azerbaijan will not join the EEU without clear 
guarantees that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be resolved 
taking into account the interests of Baku. At the same time, Russia 
cannot disregard the interests of Armenia, its only ally in the region. 
Most likely, in this ‘in-between’ situation, Moscow will continue 
making efforts to bring closer the positions of Baku and Yerevan by 
taking new steps to engage Azerbaijan directly and indirectly into 
the work of the Eurasian Economic Union, at least in the form of 
partnership in selected areas. However, the ongoing transformations 
of the global and regional geopolitical situation and changes of 
the post-Soviet borders may dissolve the chances for a sustainable 
dialogue between the conflicting parties.
This paper has been produced in the frame of the research project 
Proactive Conflict Management at Post-Soviet Deep Borders, funded 
by the Academy of Finland during 2012–2016. 
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nagorno-Karababakh:  
steps of settlement market 
out by russia’s interests
Vadim Romashov & Helena Rytövuori-Apunen
introduction
Russia has never been on the side of Armenia in the Karabakh 
conflict. Similarly, it has never been on the side of Azerbaijan 
in this conflict. In the Karabakh conflict, Russia has been on 
the side of Russia (Aleksandr Dugin ).1
Western discourses often leave unnoticed the complexities which 
Russian policies encounter in the conflict concerning Nagorno-
Karabakh. The common interpretation is that Russia has little 
real interest in the final settlement of the conflict but, instead, 
utilizes the situation in order to expand its domination in the 
South Caucasus region. According to this view, Russian diplomatic 
activity is ultimately interested only in the preservation of the 
status quo between the conflicting parties. The reasoning is that, 
because of the equal importance of Baku and Yerevan for the 
Kremlin’s strategy to increase its influence in the region, Moscow 
is not willing to exert any real pressure on either one of the states, 
and thus to press for a compromise. The parallel supply of Russia’s 
modern weaponry to the conflicting parties is presented as the 
1 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Vesti.az, July 22, 2013, http://vesti.az/news/166557 
(translation by V.R.).
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main evidence of the absence of any genuine interest in Moscow in 
resolving the conflict.
Viewing Moscow’s policy in the region against such background 
assumptions is common not only to observers outside Russia, but 
also for Russia’s domestic experts. In 2011, Aleksandr Dugin, a 
much-debated figure among Russian political scientists and a writer 
considered to be the key ideologist of “Neo-Eurasianism”, explained 
the absence of Russian interest in the normalization of Armenian–
Azerbaijani relations by referring to the lack of a solution which 
could satisfy all parties to the conflict. At the same time, Dugin, like 
most analysts of this conflict, emphasized that any radical change in 
the status quo could easily provoke the resumption of war. Dugin’s 
argumentation pivots around the belief that the actors interested in 
the destabilization of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh are 
the Western states. Therefore, the “task of the day” for Moscow’s 
diplomacy is to maintain the status quo while at the same time 
keeping a keen eye on the conflict developments in the region.2
However, the reasoning according to which the maintenance of 
the status quo is the only way by which Russia can ensure its influence 
in the South Caucasus is by no means the final answer among 
Moscow’s analysts. Three years later, in 2014, Dugin emphasized 
that Russia’s long-term goal is to reshape Armenian–Azerbaijan 
relations in such a way that would consolidate its position in an 
integrated South Caucasus region with minimized external (that 
is, Western) influence.3 From this point of view, Moscow must try 
to find a solution to the protracted conflict from the perspective of 
the advances made in the integration process, which is expected to 
generate a more peaceful regional order. This process is believed 
to create a positive environment for the realization of energy and 
infrastructure projects and, more generally, for economic development 
of the entire Caucasus, and is thus thought to be the scenario to best 
reduce the risk of the involvement of the Russian military in a war 
between its strategic partners in the region. This reasoning is the 
“root” from which branch out such initiatives as regionalization of 
the peace process (implicating some degree of substitution of the 
2 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Zerkalo.az, July 21, 2011. 
3 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Noev Kovcheg, July 1–15, 2014, No.12 (242), 1–2.
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Western mediators in the Minsk Group format by representatives 
from the neighbouring countries, Iran and Turkey) or, alternatively, 
creating altogether different or complementary platforms for the 
negotiations. The political significance of such changes goes beyond 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and gives new operative meaning to 
the dynamics of Eurasian economic integration.4 
The conclusion that Moscow either has or does not have an 
interest in a final settlement is too simple when we try to make sense 
of Russia’s policies and actions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
The two perspectives rather point to the dilemma which Russian 
diplomacy faces when trying to balance its strategic and immediate 
goals, i.e. to strengthen its political influence in the region and at the 
same time prevent the resumption of an openly military conflict and 
war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The fact that the military dimension of 
policy plays a crucial role in Russia’s efforts to counter this dilemma 
is demonstrated by Moscow’s emphasis on two military factors 
meant to keep Azerbaijanis and Armenians from resorting to open 
war, namely conventional deterrence and the balance of threats.5 
The presence of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
in the region is a significant policy instrument to serve these goals.
The dilemma described is the point of departure of this paper 
to analyse the possibility of a compromise between the perspectives 
of the “Armenian sides” (Yerevan and Stepanakert) and Azerbaijan 
on grounds that also take into account the interests of Russia, 
which has reserved itself the role of principal intermediary in the 
conflict. We examine the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
conflict and ask what opportunities there can be to start opening the 
steadfast deadlock of the conflict when we also take into account 
the fact that Russia’s strategic interests define its position on the 
negotiation process and promote certain conditions for settlement. 
These conditions recognize Russia’s existing military presence in the 
4 See Vadim Romashov, “Russian expert discussions about recent trends in the 
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, paper prepared for the research on 
peace mediation supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Spring 
2015. 
5 See Sergey Minasyan, “Quest for Stability in the Karabakh Conflict,” Russia in 
Global Affairs, No. 1, January-March 2012.
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region as well as the political and economic influence embedded in 
its Eurasian integration projects. For obvious reasons, we cannot 
speak of conditions acceptable to any of the parties, but merely look 
for the possibility of opening a path of compromises in the frame of 
the basic elements of settlement which have been identified in the 
Minsk process as the elaboration of the “Madrid Principles”. This 
thinking exercise, we hope, can facilitate seeing how a path could be 
cleared to negotiate the conflict in cooperation with Russia. We do 
not advocate any parties’ interests, but ask readers to think how the 
process could be opened so that a world political antagonism – an 
antagonism between Russia and the West – is not embedded in the 
process from the start. 
The backdrop of our discussion is the worsening security 
environment in the Eurasian political space generated by the 
confrontation between the Western countries and Russia, 
especially since the conflicts over Ukraine flared open in 2014. The 
Ukrainian crisis was the backdrop against which the occurrence 
of the unprecedented (since the ceasefire regime was established 
in 1994) armed clashes in the late summer of 2014 in the Line of 
Contact and on the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
became possible. In early 2015, the violent trend continued. These 
developments show that the conflict potential in Nagorno-Karabakh 
remains very high. The tension, together with the accumulation of 
weaponry on both sides of the Line of Contact in recent years, makes 
the risks involved in any radical changes in the status quo in this 
conflict more evident than ever before. In this situation, the question 
of how escalation can be prevented and a move towards resolution 
of the conflict can be facilitated is equally relevant for the conflicting 
parties and the mediator-states who are the co-chairs in the Minsk 
Group, i.e. Russia, the United States and France. 
While the empirical task of this paper is to look for the possibility 
of compromise in the tripartite frame explained above, the question 
whether this could be acceptable also to the Western states and how 
they in this process could have their own interests satisfied has too 
many contingencies to be discussed here. It is beyond the scope of 
the present paper and opens another chapter in the same research 
problem. Our task is more limited, empirical and hypothetical: 
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Is there a possibility to start building a compromise between the 
conflicting parties, and to do so in such a way that does not exclude 
Russia’s interests in the process? Our study proceeds by analysing 
official documents, speeches, expert opinions and media accounts 
from Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
armenia and azerbaijan: twenty plus 
Years of “no War, no peace” 
Since a ceasefire agreement was signed in May 1994, the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani societies have developed post-war interpretations 
of reality based on their mutually opposed and incompatible 
interests. Whilst the two ethnic societies had lived side by side with 
some tension and occasional communal violence throughout the 
Soviet decades and earlier during the rule of Imperial Russia, the 
post-war years sparked a “conflict of identities” in which Nagorno-
Karabakh for both parties, in the context of their newly founded 
state building, signifies mutually antagonistic identity projects. 
According to Laurence Broers, the identities of the conflicting parties 
are grounded on “competing understandings of historical justice 
tightly interwoven with national ideologies.”6 The Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis have created two alternative and incompatible national 
versions of Karabakh history. Thomas de Waal argues that, based 
on these versions of history, the conflicting parties believe “that to 
be without Nagorny Karabakh is to have an incomplete national 
identity, that Armenian or Azerbaijani nationhood is a stunted and 
wounded thing without it”. 7 The identities of the conflicting parties 
6 “Introduction” by Laurence Broers in his edited work “The limits of leadership: 
Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process,” Accord, No. 17, 2005. 
The conflict discourse has created a self-reproducing social discourse of “othering” 
and “demonization”. About these exclusionary politics, see Hratch Tchilingirian, 
“New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace” in Broers, op. cit. 
7 Thomas de Waal, “The Nagorny Karabakh conflict: origins, dynamics and 
misperceptions” in Laurence Broers (ed.) “The limits of leadership”. For a 
comprehensive history of the conflict see, for example, Thomas de Waal, Black 
Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: New York 
University Press, 2003.
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that have been constructed in the situation of “no war, no peace” are 
a major obstacle to the settlement of the conflict in the social and 
political processes of both countries. Because Nagorno-Karabakh 
has been made a constituent part of the new national identity, 
undermining this part becomes self-defeating for any politician in 
the election process. 
Although the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a division on 
ethnic lines, ethnic or national identities as such cannot be held 
to be the sources of the conflict. Instead, the problem is that the 
conflict over Karabakh has been made a key issue of national 
identity in both countries, and this element of identity has become 
so deeply rooted in both societies that a change can only come 
with either a major disruption of the power of the present elites 
or as a long-term process. Because the war (1992–94) flared up 
during the first years of independence, the state-building processes 
were started in the situation of war. Consequently, the national 
processes of identity building today would no longer be the same 
if they were not affected by the two different “no war, no peace 
syndromes” (as denoted by Laura Baghdasarian and Arif Yunusov), 
that is, the syndromes of a “victor” and a “victim” (Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis, respectively).8 In Azerbaijan, the idea of revenge 
and the inevitability of returning Karabakh is an element of state-
building and the ideological basis for national consolidation, 
whereas in Armenia the movement in support of Karabakh is 
the foundation of Armenian independence and statehood. The 
sense of historical victimhood (the genocidal tragedies of the 
early twentieth century) gives Karabakh a significance which is 
far greater than the territory and land (in spite of the fact that 
this land is exceptionally fertile in the region and does have 
agricultural significance). In Stepanakert, the bitter pride of being 
part of the Armenian “victor” connects with the syndrome of being 
a “besieged fortress”. The politicians in Stepanakert appeal to the 
idea of people’s unity facing a permanent external threat in order 
to ensure the national consolidation without which the tiny polity 
8 Laura Baghdasarian and Arif Yunusov, “War, social change and ‘no war, no 
peace’ syndromes in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies,” in Laurence Broers (ed.) 
“The limits of leadership.”
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of “Artsakh”, the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (NKR), with 
its population of less than one hundred thousand, could hardly 
exist. The fact that Karabakh is able to increase its political weight 
by being an integral part of Armenian politics is indicated by the 
number and influence of the activists of the Karabakh movement 
in the Armenian political and military elite.9 While the military 
confrontation continues, finding a balance in which all these 
sentiments do not result in a backlash with action that further 
accelerates the violent conflict is extremely difficult.
Self-censorship and state control over the information space 
in both countries contribute to building mental walls, which bar 
communication between the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. 
In this situation, the negotiation agenda crafted in connection with 
the Minsk Group remains detached from the social and political 
processes of both countries, and arguably needs mechanisms to 
curb the distance. In creating such mechanisms, the experiences of 
other countries about post-war conciliation and peace-building can 
be useful. However, the first and primary task is to look for the 
possibility of agreement in the elements that have been identified in 
the Minsk process. 
9 On the role of the Karabakh activists in contemporary Armenian politics, 
see Sergey Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Foreign, Military 
and Domestic Politics of Armenia: an Assessment” and Alexander Iskandaryan, 
“From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism: Whither Armenia”, both in Mikko 
Palonkorpi and Alexander Iskandaryan (eds), Armenia’s foreign and domestic 
politics: development trends, Yerevan: Caucasus Institute and Aleksanteri 
Institute, 2013. Although Armenia represents the position of Nagorno-Karabakh 
in official negotiations, the political influence of Yerevan on Stepanakert is limited 
because of the sensitivity of this issue in Armenian society and the influence of 
the Karabakh activists in the economic, political and military spheres of life in 
Armenia. Political pressure from Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh or unilateral 
decisions concerning a peace agreement may end the political career of decision-
makers in Yerevan. An example is the resignation of the former president Levon 
Ter-Petrossyan in 1998. 
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Basic principles to Bridge the gap of 
communication 
The proposals known as the Madrid Principles were presented 
to the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers by the OSCE 
Minsk Group co-chairs at the OSCE ministerial meeting in Madrid 
on 29 November 2007. They laid the basis for the Basic Principles 
for the renewed negotiations geared towards the conclusion of a 
comprehensive peace agreement. These principles were outlined in six 
main points: return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh 
to Azerbaijan’s control, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh 
providing guarantees for security and self-governance, a corridor 
linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, future determination of the 
final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding 
expression of will, the right of all internally displaced persons and 
refugees to return to their former places of residence, and international 
security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.10 
The work begun in Madrid was continued in 2009 (after the break 
caused by the Russia-Georgia war) by the Minsk Group co-chairs on 
the side-lines of major international conferences. 
Despite the formal acceptance of the agenda of the principles 
by Yerevan and Baku, progress was hampered by the “devils in the 
details” and the question of the mutual hierarchy of the principles 
(which consequently was ruled out). The contemporary agenda of the 
negotiations is about “updated Madrid Principles” where the basic 
elements remain the same. The key issues are status and territory. 
While the Armenian side in the conflict refrains from disputing the 
demand of the international mediators and Azerbaijan to vacate 
the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, they also link this 
process to granting independent status to Nagorno-Karabakh. This 
scenario is unacceptable to Baku, which agrees to provide Nagorno-
Karabakh with maximum autonomy while the area at the same time 
would be strictly under Azerbaijani jurisdiction. In order to untie the 
knot, the mediators have elaborated a settlement design in which an 
interim status would be provided to Nagorno-Karabakh to guarantee 
10 CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 131, April 2013.
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its security and self-governance. This design is meant to move the 
negotiation process forward and begin a gradual transformation 
of the status quo. Under this scenario, the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan de jure is not violated, but Nagorno-Karabakh remains 
de facto beyond its control. However, Stepanakert does not support 
this option and sees the status of the territory as nothing less than 
“a question of survival”. The Armenian side remains convinced that 
the return to Azerbaijan of the seven districts around Nagorno-
Karabakh would weaken both their advantageous strategic positions 
for military defence and their political arguments in the peace 
negotiations. Sergey Minasyan (Caucasus Institute, Yerevan) notes 
that the Armenian public opinion “holds that any change in the 
geography of the frontlines would only upset the balance in favour 
of Azerbaijan, giving Baku a new motive to resume war.”11 This 
reasoning is demonstrated by the categorical statement expressed by 
Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian in July 2011 on the 
interim status of Karabakh as a “status quo plus”, that is, “all that 
Nagorno-Karabakh has today, plus the international recognition of 
that status”. 12
Another disputed issue in the frame of the Madrid Principles is 
the way the expression of popular will should be organized so as 
to be legally binding and thus to lay the basis for the international 
recognition of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku objects 
to the idea of organizing any referendum exclusively among the 
population now living in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani 
party to the negotiations has argued for two alternatives. The first 
is a referendum, which would have to include the entire population 
of Azerbaijan. This is in accordance with the provision which 
Azerbaijan introduced into its Constitution in 1995: any change 
of the state’s borders requires a nation-wide referendum. Popular 
11 Sergey Minasyan, “Armenia in Karabakh, Karabakh in Armenia: living with 
a conflict” in Alexander Iskandaryan (ed.) Identities, Ideologies and Institutions. 
A Decade of Insight into the Caucasus: 2001–2011, Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, 
2011, 146.
12 The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The visit of the Armenian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to London,” Press Releases, July 13, 2011, http://www.mfa.am/
en/press-releases/item/2011/07/13/london/.
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opinion provides a back door exit for any compromises that the 
negotiations may achieve, and can nullify at a stroke the results of 
the peace process, including all that the international community 
may have invested in building an interim administration. Another 
alternative acceptable to Azerbaijan would be organizing a plebiscite 
in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh after the return of Azerbaijani 
displaced persons and refugees to their former places of residence. In 
this alternative, the status can be determined only if the will expressed 
by both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani communities match; if 
not, the search for a mutually acceptable solution would continue.13 
The reasoning in this option is that the decisions made in Karabakh 
by both ethnic groups should instruct Baku and Yerevan in the peace 
process and commit them to achieving joint goals. From Armenia’s 
point of view, the first alternative of Baku is a political tool and the 
second breaks down into a dispute about numbers: the number of 
IDPs in Azerbaijan including the new generations can easily more 
than double the present population of Karabakh, and thus decide 
the status question in advance.14 In addition, such mobility would 
create enormous economic and social strain in Karabakh, a strain 
that no amount of assistance from the international community can 
prevent. 
A third acute problem concerns the width and operation of a 
land corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through the 
Lachin district. Yerevan would like to keep this corridor as wide as 
possible, while Baku would restrict it to a road for joint Azerbaijani 
and Armenian use, preferably to continue to Nakhichevan in the 
south to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave district at the Iranian 
border. The joint road would enable Armenia through the territory 
of Azerbaijan to connect with Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan 
through the territory of Armenia to connect with Nakhichevan. 
While such a parallel structure has the advantage of looking like an 
13 Rasim Musabekov, “Karabakhskii factor vo vneshnei i vnutrennei politike 
Azerbaidzhana” in Alexander Iskandaryan (ed.) Caucasus Neighborhood: Turkey 
and the South Caucasus, Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, 2008, 86.
14 The war left approximately one million IDPs, of which 750,000 for Azerbaijan 
(Azeri population from Karabakh and the seven occupied regions) and 230,000 for 
Armenia.
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ideal peace structure, it is not a sufficient connection for Yerevan. 
Although Yerevan, for the sake of contributing to the peace process, 
must be prepared to negotiate on the return of at least parts of the 
territories, Lachin is likely to be the piece in which little will be 
conceded. A corridor will hardly be enough, and several points of 
access on the map are demanded. 
While these bundles of issues remain open and the future for 
Stepanakert is undetermined, it too is not ready to agree to discuss 
any interim status that might set some frame for the future. The 
syndrome of the victory with heavy costs maintains this attitude. 
Sergey Minasyan notes that “the Karabakh authorities affirm that 
there is no precedent in history, when a nation, having won a war 
for independence and successfully built its statehood for more than 
two decades, of its own free will renounces the fruit of these hard-
won achievements.”15 Whereas Stepanakert argues to be included in 
the official negotiations in the Minsk frame Baku has consistently 
objected restoring the three-party structure of negotiations which 
existed for a short time after the ceasefire, arguing that the military 
achievements of Nagorno-Karabakh were possible only because of 
Armenia’s direct involvement (“Armenian aggressive expansionism”). 
The participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the peace talks is feared 
to weaken the negotiation positions of the Azerbaijani diplomats, 
who would then have to repel “diplomatic attacks” from “two 
Armenian parties”. Azerbaijanis are concerned about the balance 
in the negotiations where they already claim to see the Russian and 
French co-chairs inclining towards supporting the Armenian party.
strategies of the conflicting parties 
The mutually exclusive identity projects and the victor–victim 
syndromes are manifest in the strategies of the conflicting parties 
and their policies for achieving the maximum of their goals in the 
negotiation process. David Petrossyan argues that there are two 
confronting “asymmetrical doctrines”– “the ‘deferred revenge’ 
15 Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.”
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(Baku) and the ‘retention of territories’ (Yerevan, Stepanakert)”.16 
Baku supports its doctrine by its diplomatic, information and 
military resources. Azerbaijani officials exert diplomatic pressure 
on Armenia by using the platforms of international organizations 
and meetings at which they emphasize the inadmissibility of “the 
Armenian occupation” and their right to restore the territorial 
integrity of their state by means not excluding military force. The 
state-controlled media in Azerbaijan supports the often aggressive 
rhetoric of politicians by explaining Baku’s position in more detail. 
In Armenian expert circles again the opinion seems to be that, in 
order to support its threats to return the territories by force, Baku 
maintains a permanent tension by provoking incidents in the Line of 
Contact and at the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.17 
While there is no international investigation of these incidents, it 
is impossible to form any reliable conclusions about the source of 
these incidents. Simultaneously the continuing tension in the conflict 
zone attracts the attention of the international community, and the 
conflicting parties are able to use it instrumentally to gain political 
and economic dividends in international connections. 
The arms race is another military means by which Azerbaijan is 
seen to use threat policies towards Armenia. Baku has increased its 
arms acquisitions since the mid-2000s when the revenues from the 
export of oil and gas allowed the political leadership to raise the 
allocations budgeted for military modernization. Rasim Musabekov 
(independent expert, Baku) notes that the widely held belief in 
Azerbaijani society is that the main goal of the arms race is to “wear 
out” Armenia’s economy. Combined with the economic blockade 
and the consequent isolation of Armenia from regional projects (in 
which policies Azerbaijan is supported by Turkey), the arms race is 
expected to overstrain the country’s budget, increase social risks and 
16 David Petrossyan, “Precedents and prospects: the de-facto states of the South 
Caucasus in 2008” in Alexander Iskandaryan (ed.) Identities, Ideologies and 
Institutions. A Decade of Insight into the Caucasus: 2001–2011, Yerevan: Caucasus 
Institute, 2011, 163.
17 See Larisa Deriglazova and Sergey Minasyan, “Nagorno-Karabakh: the 
paradoxes of strength and weakness in an asymmetric conflict,” Caucasus Institute 
Research Paper, No. 3, June 2011.
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stir up public discontent. The reasoning is that this policy will force 
the Armenian politicians to make concessions on the Karabakh 
issue.18
For the time being, the conclusion in Armenia is that it has been 
able to counter these efforts with assistance from Russia. Sergey 
Minasyan argues that, owing to Russia’s free and discount supplies 
of armaments within the frames of bilateral agreements and the 
cooperation in the CSTO, Armenia has been able to maintain an 
asymmetric parity in the arms race with Azerbaijan. Additionally, 
Armenia’s military potential of deterrence includes the fortified line of 
defence in the conflict zone which has been significantly strengthened 
during the past two decades.19 Moreover, David Petrossyan notes that 
while “Azerbaijan has to […] sustain its defence capabilities in other 
directions from which potential threats may come, especially on the 
border with Iran and […] the Caspian Sea”, “Armenia is blocking 
the threat from the western, Turkish, direction with support from its 
strategic ally, Russia”, whose troops conduct security control in this 
sector of the Armenian border.20 In addition, Armenia participates in 
the system of collective defence in the CSTO frame, and the presence 
of Russia’s 102nd military base in Gyumri is an important element of 
the Russian-Armenian strategic alliance. The base is part of a joint 
air defence system of the Commonwealth of Independence States 
and contributes to the defence of Armenia’s airspace. As a result of 
all of this, the aggregation of the military, political and geographic 
factors have helped Armenia to maintain an asymmetric parity with 
Azerbaijan in its military capabilities.
The preservation of such an overall balance in the conventional 
military capacities in the region has prompted some experts to 
argue that a mechanism of mutual deterrence is being developed.21 
The Armenians, unlike the Azerbaijani who seek for “revenge”, 
have no interest in resuming large-scale hostilities because of the 
18 Musabekov, “Karabakhskii factor,” 94.
19 Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” 25–26.
20 Petrossyan, “Precedents and prospects,” 163–164.
21 See Sergey Minasyan, “Nagorno-Karabakh after Two Decades of Conflict: Is 
Prolongation of the Status Quo Inevitable?” Caucasus Institute Research Paper, No. 
2, August 2010.
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advantageous positions they gained in the war before 1994. Against 
this backdrop, it makes full sense that Yerevan prefers a policy of 
“conventional deterrence” as its strategic guideline. This means 
preventing the enemy from starting combat operations, and doing 
this by the means of “intimidation, imminent retaliation and risk 
of irreparable harm” provided by conventional weapons. Minasyan 
argues that, despite the large military offensive potential of 
Azerbaijan, “the Armenian forces are capable of inflicting significant 
damage on industrial, infrastructural and communication facilities 
deep inside Azerbaijan’s territory, which in the long term would have 
a negative impact on its economic and political development”. The 
logic of conventional deterrence here is that “the asymmetric arms 
race in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone raises the threshold and 
reduces the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities”, and that this 
evolving “balance of threats” maintains the military stability and 
prevents the outbreak of war.22
The strategies of the conflicting parties are also influenced by 
their perceptions of time. Dov Lynch notes that a long-lasting status 
quo plays in favour of the de-facto states and that, therefore, “these 
states will hold out as long as they possibly can” and stand with their 
non-recognition and isolation.23 In much the same way, Minasyan 
argues that for unrecognized states time is a power resource that 
they use to strengthen their political de-facto existence and status.24 
Consequently, there is a widely shared belief within the Armenian 
and Karabakh political elites and societies that “every day of the 
existence of Nagorno-Karabakh outside of Azerbaijan serves to 
reinforce its sovereignty.”25 Baku in turn seeks by diplomatic and 
propaganda means to counteract the development that a lapse 
of time would make the Azerbaijani people and the international 
community accept the established status quo. 
In 1994, Azerbaijan had to agree to a ceasefire because of its 
military losses and in order to gain time. Lynch notes that Baku 
22 Minasyan, “Quest for Stability in the Karabakh Conflict.”
23 Dov Lynch, “Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts,” International Affairs, 
Vol. 78, No. 4, 2002, 848.
24 Minasyan, “Armenia in Karabakh, Karabakh in Armenia,” 150.
25 Minasyan, “Nagorno-Karabakh after Two Decades of Conflict,” 63.
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initially, like also many other “post-Soviet metropolises” with 
similar problems, saw the status quo as “a window of opportunity in 
which to gain external sources of support”.26 Azerbaijan anticipated 
that its strategic geographic position and oil resources would attract 
the leading world powers to support it, and that this would help to 
promote Azerbaijan’s interests in the conflict settlement.27 However, 
the continued build-up of a functional state in Karabakh and the 
lack of progress in the negotiation process brought the Azerbaijani 
leadership to the conclusion that the continuation of the status quo 
diminishes the prospects for restoration of the country’s territorial 
integrity, and that it is harmful for its authority because the confidence 
of its population about the return of the territories is declining. At 
the same time, several factors, among them, arguably the “balance of 
threats”, and also the unified opinion of the international mediators 
in the Minsk Group about the inadmissibility of renewed hostilities, 
hampered developing incentives in Baku to launch offensive military 
activities against Nagorno-Karabakh. In such circumstances, military 
modernization and the promotion of the arms race remain the way 
to make use of the status quo. However, Azerbaijan’s efforts to 
overstrain Armenia’s economy and to change the balance of military 
power in its favour can only gain limited results insofar as Armenia 
can count on its side the Russian military capacity in the region.
russia’s relations with armenia and 
azerbaijan 
In the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, there was no direct involvement 
of the Russian military, although equipment and manpower from the 
Soviet bases in the region were used to support both parties. The fact 
that Nagorno-Karabakh itself remained outside of direct Russian 
involvement and that Russian diplomacy brokered a ceasefire 
agreement in 1994 facilitated Russia’s role as the main intermediary 
in the peace negotiations. For reasons related both to the deadlock 
26 Lynch, “Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts,” 845.
27 See Musabekov, “Karabakhskii factor,” 86.
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in the conflict and the wish to increase the international normative 
weight of its mediation efforts, Moscow agreed to the OSCE Minsk 
Group as the frame of the negotiation process. However, Russia’s 
mediation efforts in Karabakh were not very active before the war 
with Georgia in 2008. Immediately after this war, President Dmitry 
Medvedev organized a meeting with his Armenian and Azerbaijani 
counterparts, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, and several trilateral 
meetings followed in the format established in Russian diplomacy. 
Simultaneously, the work of Russian diplomats intensified in the 
OSCE Minsk Group. It was important to send the message to the 
West that Nagorno-Karabakh was a case different from Georgia’s 
separatist regions, and anxieties had arisen in Moscow about the 
possibility of another explosion developing on Russia’s Caucasus 
border. The support given by the U.S. and France to Medvedev’s 
efforts is indicative of the wish for some breakthrough based on the 
Madrid Principles.28 However, this was also the time when Aleksandr 
Dugin argued that Moscow must replace the Armenian forces with 
Russian peacekeepers and begin the return of the displaced persons, 
and that the idea in the background of this plan was to eliminate the 
U.S. influence in this region.29 Whatever the main motive, Medvedev’s 
active efforts failed, and by 2011 the conflict settlement resumed its 
previous standoff.
When the ceasefire was negotiated, Azerbaijan had objected to 
the proposal, then coming from the Russian Ministry of Defense, to 
establish Russian peacekeepers in the Kelbajar district which Armenia 
had occupied. A feature to be noticed in the current discussion is 
that Armenian experts and official statements demonstrate an 
unwillingness to accept international peacekeepers, apparently 
because in such case their forces would be obliged to leave the 
fortified territories, which again would be perceived as changing 
the status quo to the favor of Baku. The Armenian experts vaguely 
explain why the peacekeeping operation as an international security 
28 “Medvedev momentum falters in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Strategic Comments 
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, Comments 27, August 
2011.
29 Aleksandr Dugin, Interview, Nakanune.ru, October 30, 2008, http://www.
nakanune.ru/articles/13696/.
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guarantee cannot be effective.30 In August 2014, the Armenian 
Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan stated that the Armenians 
themselves can solve the issues they are facing, and that “there is 
absolutely no need for the deployment of peacekeeping forces”.31 
Thus, the Armenian Ministry of Defence seems to have chosen 
not to consider the preliminary agreement included in the Madrid 
Principles that the peacekeeping contingent is to be discussed as the 
main form of the international security guarantee.
Since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
August 2008, these entities have been formally connected to the 
economic, social and political space of the Russian Federation by the 
bilateral Agreements of the Allied Relations and Integration signed 
in 2015. The Armenian population currently living in Nagorno-
Karabakh have hopes of a similar future together with Armenia. 
However, Moscow’s policy on Nagorno-Karabakh remains 
unchanged. The Russian diplomats continue to call for the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan, and do not draw parallels between Nagorno-
Karabakh and the breakaway regions in Georgia and Ukraine. Unlike 
in these other conflicts, Russia does not provide direct support to the 
NKR. Russia is the security guarantor of Armenia, which in turn 
is the security guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh. This structure of 
relations would be violated if Moscow were to recognize the NKR 
ahead of Yerevan.
A reason which is by no means less important for Moscow’s 
restrained relations with Stepanakert is Baku. Azerbaijan is Russia’s 
important strategic partner in the South Caucasus. In 2013, Baku 
refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, which 
Moscow considers as a rival project to its own integration initiatives 
30 For instance David Petrossyan emphasizes that “there is a priori distrust towards 
hypothetical peacekeepers among all the conflicting parties” (Petrossyan, “Precedents 
and prospects,” 164). Sergey Minasyan again argues that “the experience of other 
countries shows that peacekeepers are no guarantee against war in the conflict zone 
in the case of external pressures” (Minasyan, “Armenia in Karabakh, Karabakh in 
Armenia,” 146).
31 See “Armenia’s Defence Minister sees no need for deployment of peacekeepers 
in Karabakh zone,” Armenpress, August 6, 2014, http://armenpress.am/eng/
news/771794/seiyran-oganyan-ne-vidit-neobkhodimosti-v-razmeshchenii-
mirotvorcheskikh.html.
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in the former Soviet areas. Nor do Azerbaijani officials currently 
indicate any further willingness to deepen cooperation with NATO. 
Thus, there are no apparent reasons for Russia to use Nagorno-
Karabakh to influence Azerbaijani policy-makers, in whose eyes any 
moves to alter the formal status of Nagorno-Karabakh constitutes an 
act of offence. The recognition of the NKR would be an unwise step 
to take when Moscow in the contemporary geopolitical conjuncture 
is searching for support from its strategic partners and trying to 
create new incentives to intensify cooperation.
Moreover, there is a widely shared understanding in Moscow 
that a radical change of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh can result 
in the resumption of warfare. A war could hardly be kept within 
the Karabakh area, but could easily spread over to the territory of 
Armenia, and thereupon the Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty 
on mutual defence would enter into force.32 In this situation, Russia 
would face a dilemma about sending its troops into a war between 
its two strategic partners in a geopolitically important region. Direct 
participation of the Russian military on the side of the Armenian 
forces would result in a rupture of the relations with Azerbaijan. 
However, if Moscow would refrain from supporting Yerevan, its 
reputation, as a reliable ally – not only for Armenia but also for 
the other members of the CSTO – would suffer a serious blow. If 
Russia shows such reluctance, pressures would emerge in Armenia 
to demand closing down the Russian military base, and Moscow 
would risk losing its major ally not only in the South Caucasus but 
also in the CSTO.33 
Due to the weaponry accumulated in the arms race between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, a possible war would have a destructive 
potential far greater than the war in 1992–1994. On the Armenian 
side, the increase of armaments is aimed at maintaining the 
asymmetrical balance of power and the deterrent potential of the 
Armenian military. Although Russia’s assistance to Armenia includes 
discounted and free supply of weapons, its ally image in Armenia 
is tarnished by the criticism, voiced especially by the political 
opposition, of Russia’s simultaneous military sales to Azerbaijan. 
32 Romashov, “Russian expert discussions.”
33 Deriglazova and Minasyan, “Nagorno-Karabakh.”
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From Russia’s point of view, the parallel cooperation is a way to keep 
the arms race under control. If Baku were to purchase armaments 
from other countries, Moscow would possess less information about 
the military potential of Azerbaijan. An additional reason for the 
export of arms to Azerbaijan is that these sales are commercial, 
and to some extent compensate for the financial loss of supplying 
weapons to Armenia on preferential terms. Moreover, the arms race 
helps to legitimize the ongoing modernization of the Russian military 
base at Gyumri, which considerably raises its combat capability. The 
growing destructive potential of a possible war with Azerbaijan and 
the permanent threat of resumed warfare justify Russia’s military 
presence in the eyes of the Armenian citizens. Finally, in spite of all 
the criticism that the parallel military cooperation raises, it would be 
far more difficult for Moscow to support its image of a mediator if 
it had cooperation only with Armenia. 
strategic interests in the conflict 
settlement 
Moscow has set two immediate goals for its policy in Nagorno-
Karabakh. The first is to keep the situation in the conflict zone within 
the state of “no-war” by all possible means – diplomatic, economic, 
political, and military. The second is to maintain the dialogue 
between Baku and Yerevan. In early August 2014, when the violent 
military encounters between the two parties reached the peak of the 
past two decades, the Russian foreign ministry organized a high-
level diplomatic intervention. President Vladimir Putin held bilateral 
meetings with Presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliev on the 8th 
and 9th of August, and these were followed by trilateral talks. The 
military escalation of the conflict, which had been developing in the 
geopolitical conjuncture unfavourable to Russia, was brought to a 
halt, and the meeting demonstrated that a willingness to negotiate 
and speak for a peaceful resolution still prevails in Baku and in 
Yerevan. 
The positive results of the meetings realized Russia’s immediate 
goals, which serve its strategic interests in the South Caucasus and 
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beyond, including the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions. In 
2014, the geopolitical configuration in the Black Sea region had been 
complicated by the crisis in Ukraine. One result of the activation of 
Moscow’s policies in the region is the emphasis given to strategic 
cooperation with Turkey. In early December 2014, President 
Putin visited Ankara with a large delegation to intensify bilateral 
economic relations and to discuss regional issues. The Russian and 
Turkish representatives reached an agreement on the creation of 
the so-called “Turkish stream” gas pipeline, which is meant to meet 
Turkey’s aspirations to become a hub bringing energy to Europe 
and to replace the South Stream project, which had turned out to 
be problematic in the EU. The new moment in the Russian–Turkish 
relations developing since 2013 has raised speculations about the 
emergence of a strategic alliance with similar political agendas 
opposing Western aspirations for domination in the region of the 
Black Sea and the South Caucasus.34
Due to the close relations of Turkey and Azerbaijan and the firm 
support which Ankara gives to Baku on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Azerbaijan cannot remain outside of the Russian-Turkish 
cooperation. Moreover, Azerbaijan, which plays a crucial role in the 
energy geopolitics of the Caspian Sea region, is a key partner for 
this cooperation. At the same time, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and the isolation of Armenia from the regional projects create 
obstacles for developing the trilateral cooperation of Ankara, Baku 
and Moscow. Because Russia does not have diplomatic relations 
with Georgia, which actively collaborates with NATO and the EU, 
the inclusion of Armenia in the Russia–Azerbaijan–Turkey axis has 
great importance in Moscow, both principled and practical. These 
aims are an additional reason for Moscow to seek a way out of the 
stalemate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The years of President Dmitry Medvedev’s mediation efforts 
(2009–2011) coincided with the reconciliation efforts of Yerevan 
and Ankara to establish diplomatic contacts based on the so-called 
“Zürich protocols”. Russia supported this dialogue, which was 
34 On the political aspects uniting Russian and Turkish interests, see Toni Alaranta, 
“Turkey’s new Russian policy: towards a strategic alliance,” The Finnish Institute 
of International Affairs, Briefing Paper, No. 175, March 2015.
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anticipated as taking some steps towards the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey plays a conditioning role in the 
process, because the question of re-opening the Turkish border with 
Armenia is a negotiating chip for Azerbaijan. Although a dialogue 
between Yerevan and Ankara presents a chance to ease the Nagorno-
Karabakh deadlock and to involve Armenia in Russia’s cooperation 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan, a breakthrough in this process seems 
unrealistic in the foreseeable future. The year 2015 is the centennial 
commemoration of the genocide of the Armenian people and not in 
Armenian society a moment conducive to the resumption of dialogue 
with Ankara.35 Moreover, in early 2015 tensions emerged between 
the main political forces in Armenia, President Serzh Sargsyan and 
his ruling party, the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) and the 
second largest political force in the country, the party Prosperous 
Armenia led by the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan. If these tensions 
mobilize nationalist sentiments, they will undermine the possibilities 
of developing a favourable atmosphere for the resolution of the 
conflict. 
In order to facilitate the dialogue between Baku and Yerevan, 
Moscow relies on the working platforms provided by the Minsk 
Group and the trilateral meetings between Russian, Armenian and 
Azerbaijani high-level officials. The last-mentioned platform has 
been used to realize immediate goals, i.e. to quickly stabilize the 
situation in the case of conflict-escalating events. The trilateral 
platform is also needed in order to discuss Russian’s conditions for 
settlement (to ensure strategic goals) in a confidential environment 
without representatives from the U.S. and France. Although there 
is no publicly available reliable information about the concrete 
proposals which the Russian diplomats have put on the table, 
Russia has no reason to deviate from the Madrid Principles, which 
35 In February 2015, President Serzh Sargsyan made a decision to recall the Zurich 
protocols (signed in October, 2009) from the parliamentary agenda explaining 
the measure by “the absence of political will, distortions of the letter and spirit 
of the protocols by the Turkish authorities and continuous attempts to articulate 
preconditions”. President of the Republic of Armenia, “Armenian President recalls 
Armenian-Turkish protocols from National Assembly,” Press Release, February 16, 
2015, http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2015/02/16/President-Serzh-
Sargsyan-National-Assembly/.
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it has helped to craft, and which are only the basic elements agreed 
for discussion. The real issue concerns the practical implementation 
and, while there is a stalemate, it is difficult to argue that Russia’s 
efforts would not have positive impacts on the prospects of 
resolution. 
The fact that several rounds of mediation have failed to bring 
concrete results show that such efforts must be combined with 
measures which reshape the environment around the negotiation 
process. While this approach requires a range of inducements for 
the conflicting parties to make concessions, the use of any coercive 
power on behalf of Russia is fraught with the risk that Baku 
or Yerevan may turn to the Western states for support. Having 
experience of the acute conflict since the last years of the Soviet 
Union, Russian diplomacy seems to have settled on the conclusion 
that there is no possibility of resolving the conflict peacefully in 
the immediate future. In this situation, the line of action which 
has repeatedly been suggested by a number of Russian experts 
on security policy is to transform the Armenian–Azerbaijani 
relationship from a zero-sum conflict to a relationship of at least 
some compatibility of interests.36 From this perspective, the task of 
diplomacy is to construct an environment of common interests in 
line with Russia’s strategic interests in the region and promoting 
the Eurasian integration.37
The refusal of Baku and Yerevan to sign the Association 
Agreement with the EU, Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), and the simultaneous intensification 
of Russia-Azerbaijan cooperation are all developments that 
correspond with Russia’s aims in bringing the interests of the 
parties closer to each other. Although Baku is cautious about 
Russia-dominated integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space, 
Azerbaijan’s participation in selected areas of cooperation under 
the EAEU seems possible. Positive signs in this respect include the 
mutual discussions of Ankara and Moscow on the formation of a 
free trade zone between the EAEU and Turkey. The success of these 
36 Romashov, “Russian expert discussions.”
37 See Sergey Markedonov, “The Caucasian Factor in the Eurasian Integration,” 
Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, January-March, 2014.
163
plans can give Armenia a chance to resume direct trade contacts 
with its neighbours.38 One piece in this puzzle is Kazakhstan, 
which, because of its ethnic Turkic connection, can build bridges 
with Azerbaijan within the EAEU.39 
There is a range of potential projects that interest Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, Armenia, Russia and Kazakhstan in the fields of trade, 
transportation, communications and, above all, energy; however, 
these projects cannot be fully realized unless the Armenian borders 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan are opened. This requires at least 
some positive dynamism in the transformation of the status quo. 
As a minimum, the return of some of the territories surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh, combined with concrete security guarantees for 
the NKR, can be a step to facilitate the abolishment of the economic 
blockade of Armenia. While the return of some of the territories 
is the most obvious starting point for the implementation of the 
Madrid Principles, the obstacle, as always, is that from the point of 
view of the conflict parties the overall package should be basically 
defined and agreed before they are prepared to make concessions 
about individual items. 
Key issues and process drivers 
Of the six Madrid Principles two touch mainly upon Russia’s 
strategic interests. These are the questions of an interim status 
for Nagorno-Karabakh and international security guarantees, 
including a peacekeeping operation. The remaining principles 
appear to be more technical issues, although they do have 
significance as parts of the comprehensive process. From Moscow’s 
point of view, being more technical means that it is prepared to 
agree to any compromise which Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert 
38 “Turkey May Create Free Trade Zone with Eurasian Customs Union – 
Development Minister,” Sputnik, July 19, 2014, http://sputniknews.com/
politics/20140719/191039085.html. 
39 President Nursultan Nazarbayev has twice (in May and October 2014) made 
statements confirming the inadmissibility of including Nagorno-Karabakh in the 
EAEU upon the accession of Armenia.
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is able achieve on the issues. By contrast, the questions about 
the interim status and the international security guarantees for 
Nagorno-Karabakh relate to the strategic goal of Russia’s policies 
in the South Caucasus to limit the influence of Western countries 
in the region and to consolidate its own presence. The uncertain 
future of Nagorno-Karabakh which the agreement that there will 
be an interim status renders possible (although this does not follow 
from the concept and its definition in the process) is in line with 
Russia’s interests, because it allows Moscow to continue using the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue to influence decision-making in Baku and 
Yerevan. While such uncertainty prevails, Armenia needs Russian 
security guarantees, and Azerbaijan seeks for approaches which 
bring Moscow to its side of the conflict.
On the question concerning international security guarantees, 
Moscow has clearly signalled that a peacekeeping contingent 
from NATO or the EU is not acceptable. Because a Russia-
dominated composition is unacceptable in the West and certainly 
for Azerbaijan, Moscow has to come up with a proposal that at 
least the three conflict parties – Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert – 
can accept. Candidates include other member states of the CSTO, 
notably Kazakhstan, and the countries influential in the region, 
notably Turkey. While Turkey may be a good candidate from the 
point of view of Azerbaijan, for Russia the NATO connection is 
problematic. The involvement of the CSTO and NATO in the same 
peacekeeping operation on opposite sides can create a dangerous 
“face off” of the two politico-military blocs. Moreover, this situation 
would draw Azerbaijan closer to NATO. However, it is also possible 
to stress the fact that Turkey does not support NATO activities in 
the Middle East and that it currently declines to deepen military 
integration with the organization.40 The recent developments make 
it possible to reason that the participation of Turkish peacekeepers 
40 See Nural Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Won’t Link Air Defense System to NATO,” 
DefenseNews, February 15, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
land/weapons/2015/02/19/turkey-missile-defense-nato-integrate-china-cpmiec-
aster-patriot/23667183/.
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does not automatically bring in NATO.41 In addition to Turkey, Iran 
too is a power in the region. Iran’s participation in the peacekeeping 
operation is less probable due to its still problematic position in 
the international community, modest experience in peacekeeping42 
and, above all, its strained relations with Azerbaijan, including 
the borderland issue to which Azerbaijanis refer to as “Southern 
Azerbaijan” because there are widely scattered Azeri-populated 
areas in northern Iran. 
The efforts to settle the conflicts in South-Eastern Ukraine 
during 2014–2015 demonstrate that Russia has some confidence 
in the peacekeeping of the OSCE. The organization is the frame 
for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations and has since 1995 
conducted a monitoring mission in the conflict zone.43 Thus, it is 
not excluded that Russia could agree to a mandate of the OSCE to 
organize a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, 
such an agreement is not the same as agreeing to the specifics of its 
implementation. The fact that the organization, which is recognized 
to have experience in monitoring a ceasefire regime, lacks practical 
skills in conducting a full-fledged military peacekeeping operation 
may be seen to leave space for a large contribution from Russia. 
However, Russia’s pursuit of a dominant role would probably 
41 These developments have prompted speculation about whether Turkey will 
eventually remain in the alliance. See Jonathan Schanzer, “Time to Kick Turkey Out 
of NATO?” Politicomagazine, October 9, 2014,http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2014/10/time-to-kick-turkey-out-of-nato-111734.html#.VRLMdmOw_
mY, Bernard-Henri Levy, “Shame on Turkey for Choosing the Islamic State 
Over the Kurds,” New Republic, October 12, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/119803/kobane-syria-will-fall-islamic-state-and-its-turkeys-fault, 
Metin Gurcan, “Is NATO membership shackling Turkey?” Almonitor, October 
29, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-nato-
polarized-membership.html#, Conrad Black, “Get Tough with Turkey,” National 
Review, October 30, 2014, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/391337/get-
tough-turkey-conrad-black, Semih Idz, “No chance Turkey will be ‘kicked out 
of NATO,” Almonitor, November 11, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2014/11/turkey-syria-diplomats-nato.html#. 
42 Peacekeeping troops from Iran have been deployed in Sudan, South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
43 The mission was established when the war broke out in 1992 but it did not 
become operative until the CSCE became the OSCE in January 1995. 
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block the entire effort, which is what happened in the 1990s, when 
peacekeeping for Nagorno-Karabakh, provided that it would be 
supported by a UN Security Council resolution, was considered 
in the frame of the CSCE. The alternative deployment of military 
peacekeepers under the aegis of the United Nations does not make 
this question any different. Moreover, the UN lacks a political 
momentum after the mission in Abkhazia (1993–2009) did not 
achieve much and ultimately crumbled into conflict in the UN 
Security Council. The only success story of UN participation in 
mediation and peacekeeping efforts in the conflicts of the former 
Soviet territory is the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997). In this 
conflict, the UN supported the peace plan which was brokered by 
Russia and implemented in the country’s domestic process. 
The political momentum, which for the time being, can be 
attached to the OSCE, is crucially dependent on the conflict 
in Ukraine. Also for this reason it is premature to consider the 
institutional frame of peacekeeping until there is a basic agreement 
between at least Russia, the U.S. and France – the states which 
are also the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group is 
more than a frame for discussions: it is the symbolic and practical 
“bottleneck” for the solutions which can have a chance of being 
effective because of a basic agreement among the major powers of 
the Northern hemisphere. The Minsk Group has great symbolic 
political value for Russia and discontinuing it would signal the 
burial of any hopes about security cooperation “from Vancouver 
to Vladivostok”. Simultaneously, the credibility of the work in the 
Minsk Group requires that it must draw the consequences of the 
failures which have to do with the distance of the international 
negotiations from the realities on the ground.44 In Baku and in 
Yerevan, the conflict is deadlocked in political processes which make 
Karabakh an integral part of foreign and domestic policies. Because 
the ruling political elites have become prisoners of their political 
44 During April–July 2001, the US State Department, led by Colin Powell, sought 
a new breakthrough in the negotiations arranged in the frame of the Minsk Group 
in Key West, Florida. While these negotiations were carried out in an amenable 
atmosphere, the diplomatic effort failed to produce any results in Baku and in 
Yerevan.
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rhetoric, any compromise that they may wish to pursue will not 
find public support without a complete change in the information 
environment. This is difficult while the domestic opposition is at the 
same time prepared to exploit contradictory situations. 
Because there is very little chance that a political momentum 
can be developed to bring together the interests of Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, the path available is to promise economic and political 
dividends from cooperation. A new opening with an emphasis on 
economic matters may find some chances in the contemporary 
situation which in both Armenia and Azerbaijan require proactive 
action from the governments. Due to the economic crisis in Russia, 
the fourth quarter of 2014 brought a sixty-nine percent decline in the 
private remittances from Russia to Armenia.45 In recent years, these 
remittances have been the main economic driving force in Armenia. 
As the dram falls, prices rise and economic and social risks increase. 
The Azerbaijani government again devalued the national currency 
by 33.5 percent in February 2015. The decline in the oil price, the 
main source of Azerbaijan’s export revenues, ultimately made this 
measure necessary in order to maintain the competitiveness of the 
Azerbaijani economy on international markets.46 The devaluation 
of the manat caused the inflation rate to rise. In this situation, 
Azerbaijan might have to correct its budget allocations for “military 
needs”. It did so during 2008 and 2009, which were also times of 
low oil prices and economic crisis. Azerbaijan’s state budget for 2015 
has been composed with the estimated average price of oil at $90 per 
barrel, which is far from the present price (floating around $60). In 
the difficult economic situation, the leadership of both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan may be willing to consider the opportunities in regional 
cooperation. Of the two, Armenia is far more vulnerable because 
of its limited access to global trade. While Armenia most urgently 
needs to have the blockage ended, Russia’s challenge in relation to 
45 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, “Cross-border Transactions of 
Individuals (Residents and Nonresidents) in Breakdown by Countries”, 2014, 
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=Par_17101#CheckedItem.
46 Georgii Peremetin, “Azerbaidzhanskii manat za sutki podeshevel k dollaru na 
tret’,” RBC, February 21, 2015, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/21/02/2015/54e8865b
9a79473d21ca14b6.
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Azerbaijan is to demonstrate not only the economic but also the 
political benefits of cooperation, and hence remain sensitive about 
Karabakh. 
concluding remarks
During the longstanding stalemate in the conflict, people on both 
sides have learned to live in the situation of “no war, no peace”. 
Nationalist narratives have supplanted the shared history of 
co-existence, which shrinks with each generation as the past is 
interpreted in the frame of the present conflict discourses. The 
presentation of Karabakh as a constitutive value of national unity 
not subject to compromise is used to raise patriotic sentiments on 
both sides. The norms of the international community are subject 
to similar political uses whenever the conflict is seen in mutually 
exclusive perspectives: either “national liberation” and “self-
determination” (Armenia) or “liberation of occupied territories” and 
the “respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Azerbaijan). 
Although experts, public figures, and diplomats have pointed out 
the impasse in which the conflicting societies are caught, very little 
has been accomplished to turn the tide. Against the backdrop of 
all of this, the idea of cooperative security propelled by mutually 
beneficial economic relations may not look very plausible. Certainly, 
the Russian diplomats and experts promoting the idea do not expect 
any quick resolution of the conflict. They do not have a design for 
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is the main issue in the 
conflict, nor can they outline a post-conflict future for the region. 
However, bringing the conflict to its final resolution is not as 
important for Russia as the support of Baku and Yerevan is for its 
strategic aspirations in the region. This makes it necessary to create 
some positive dynamism in the settlement process associated with 
specific benefits for both parties in the conflict. For this reason, the goal 
is not to preserve the status quo, but to maintain the situation open 
and flexible although firmly on the track of only peaceful solutions, 
while at the same time preserving the balance between Armenian and 
Azerbaijani interests. Thus, the political uncertainty about the status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which the Madrid Principles agenda item about 
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the “interim status” renders possible, suits Russia’s interests. It does 
so for two reasons: first, Russia, like the other crafters of the Madrid 
Principles reasons that an interim status helps to avoid the disputes 
about the final status, which would be likely to hamper the resolution 
process from its start; second, leaving the question of the final status 
to the future enables Moscow to continue using this issue as a tool of 
influence on the foreign policies of Baku and Yerevan in order to gain 
their support for the cooperation it pursues in the region, or at least 
prevent them from engaging in Western cooperation, which would 
exclude developing relations with Russia. 
While the strategic goals are set for a long-term perspective, the 
immediate objectives are to retain stability (not synonymous with 
the status quo, as explained above). Stability in the conflict zone 
together with a consistent diplomatic work aimed at a peaceful 
and gradual change of the status quo is supposed to best ensure a 
smooth transition from the conflict-ridden relations to a cooperative 
environment between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this long-term 
perspective, Nagorno-Karabakh is to a great extent a pawn in the 
game, and it has good reason to be concerned about the undetermined 
future that the definition of its interim status in the process may bring. 
In the present situation, the frustrations of the NKR can be alleviated 
by providing assistance in the build-up of its state capacity. In this 
respect, the diaspora donations which are sustained irrespective of 
political discord are functional in a dual sense. They are crucial for the 
survival of the NKR, where the intention persists that the tiny polity 
will develop in spite of the international environment which keeps 
it a “besieged fortress”. By helping to stabilize the present uncertain 
situation, they also help Moscow to work in its long-term perspective. 
As far as the outburst of violent conflict can be avoided, Nagorno-
Karabakh itself remains a relatively stable element in the game, and 
Moscow can focus on the economic and political dividends by which 
Armenia and Azerbaijan can be brought to cooperate.
This paper has been produced in the frame of the research project 
Proactive Conflict Management at Post-Soviet Deep Borders, funded 
by the Academy of Finland during 2012–2016. 
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russia and its BehaViour
Heikki Talvitie
introduction
First, the Russo-Georgian war and then the Ukraine crisis. These 
recent events have made Western countries search for answers to 
the following questions: What is Russia, what is it trying to do, and 
how should we react to it? These themes have also occupied centre 
stage in Finland, whose territory has been in contact with Russia 
in various ways for more than a thousand years. Many issues that 
are taken for granted, even if only looking at Finland’s period of 
independence, are not certainties at all, when political decision-
makers do not show interest in anything that happened before their 
own term of office. Without retrospection, everything is new, and 
such decision-makers are easy targets in an information war.
My personal starting point is that Russia is a superpower; it 
always has been, through both frightening periods of weakness and 
terrifying periods of power. For most of the time, however, it has 
been positioned somewhere between these two extremes. Another 
aspect that should be taken into account is that mainland Russia 
is not only the size of a continent, it is a continent of its own. With 
this in mind, geography cannot be helped. Russia’s national security 
interests are directed at the boundaries of its geographic territory. 
This also applies in times when the country has fallen into a state 
of weakness due to internal crisis – or perhaps during such times in 
particular.
Written accounts of history have provided us with information 
on Russia during its periods of power and weakness. We have 
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empirical evidence of a weak Russia (Soviet-Russia) in the 1920s, 
and a powerful Russia (the Soviet Union, 1944–1985). It is also 
fascinating to study how Russia has behaved during the times when 
its position of power has been weakening or strengthening. Our 
recent experiences could be classified as follows: weakening Russia, 
1985–1991; weak Russia, 1992–2006; and strengthening Russia, 
2007–2014.
Russia’s actions are often interpreted to be aggressive even when 
they are counteractions to external aggression against it. In general, 
Russia’s states of weakness have given its external opponents an 
opportunity to spread to the borders of Russia or even invade its 
core areas. Here is one example. In the 1990s, a large and impressive 
exhibit on the king of Sweden, Charles XII, and the czar of Russia, 
Peter I “the Great”, was displayed in Livrustkammare in Stockholm. 
However, the exhibition was completely ruined by the main title 
which stated that Russia had been aggressive all the way from 
the 12th century to the 18th century, while Sweden had remained 
defensive that whole time. In actual fact, during that period, Sweden 
conquered Southwest Finland, the Häme region and Karelia. Through 
its settlement activities, Sweden created the Savo region and pushed 
Russians and Karelians out of the usufruct areas of Ostrobothnia 
and Lapland. An otherwise wonderful exhibition was completely 
ruined by the misrepresentation of power relations. After the Battle 
of Poltava, and after having gained back its strength in relation to 
Sweden, Russia became the aggressive party, taking back its position 
of power in those areas of Finland and around the edges of the Black 
Sea that it had lost during its period of weakness.
Due to the nature of Russia’s land area, at its best, Russia is a 
regional superpower – by which account, in certain respects, also 
the Soviet Union was a regional superpower. Russia has always 
competed for access to the world’s oceans, but in every direction, 
there are waterways controlled by others, which has made gaining 
access to the main sea areas difficult.
Throughout history, border areas have been problematic to 
Russia; the country has been invaded from the East, the West and 
the South. In most cases, whenever Russia has expanded its border 
regions, it has done so as a countermeasure against its invaders. 
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Their defeat in the vast Steppes of Russia has created vacuums that 
Russia has then filled.
In Russia’s periods of weakness, vast areas of land have been 
occupied by its adversaries: by the Mongolians from the 14th 
century to the 16th century, by Poland in the early 17th century, 
and by Sweden from the 14th century to the 17th century. The 
vacuums that have put Russia in a position of power in relation to 
its invaders include the vacuum following the collapse of Mongolian 
rule in Siberia, and the vacuums created by Sweden’s Charles XII in 
the land areas of Finland, by Napoleon in Western Europe, and by 
Hitler in Central Europe.
russia’s problems and the Way it has 
reacted to them
How has Russia reacted to the problems that have emerged in its 
border regions? It is a long continuum, covering the eras of the 
Russian Empire, the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and 
the Russian Federation. I doubt that many doctoral dissertations 
have been written about it. Some references might be found in the 
words of Paasikivi, or perhaps Mannerheim, who stated after the 
Continuation War that he did not have much faith in the borders of 
the Treaty of Tartu. According to Mannerheim, they were negotiated 
at a time of weakness for the Soviet Russia, and therefore could 
never be thought to hold once it gained back its power.
I myself have studied this problem in Russia’s history, and 
I have later had the opportunity to follow the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the period of a weakened Russia. The weak Russia 
inherited the ethnic conflicts of several post-Soviet regions, which 
include Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, 
and two partially recognised states within Georgia, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. To certain extent, Transnistria, which is a breakaway 
state within Moldova, is in the same situation. Crimea, a peninsula 
on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, and East Ukraine are also included in 
this category. A large Russian population was left in these regions 
after the declaration of independence by Ukraine.
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Basically, I have defined these issues as Russia’s problems myself, 
and divided them into different stages. When a problem arises, it is 
first latent. If the problem evolves into a crisis, it becomes acute. It is 
of course in the best interest of Russia to solve any acute problems, 
leading to the formation of an action plan. But an action plan cannot 
be formed before favourable conditions necessary for solving the 
problem have been created.
Of course, this is all just a theory, but it can be tested by studying 
how Russia has reacted to the above-mentioned ethnic conflicts over 
the years.
nagorno-Karabakh
The beginning of the unrest in the Nagorno-Karabakh region dates 
back to the late 1980s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
approaching. With Azerbaijan trying to strengthen its hold on 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the region’s Armenian population started a 
rebellion, supported by Armenia. In the beginning, the USSR/Russia 
tried to remain impartial in order to achieve a ceasefire, but it was 
obvious that its sympathies were mostly on Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
side. Ever since the occupation of several provinces in Azerbaijan 
by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has not only tried to 
achieve a ceasefire, but also to reach a solution in which Armenia 
would give back all the provinces, apart from Nagorno-Karabakh, 
the Kalbajar district and the Lachin corridor. Special agreements 
would be concluded for these three regions that both sides of the 
conflict would have to approve.
No peacekeeping forces have been used in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. In the 1990s, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) started its own peace process to aid Russia 
in the cessation of the armed conflict. The idea was born for the 
Minsk Conference, to be prepared by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk 
Group.
A ceasefire was achieved in 1994. The Minsk Group’s Co-Chairs 
at the time were Russia and Sweden. The competition between 
these two Co-Chairs was rather fierce, i.e. for the most part, they 
had different ideas of how the armed conflict could be ended. The 
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successful achievement of the ceasefire has been generally attributed 
to Russian diplomat Vladimir Kazimirov.
Finland acted as a Co-Chair with Russia from spring 1995 to the 
end of 1996. Finland’s main objective was to get the Co-Chairs to 
act in unison in order to reduce the effect of the tactical game among 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on the crisis mediation 
process. Therefore, only joint visits to the region of conflict were 
included in the Mandate of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Conference. 
Kazimirov was also President Boris Yeltsin’s special envoy on this 
issue, in which capacity he also visited the region on his own. The 
balance between Russia and Finland, when they acted as Co-Chairs 
of the Minsk Group, was based on Finland being backed by the EU, 
the US and Turkey. 
The negotiations were then attended by all three parties to the 
conflict and the key states of the Minsk Group. An OSCE High-
Level Planning Group had also been formed in preparation for the 
possible use of peacekeeping forces.
The negotiations were not going anywhere and Finland’s Co-
Chairs (Talvitie and Nyberg) fairly quickly arrived at the conclusion 
that the President of Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan, was “held prisoner” 
by the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, Kocharyan, and could not 
act as a representative of Nagorno-Karabakh when meeting with 
the President of Azerbaijan, Aliyev. The Americans agreed with 
this conclusion, which was proven to be correct after the forced 
resignation of Ter-Petrosyan from the presidency and the subsequent 
election of Kocharyan, the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, as the new 
President of Armenia.
Finland also started directing its efforts towards ensuring that 
the next country to Co-Chair with Russia would be the US. The 
US was showing interest towards Azeri oil production, and the 
first investments were made at that time by the Americans and the 
British. At first, the representatives of Russia stated that Russia was 
not interested in co-chairmanship with the US, so the matter was 
left to rest. At the end of spring 1996, the Russians said that they 
would accept the US as the next Co-Chair after Finland. One can 
only speculate why Russia was all of a sudden willing to accept the 
US as co-chair. I myself have come to the conclusion that the US’ 
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interest in the region and its energy production was genuine and, in 
its weakened state, Russia saw it best to tie the US to the joint conflict 
resolution efforts aimed at bringing peace to the region. And so, a 
key goal of Russian politics, the ability of the CIS (Commonwealth 
of Independent States) to resolve post-Soviet conflicts, had also come 
to the end of the road in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On the other hand, the decision concerning co-chairmanship 
was not an easy one to make for the US. At the OSCE Lisbon 
Summit in December 1996, Finland passed its co-chairmanship to 
France. In early 1997, however, the US expressed its interest in the 
co-chairmanship, and that is why we now have three Co-Chairs.
At the beginning, the US was the most active Co-Chair, leading 
the OSCE sponsored Key West formula, for example. The peaceful 
resolution sought at Key West would have technically forgotten 
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The President of Azerbaijan, 
Heidar Aliyev, and the President of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan, had 
to take a stand. The three Co-Chairs had come to the conclusion that, 
with Kocharyan as the President of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh 
would no longer need to be included in the negotiations. The Co-
Chairs also no longer invited the Minsk Group to the negotiations, 
because they felt that having three co-chairs constituted as sufficient 
representation.
The Key West formula caused unrest both in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Certain notable MPs were shot in broad daylight at the 
Armenian Parliament. The Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan resigned 
as a protest against the Key West formula. The resignation was futile, 
because after consulting his advisers, President Aliyev withdrew 
from the plan.
After this, France took an active role as co-chair. However, 
its attempts were not successful, because the new President of 
Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, brought back the concept of territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan to the negotiation tactics of the Azeri, thus 
taking the negotiations to a new level.
After the Russo-Georgian War, Russia took an active role. My 
interpretation is that the Russian President at the time, Dmitri 
Medvedev, was doing his part to create a solution that would have 
eased regional tensions. Whether he had Prime Minister Putin’s full 
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support for his actions still remains a secret. At that time, in the 
aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War, the situation with Moldova 
and Transnistria, and the internal instability in Ukraine, Russia was 
facing such huge security issues that no solution to the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue could be imagined to satisfy Russia.
In one sense, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is now very close 
to the situation in Georgia that led to the crisis. Armenia is Russia’s 
ally and Georgia has Western allies. In the middle is Azerbaijan, 
backed by its energy funds. It is nevertheless clear that if Azerbaijan 
were to attack Nagorno-Karabakh, it would not only be fighting 
against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but also against Russia. 
And Azerbaijan could not expect to get any military assistance from 
the West. That is why this conflict remains “frozen”.
I have often been asked whether it is Russia’s intention to be in 
control of the situation in the South Caucasus through hindering 
the finding of a peaceful resolution to conflicts. My opinion has 
been that Russia is ready to use any solution that does not weaken 
its position. This view is supported by Russia’s behaviour in other 
conflicts, brought on by the West’s attempts to undermine Russia’s 
position in the South Caucasus and Transnistria. This category 
also includes the issue of Kosovo, the status of Crimea and the 
self-governance of East Ukraine. Russia made the first initiative 
regarding the unification of Transnistria and Moldova in 2003, but 
the EU torpedoed its federalist solution.
In the behaviour pattern of Russia that I have created, Nagorno-
Karabakh fits as follows:
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia is a latent problem for Russia, because it may endanger its 
position in the South Caucasus.
Russia has not made any attempts to solve the conflict by 
dismissing the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and since these 
two have not at any stage been ready to make any compromises, it 
has thus also been in the best interests of Russia that the conflict 
stays frozen.
Therefore, the problem that Russia has with Nagorno-Karabakh 
has not yet reached an acute stage.
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the Yugoslav Wars
The behaviour of Russia can never be fully understood without 
taking into account the Yugoslav Wars and the strong military role 
of the West in that course of events. For Russians, the final straw was 
the Kosovo War, which showed the goals of Western policy without 
any significant action or influence on Russia’s part. Specifically, this 
was about the weakness of Yeltsin’s term of office and the related 
attitude towards Western values and geopolitical aspirations.
The former Prime Minister of Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was 
still in power then and able to influence policy-making. He was a 
member of the group led by Ahtisaari that was tasked with reaching 
a negotiated settlement with Milosevic. It is doubtful that Ahtisaari 
would have been able to persuade Milosevic into a settlement without 
Chernomyrdin. Afterwards, Chernomyrdin has defended his actions 
by stating that he prevented a third World War from breaking out 
between the West and Russia. Be that as it may, Chernomyrdin faced 
fierce criticism when he returned to Moscow. He was accused of 
betraying the Russian cause. Chernomyrdin gradually transferred to 
Ukraine to act as an ambassador. Judging by today’s standards, not 
a minor position, but at that time, a clear demotion for him.
Sometime later, when Ahtisaari wanted to confirm the final status 
for Kosovo, Russia’s President at the time, Vladimir Putin, would not 
see Ahtisaari in Moscow unless he had something new to present. 
This “something new” was related to the status proposed for Kosovo 
and how, back then, the Russians no longer approved of the West’s 
proposal for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. This was because the 
Serbs themselves were opposed to the secession of Kosovo from Serbia.
Russia had no means to resist the transfer of the former 
Yugoslavian region to fall under Western control and, from the 
viewpoint of Russia, the situation cannot even really be described 
as a latent problem. But the Russians understood the symbolic value 
of Kosovo, and realised that the solution to the Kosovo issue was 
problematic on account of it definitely leading to other measures 
aimed at pushing the Western sphere of influence to the borders of 
Russia by leveraging the attempts to resolve the conflicts arising 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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the Kozak memorandum for a united 
state of moldova and transnistria 
Negotiations regarding the Transnistrian problem were carried out in 
2003 between Russia, Moldova and Transnistria, and consequently 
reached the point where the parties were ready to sign the “Kozak 
Memorandum”, the objective of which was to reunite Transnistria 
with the Republic of Moldova. The President of Russia, Putin, was 
preparing to fly from Moscow to attend the signing.
At this point, the EU woke up to the realisation that the conflict 
between Moldova and Transnistria was about to be solved based 
on terms accepted by Russia. As a result, EU High Representative 
Javier Solana informed Moldova that if the memorandum is signed, 
Moldova will lose its EU membership perspective. After hearing this, 
the President of Moldova cancelled the signing of the memorandum 
and in the process undermined the authority of President Putin; an 
act that would cast a shadow far into the future.
In 2006, the EU was drunk on power and did not regard Russia 
as an equal partner whose opinions, let alone suggestions regarding 
crisis management needed to be taken into account. According to 
the EU’s interpretation, the Kozak Memorandum included clauses 
that would have given Russia the power to influence EU policies 
in case Moldova later became a member of the EU. No later than 
in 2006, the President of Moldova, Voronin, stated that the Kozak 
Memorandum was no longer relevant.
Be that as it may, 2006 is the year when the relationship between 
Russia and the EU started to escalate rapidly, with no end in sight 
yet. Actually, in the view of the Russians, the actions of Ahtisaari or 
Solana were not useful in trying to resolve the conflicts and territorial 
fights between the West and Russia.
The problem of Moldova and Transnistria was left on the table. 
For Russia, it is a latent problem, and it has no interest in resolving 
it if it benefits the West. The problem is closely related to the internal 
weakness of Ukraine and the attempts of the West to tie Ukraine 
to its sphere of influence. The conflict between Transnistria and 
Moldova may become acute if the crisis in Ukraine turns into a 
civil war again. The existence of Transnistria strengthens Russia’s 
180
position in the negotiations with regard to its presence in the Black 
Sea and, through that region, also in the South Caucasus and the 
Middle East.
In any case, 2003 and the Kozak Memorandum showed that the 
Russians are ready to solve these conflicts, provided that doing so 
does not diminish Russia’s influence in the regions in question.
president putin in munich in 2007
The chain of events described above led to Putin’s forthright speech 
at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007. The key 
message of his speech was that enough is enough. In other words, 
Putin was annoyed with the way Russia was being treated by the 
West. In short, Russia wanted the West to behave in a manner which 
would have shown that it recognised Russia as its equal, even though 
in many respects, they were not on an equal level. It probably should 
be noted here that this time it was the Russians’ who were naive: 
equality can only be achieved through being on equal level. That 
is to say, force and the potential use of force are the key to solving 
the equation. This message has now been received by the Russians 
and they have been behaving accordingly, in line with the behaviour 
pattern of the West.
The reactions of Western leaders to Putin’s speech were 
characterised by a genuine uncertainty about what he meant by his 
speech and what he wanted to achieve with it. After all, the European 
Union is a peace project, and the actions of the US after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union were merely taken to ensure the spreading of 
democracy and global markets to benefit the world as a whole. To 
achieve this, use of force was totally justified and especially after 
the war on terrorism began, it was fine to eliminate and occupy 
countries that had provided strongholds for terrorism, all in the 
name of the common good.
The use of force by the West was viewed as an act of 
humanitarianism and, for the first time ever, the bombing of areas 
belonging to rogue states was deemed as protecting the local civilians. 
The West had long forgotten the concept of the sphere of influence, 
which had been dismissed after the dissolution of the USSR.
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The attitudes described above did not create favourable 
conditions for mutual understanding on either side, and the 
relations are still marked by a lack of understanding and suspicion. 
Russia has now become a counterforce to the expansion of Western 
organisations to regions that are sensitive to Russia, and therefore 
the West has also had to adjust its pursuits to the idea of the sphere 
of influence. In my opinion, Moldova and Ukraine are important 
issues for Germany, which is the reason why the EU is advocating 
the membership of these two countries, albeit some obstacles 
have now emerged to hinder this process. The Baltic countries 
and Georgia, on the other hand, are important issues for the US. 
The Baltic countries are not able to establish their own defensive 
system, so it is only natural that their solidarity in the security 
matters lies with the US and not the EU, because the latter has no 
teeth. This also applies to Georgia.
south caucasus
In summer 2003, I was appointed EU Special Representative for the 
South Caucasus. I was the first EUSR in that region. The European 
Commission was widely represented in Tbilisi, Georgia, and there 
was also a branch office in Yerevan, Armenia. The Commission 
did not have representation in the city of Baku in Azerbaijan until 
a Commissioner was appointed there during my term of office. I 
was tasked with representing the Council of the European Union 
as a member of the team of EU High Representative Javier Solana, 
and I reported to the EU Political Committee, which comprised 
representatives from the capital of each Member State.
I stayed in close contact with Commission personnel both 
locally and in Brussels, because every time I visited the region, 
Commission representatives would take good care of me together 
with the representatives of the EU Member State holding the 
presidency at the time. My close relationship with the Commission 
was at first criticised in Brussels by Solana’s Cabinet, but they 
too later approved of my co-operation with the Commission, 
which came naturally to me. Then again, I should note that the 
weaknesses of the EU as an organisation were clearly visible also 
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in the Commission’s operations. I had no official access to the 
reports of Commission representatives, because statutes prohibited 
showing them to Council representatives. This put me in an 
awkward position on a few occasions during negotiations with 
non-EU states: while I could not obtain the relevant Commission 
report, the opponent could, and they also made sure that I saw that 
they had gotten hold of it.
In my new capacity, I also visited Moscow to introduce myself. 
Solana had also expressed his expectations regarding my ability to 
get along with the Russians in the South Caucasus, where a certain 
territorial mindset was gaining ground. I told the Russians that the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the South Caucasus did 
not include any membership perspectives for Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. Their response was that this is what you assured us 
earlier about the Baltic countries, and now they have joined both the 
EU and NATO. The Russians had given the European Commission 
some observer statuses regarding the co-operation bodies whose 
task it was to find a peaceful solution to conflicts and prevent new 
ones from emerging. However, I was led to understand that as a 
representative of the Council, i.e. the Member States, I could not 
have any part in these co-operation bodies. I made an attempt to 
participate in the Joint Control Commission on South Ossetia, but 
gave up quickly on account of Russia being opposed to it.
As is often the case with EU decision-making, the EU changed 
its policy roughly at the turn of the year 2004–2005. The new 
policy stated that the ENP still does not include the EU membership 
perspective but, on the other hand, it does not rule it out either.
I was no longer in the South Caucasus when, during Finland’s 
EU Presidency in 2006, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCA) were concluded between the EU and three South Caucasus 
states. Finland played a significant role in the successful completion 
of the PCA negotiations. The goal was to improve stability in the 
border regions of the EU, but also to offer these states financial aid 
and other support. From the perspective of the Russians, this may 
have been interpreted as the West wanting to slowly push the South 
Caucasus under its “control”.
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Finland’s osce chairmanship in 2008
Finland held the Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation (OSCE) in 2008. Back then, I had agreed with the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Ilkka Kanerva, that I will 
join the team to handle the so-called frozen conflicts. At first, my 
tasks also included following the elections in the region and the leg 
work required to gather all the evaluations on the elections. I myself 
did not take part in evaluating the elections.
Quite quickly, however, it became clear that I needed to discard 
the elections and focus completely on the conflicts. We were in full 
negotiation mode regarding the Moldova and Transnistria issue. 
In addition, the Abkhazia issue required taking action in spring 
2008, until South Ossetia took centre stage in August 2008. When 
Alexander Stubb became Minister for Foreign Affairs, I was solely 
involved in crisis management.
recognition of the independence of 
Kosovo
Finland had decided to recognise the independence of Kosovo at the 
beginning of 2008. For Finland, this was a question of EU foreign 
policy. A common EU policy on Kosovo was not formed later 
because, due to their own regional problems, many EU Member 
States did not find it appropriate to recognise Kosovo’s separation 
from Serbia. It was my understanding that the Finnish Government 
wanted to fly the flag in order to highlight the fact that Finland 
is part of the West, and that any tactics related to the OSCE were 
less important. I was about to start the Moldova-Transnistria talks 
and, for tactical reasons, from my perspective in those negotiations 
it would have been appropriate to postpone the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence until after 2008, to gain more leverage. I 
did not suggest this, and after the statement by the Russians that 
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the West will have a 
negative impact on international relations, I started to think about 
how I could avoid any negative reactions by the Russians regarding 
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the Moldova-Transnistria talks. I ended up postponing the talks and, 
after the Russians said that they might be ready for the talks on 15 
March, we all convened in Vienna that day and the Russians were 
also there. The recognition of the independence of Kosovo by the 
West influenced Russia’s choices throughout 2008 and, for multiple 
reasons, we did not have any chance of success in the Moldova-
Transnistria talks. 
abkhazia
The Abkhazia crisis was showing signs of heating up in spring 2008. 
Russia was building rail roads and Georgia violated Abkhazian 
airspace with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). A Russian Air Force 
jet shot down the Georgian UAV in Akhbazian airspace, resulting 
in complaints from all sides, and Finland had to find a forum for 
handling these complaints. Such a forum was found, and talks began 
in Vienna that no one was expecting to lead anywhere; it was just an 
opportunity for everyone to vent.
The real reason for the increased tension in Abkhazia was to be 
found in the domestic policy of Georgia. Georgia’s President Mikheil 
Saakashvili was re-elected for a second term in an election that had 
the opposition present very convincing suspicions of rigging. The 
domestic political situation was unstable and the US Ambassador’s 
assurances that the elections were not rigged only made it worse. 
Saakashvili received 53% of the votes.
A parliamentary election was scheduled to be held in May, and 
they could not be allowed to fail. Georgia initiated provocation 
tactics in Abkhazia and the Russians retaliated in kind. The threat 
of war was in the air, and Georgian ministers visited European 
capitals, preaching how the war was coming. In the May elections, 
Saakashvili’s party was hugely successful and so the threat of war 
had done its job and the situation in Abkhazia eased off.
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nato summit in Bucharest
In spring 2008, a NATO summit was held in Bucharest, and the 
Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, did not trust Georgia’s 
Saakashvili any more than she did Ukraine’s Yushchenko. During the 
preparations for the Bucharest summit, Germany and France were 
against advancing the accession process of Georgia and Ukraine, i.e. 
offering them the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). When 
I visited the NATO Headquarters in Brussels before the Bucharest 
summit, I was told that the US had not made up its mind yet, but 
that the possibility that it might want to help Georgia and Ukraine 
get to the next stage in the process to join NATO could not be ruled 
out. This eventually became the US position on the matter, which 
resulted in a rather conflicting atmosphere when the delegations 
arrived at the Bucharest summit.
In Bucharest, NATO decided that Georgia and Ukraine will not 
be offered a MAP, but both countries were given clear membership 
perspectives. This compromise has since proven to be quite 
unsuccessful. It managed to make both Saakashvili and Russia 
angry. In late summer 2008, the situation in South Ossetia started to 
show signs of heating up.
saakasvili attacks south ossetia on  
7 august 2008
Georgia attacked South Ossetia in the late hours of August the 7th. 
I was in Finland when the Permanent Representative of Georgia to 
the OSCE, who was in Vienna, contacted me by phone several times 
during that evening. His message was that a war would break out at 
any moment and, in those final moments, he wanted Finland to do 
something. I did my best to assure him that none of our information 
indicated that Russia would attack Georgia. I could not understand 
that the Ambassador of Georgia in OSCE was trying to tell me that 
Georgia will attack South Ossetia, even though he could not say it 
directly. The following morning it became known that Georgia had 
opened fire on the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, from the 
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front lines of the city of Gori, and that Georgian troops had invaded 
South Ossetia.
The Olympics were on in Beijing, and many state leaders were 
there to watch the games, including Finnish Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Vanhanen 
met with Putin on 8 August, but it was clear that his message could 
not be more than urging the parties to cease fire. On 8 August, it was 
clear that Russia would retaliate in response to Georgia’s military 
action in kind. It was later discovered that Russia had moved 
some of its units from the North Caucasus to the south side of the 
only mountain tunnel on the road through the Greater Caucasus 
Mountains, the Roki Tunnel. Georgia aimed to close this transport 
connection from the Russian armed forces in an effort to prevent 
Russian additional forces from entering the theatre of war.
When I later discussed this in Moscow with the President of the 
Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Yevgeny Primakov, 
he said that if the Roki Tunnel had been closed, it would have taken 
the Russo-Georgian War to a more serious level. Russia would have 
been forced to attack the army of Saakashvili through Abkhazia.
The Prime Ministers of Finland (OSCE Chairmanship) and 
France (EU Presidency), Stubb and Kouchner, arrived in Tbilisi with 
the aim of negotiating a ceasefire agreement that would be approved 
by President Saakashvili and then presented in Moscow. At this 
stage, the Russian army had not made its final breakthrough and, on 
the other hand, it was clear that the EU no more than Finland had, 
either mentally or politically, what it would take to go to Moscow 
and ask for the terms of the ceasefire in advance.
After three days, Russia finally broke through the lines of the 
Georgian army and reached Georgian territory where the city of Gori 
is located. The Georgian motorway that runs from Tbilisi to the Black 
Sea coast was cut off, and the Poti seaport was occupied. Georgians 
started to flee from Abkhazia again, and the Russians occupied the 
Abkhazia region. An American military supply warehouse in the city 
of Poti, meant for the Georgian army, was confiscated.
At this stage, the US and Russia agreed that Russia will withdraw 
from the official Georgian territory and, based on the French EU 
Presidency, President Sarkozy will be the one to present the terms of 
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the ceasefire in Moscow. Once the terms have been approved there, 
they will be submitted for approval in Tbilisi. Russia also accepted 
that EU observers would be deployed to ensure that the ceasefire 
would not be breached.
The Geneva talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia were launched. 
The talks were co-chaired by representatives from the EU, the UN 
and the OSCE, and the negotiators came from Russia, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, the United States and Georgia. Russia made it clear that 
the topic of discussion was not the status of these two breakaway 
regions, but the creation of such a regime that would prevent new 
acts of provocation by Georgia and create channels for keeping new 
hotbeds of conflict under control.
Russia also declared that the crisis management by the OSCE had 
not been objective and that Russia was no longer in favour of the 
continuation of the OSCE mission to Georgia. The representative of 
Finland was told by a representative of Russia that this was nothing 
personal. Another attempt to change the Russians’ mind was made 
in Vienna, but Russia did what it had said it would do, despite being 
the only one to vote against the continuation of the OSCE mission 
to Georgia.
In the end, Russia recognised the independence of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. This behaviour pattern therefore followed the 
behaviour pattern of the West with regards to the declaration of 
independence by Kosovo.
Following Saakashvili’s election as the President of Georgia in 
early 2004, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were a latent problem to 
Russia. When Saakashvili declared that he will unify the state of 
Georgia during his first term of office, the problem remained latent 
to Russia. This was backed by the US announcement to Saakashvili 
in spring 2004 that if he were to attack to South Ossetia, he will be 
fighting against Russia without US involvement.
Every autumn, Georgia’s actions in South Ossetia and its 
peacekeeping forces increased tensions, but nothing ever happened. 
All the parties were used to this. However, the Russians were 
building an infrastructure in preparation for moving the troops 
both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Through all this, the problem 
remained latent.
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In spring 2008, when Saakashvili started having internal policy 
problems, the tension increased, first in Abkhazia and then, after the 
parliamentary elections, in South Ossetia. At this point, the problem 
was becoming acute, and the NATO Summit in Bucharest may have 
contributed to the increase of tensions. The assumption is that all 
the states involved in peacekeeping efforts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia had replaced their peacekeepers with military units.
Even so, it seems incredible, to say the least, that Russian forces 
suffered quite significant losses during the early stages of the war. 
Apparently they did not believe that Georgia would actually attack. 
The Russians must have had various scenarios for how to react in 
case a war would break out. The military forces took part in the Red 
Square May Day parade in 2008 for the first time since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Back then, I wrote in my blog that Russia probably 
did not mean this as a threat to any particular state, but if Russia’s 
vital interests would be violated, it would be prepared to bring out 
the guns to defend them. No plan was in place prior to the attack 
on Georgia, apart from the infrastructure improvements and the 
manning of the Roki Tunnel. The OSCE observers were also able to 
verify that Russian troops were ensuring their own security in the 
official Georgian territory and had no intention to invade Georgia. 
The Russian troops also did not invade the region where the West’s 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports gas and oil.
During the Russo-Georgian War, Ukraine was actively supporting 
Saakashvili. Ukraine delivered Buk missile systems to Georgia, 
used for shooting down a few Russian Air Force jets. In addition, 
President Yushchenko declared that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea 
could not return to the Russian naval base in Sevastopol, because it 
was located in Ukrainian territory. Naturally, the fleet returned to 
Sevastopol, but its status was becoming critical.
moldova
The final discussions on Moldova took place at the OSCE Ministerial 
Council meeting in Helsinki in December 2008. The internal 
situation in Ukraine, the status of the naval base in Sevastopol in 
general, and the updating of the disarmament agreements between 
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the West and Russia, were the main reasons why the Moldova issue 
did not move forward.
Later, the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, put strong 
pressure on the President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, regarding 
the Moldova issue. But even this pressure did not have any impact 
on finding a resolution to the conflict. Merkel’s goal was to find 
a resolution for both the Moldova and Ukraine issue in order to 
enable these two countries to join the EU based free-trade area and 
later eventually the EU itself. With Germany being the most powerful 
state in the EU and Merkel being a superior player in the sphere of 
influence of the EU, it is clear that the membership of both Moldova 
and Ukraine in the EU based free-trade area would strengthen the 
sphere of influence of Germany in relation to Russia.
The shadow of the Kozak Memorandum and the final stages 
of the Ukraine crisis naturally have an impact on the inability to 
proceed in this matter. For Russia, Transnistria is currently a latent 
problem. Then again, if Moldova obtains a status in EU §based free-
trade area and later also an EU membership, it would mean that 
Transnistria would be left on its own, and support would have to be 
sought from other regions under Russia’s control.
the crimean peninsula and sevastopol
I have often been asked what historical analogy would best describe 
the situation in Crimea. Could it be the annexation of Austria 
to Germany in 1938, or the annexation of the Sudetenland by 
Germany? I have replied that the transfer of the Crimean Peninsula 
by Khrushchev in 1956 to Ukraine, which was then part of the Soviet 
Union, is analogical to a situation when Alexander I reunited “Old 
Finland” with the rest of Finland in 1812 at a time when Finland 
was a Grand Duchy and part of the Russian Empire. When Finland 
became independent, and Russia was weakened by revolutions, a 
border was drawn in Tartu in 1920 that was the border of the Grand 
Duchy and only 30 kilometres from St. Petersburg. Two wars were 
subsequently fought between Finland and the Soviet Union over 
this border. As a result, Finland is now an independent state, but 
the border between Finland and Russia is the so-called border of 
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Peter the Great, from 1721, with which Peter the Great secured the 
existence of his new capital. Similarly, Khrushchev did not think 
that Ukraine would become independent and the Crimean Peninsula 
and the naval base in Sevastopol would be left on foreign territory. 
When Ukraine became independent, Russia found itself in a state of 
weakness again.
In the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, the 
border issue was a latent problem until Hitler’s rise to power, 
after which it became an acute problem for the Soviet Union. The 
resolution had two parts. The Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (ASSR) formed by a Finnish Leftist Eduard Gylling had 
to be eliminated, and this was undertaken immediately after the 
assassination of Kirov. Solving the border issue became relevant 
again in connection with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with the 
help of Germany.
A rental agreement was concluded on the naval base in 
Sevastopol. Russia was full of trust for the ability of the CIS to 
ensure the existence of a certain type of sphere of Russian influence. 
This trust dissipated rapidly and the Russian fleet was decrepit to 
say the least, and the state did not have the funds to build it up 
again. This issue was not very significant in the 1990s, when the key 
issue with the nuclear powers was how to compensate the loss of 
nuclear weapons to Ukraine.
Sevastopol became a latent problem for Russia during the term 
of office of President Yushchenko. After the Russo-Georgian War, 
when Yanukovych had won the presidential election, he continued 
the rental agreement for the naval base in Sevastopol, which had the 
effect that the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol remained a latent 
problem for Russia. However, it was still a problem in the sense that 
Ukraine’s domestic policy situation was unstable and prone to major 
changes.
And next, we arrive at the zero hour, i.e. Yanukovych was about 
to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU 
when President Putin started to put pressure on Yanukovych, saying 
that the energy issue could not be resolved in a manner that would 
satisfy Ukraine if it signs the SAA. To replace the SAA, Putin offered 
the Eurasian Customs Union that Russia was developing.
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There were spontaneous protests in the Maidan square in favour 
of the SAA, and Yanukovych soon started to feel the pressure. In 
addition, Maidan was ceased by several armed groups, including the 
Svoboda (Freedom) Party and its more radical offshoot, the Pravy 
(Right) Sector. The EU, the US, Russia and Ukraine (Yanukovych) 
did eventually come to an agreement that would have secured 
Ukraine some sort of an orderly future. However, this did not suit 
everyone, and fatal shots were fired at Maidan, killing both police 
officers and civilians. This was provocation: unless the shooters 
were identified and punished, it would be the end of the recently 
concluded agreement and Yanukovych. Apparently no one had the 
capacity for it, and the West did not seem to have the will either. The 
West put the blame on Yanukovych, at whom the provocation was 
actually directed in the first place.
The Winter Olympics were on in Sochi, and Ukraine fell into a 
state of anarchy. The country had no president or government. The 
Freedom Party was legalised by the West, except that the EU and the 
US would not have approved if the new president or prime minister 
would have been a member of the Freedom Party. The Freedom Party 
did manage to get some ministerial positions, and the Right Sector 
continued to be the most powerful paramilitary group in Kiev. The 
new government launched an agitation process in the Parliament 
immediately, demanding a ban on the Russian language in Crimea 
and East Ukraine.
In light of these events, it is clear that security at the naval base 
in Sevastopol could not be guaranteed. If not earlier, at this stage 
at the latest, the Crimean Peninsula became an acute problem to 
Russia on account of the strategically important Black Sea naval 
base. The Russians still claim that at that stage they had no plans to 
invade Crimea. This may be true, but it does not mean that they had 
not thought of all the options. The plan came together during the 
aftermath of Maidan. At the time of the plan’s implementation, the 
future circumstances of the region were well understood. 
The key factor for the plan was that neither the EU nor the NATO 
would be able to make rapid decisions, as well as the US statement 
on not using military power in Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine’s 
own armed forces were not functionally in order. The occupation 
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of Crimea was not an open military operation, which would have 
inevitably led to casualties on both sides. It was a covert operation 
by the Russian army, and even the Russians had no guarantees that 
it would be a successful one.
One curious detail is that when Grigori Potemkin annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula for the first time in 1783, he had a three-part 
plan: 1. No permanent troops. Potemkin chose Cossacks for the task. 
2. No collateral damage. There was no collateral damage because 
permanent troops were not used in 1783 nor in 2014. 3. Get local 
leaders to approve the annexation. The local khans swore an oath to 
Potemkin and, by proxy, to Catherine II and the Russian Empire. All 
these elements of the annexation in 1783 can also be found in the 
annexation by Russia in 2014.
east ukraine
When Poroshenko was elected the President of Ukraine, he 
immediately started to unite the areas of the Ukraine State with the 
goal of taking control of all the areas occupied by the pro-Russian 
separatist groups of East Ukraine. The Ukraine civil war ensued, and 
the number of casualties quickly rose to thousands. The Ukrainian 
army and Poroshenko were successful in their pursuits and it started 
to look like the East Ukrainian separatists would lose their grip on 
this area. But then the separatists were given weapons and soldiers 
by Russia, and the tables were turned. 
The NATO Summit in Wales drew limits for Poroshenko, stating 
that it was time to agree on a ceasefire and start negotiations for 
a truce in Minsk. East Ukraine’s demands included an extensive 
autonomous status, and Russia supported its demands. The ceasefire 
has not been waterproof either, and as we know, the Chancellor of 
Germany, Angela Merkel, took control of the initiative when it was 
expected that the United States would start supplying weapons to 
Poroshenko. Merkel’s actions were backed by the President of France, 
Francois Hollande, who also considered an armed confrontation 
between the US and Russia in Europe a very undesirable prospect.
Merkel and Hollande took a trip to Moscow to establish a line of 
negotiation with President Putin. Merkel also went to Washington to 
193
meet with President Barack Obama. The result was Minsk II which, 
after a rocky start, appears to be leading to a ceasefire of sorts.
One goal of Poroshenko’s army has been to destroy East 
Ukraine’s industry and mines. East Ukraine’s strength has been its 
mining activities and the production of components for weapons 
manufacturing by the Russian and Chinese armies. How Russia 
is planning to solve this dilemma is not yet known, but there are 
rumours that there are plans to move some of the destroyed factories 
that produced gun components for China to Kazakhstan.
The strong decline of oil prices and the economic sanctions put 
on Russia by the West led to Russia’s rouble crisis in late 2014. The 
value of rouble quickly dropped by half, causing a major crisis for 
the Russian economy. Even though Russia will not necessarily abide 
by the sanctions related to its most vital interests, the assumption 
is that it is more susceptible to compromise now than before the 
rouble crisis. Western Europe has also come to realise that a Russia 
in chaos would pose a genuine security threat to it both politically 
and economically. Based on this, the President of France, Hollande, 
indicates a greater will by the West to compromise with Russia. 
Merkel on the other hand has warned not to expect rapid solutions 
amidst such a difficult crisis. But the momentum is there, so it should 
be utilised by the parties on both sides. So far, both have aimed at 
strengthening their own sphere of influence at the other’s expense. 
Could we finally find a way to put things in balance?
international law
The West finds that Russia has violated international law by first 
taking over Crimea and then making it part of Russia.
Russia finds that it has acted in compliance with international 
law by protecting the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and 
East Ukraine, who have fallen under repression.
There is no question that the statutes of international law are 
appropriate and should be observed by all. In practice, however, the 
big powers with their global interests often violate these statutes 
and, in many cases, the vital security interests of states surpass 
compliance with international law standards.
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Power politics and spheres of influence never went away. They 
are the first step, used politically until vital interests require resorting 
to military power. It is often used when countermeasures are not 
very likely or can be tolerated.
sanctions
The United States, Russia and China form the tri-polar world in 
which they have to assess the use of military power and the related 
risks. It is plain to see that the US will not risk a nuclear war in 
Europe against Russia when China has been earmarked as its 
number one potential enemy. Russia also cannot afford to tighten 
the string in Europe too much, because its own interests are not 
necessarily sufficient for a prolonged war of attrition currently 
under way, which commenced with the West’s cycles of sanctions on 
Russia and its economy.
Sanctions have been issued in connection with the Ukraine 
crisis, but it is clear that they are ideological in nature, aimed at 
shaking the economic balance of Russia and a possible shift in 
power. The sanctions will not be removed in a way that would 
support the implementation of the Minsk truce agreement. It is the 
West’s understanding that Russia is still in control of the Crimean 
Peninsula and that the Minsk agreement concerning East Ukraine 
is not on solid ground, and therefore the sanctions will be kept in 
force.
If the aim of Western politics is to keep the sanctions in force 
for as long as Russia controls the Crimean Peninsula, the cycles of 
sanctions can be assumed to be an endless series of non-military 
(soft) power measures. At some point, the West will run into trouble 
when its internal cohesion will not hold against imposing such 
strong and long-lasting economic sanctions on certain EU Member 
States that their meaningfulness becomes questionable.
For Russia, sanctions are currently a latent problem and their 
effects are being undermined. Russia has responded to the West’s 
three cycles of sanctions with one cycle of its own. However, 
sanctions may turn into an acute problem that needs to be solved 
when the conditions are favourable.
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Finland’s use of sanctions has fully shifted the conflict between 
the big Western powers and Russia to the relations between Finland 
and Russia. The future impact of this is that even after the sanctions 
have been removed, the possibility of another cycle of sanctions will 
raise the level of risk associated with Russian-Finnish business and 
trade relations, with highly negative effects. The global market is 
heavily undermined by the sanctions.
osce
In connection with the Russo-Georgian War, Russia found that 
the OSCE’s reporting was not impartial. For this reason, it did not 
approve the continuation of the mandate for the OSCE mission to 
Georgia. Of course, the OSCE has not become any less impartial after 
the Russo-Georgian War, and Russia’s attitude towards the OSCE is 
somewhat ambivalent. This means that those OSCE operations for 
which Russia grants permission will have to undergo a close analysis 
by Russia.
The OSCE is also an independent operator, and lately Russia has 
shown interest in the appointment of its own diplomats to positions 
with the OSCE. In East Ukraine, the independent operations of the 
OSCE did more harm than good. They were mainly intended for 
sending Western diplomats on special monitoring missions to East 
Ukraine. These measures will reduce Russia’s interest in using the 
OSCE for crisis management purposes.
With regards to the Ukraine crisis, the strength of the OSCE 
was that its 2014 chairmanship was held by Switzerland. Although 
it is clearly a Western country, Switzerland is a neutral country. 
Switzerland paved the way for the 2015 OSCE Chairmanship for 
Serbia, which is also known to have certain abilities to influence 
Russia. 
Russia has commented on the impartiality of the OSCE also in 
connection with the Ukraine crisis. On the other hand, despite the 
alert mode, Russia has not dismissed the option of using the OSCE 
for conflict resolution purposes.
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the un
For Russians, the United Nations is the international community. 
This is logical, considering that nearly every nation in the world 
belongs to the UN, making it holistic and not based on an artificial 
alliance in which the interests of a group of powers represent the 
interests of the international community as a whole.
In addition, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
Russia has a veto right.
conclusions
Firstly, Russia is a superpower that loses parts of its continent 
whenever its status is weakened. If the breakaway regions are not 
able to defend themselves, they are classified by Russia on the basis 
of its criteria for provinces. A weak Russia loses breakaway regions 
to potential enemies. When Russia is powerful, the regions become 
reunited with it. These criteria for provinces do not apply to Finland 
due to its ability in the past to defend its independence in two wars 
against Russia. Even today, Finland’s credibility with respect to its 
ability to defend its territory is high. Forming a military alliance with 
an entity in which Russia is not a member would in all likelihood 
make Russia rethink its classification of Finland based on its criteria 
for provinces.
The aim of the weakening Russia was to form a loose alliance 
between all the former Soviet republics included in the CIS in order 
to internally find solutions to the problems arising from the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. This was not very realistic to begin with, because 
the Baltic countries and Georgia in particular were not interested in 
joining the CIS. Since then, this assumption was proven incorrect in 
light of the West’s participation in solving these conflicts through 
the OSCE and the West’s later attempts to advance the accession of 
these conflict areas to the EU and NATO.
Frozen conflicts were first considered by Russia as latent 
problems. They became acute problems when attempts were made to 
diminish Russia’s position within the frozen conflict areas. Examples 
include the Russo-Georgian War and the falling of Ukraine into total 
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anarchy after the Maidan shootings. An acute problem will not go 
away unless favourable conditions 
Russia is prepared to solve these problems in cooperation with 
the West, if its position in these areas will not be weakened. The 
West has not been willing to make this concession. Russia has shown 
its readiness to use military power in situations where its position is 
being undermined through power politics.
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